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  This dissertation focuses on the long 1960s in Latin America to ask about 
forms of political and ethical interventions that went unnoticed in the cultural debates 
of the era. Within the vast Latin American cultural markets of the sixties, I study four 
authors who works were overlooked both critically and popularly at the time. Calvert 
Casey (1924–1969), a gay Cuban-American writer, worked and published in Havana 
from 1958 to 1965 when he went into self-exile. Juan Filloy (1894–2000), the 
Argentine “writer from three centuries,” returned from a thirty year editorial silence 
in the sixties. Héctor Manjarrez (1945) returned to Mexico City from London and 
began to publish only after the massacre at Tlatelolco. Armonía Somers (1914–1994), 
a female, Uruguayan writer of dark and erotic tales, was originally dismissed by 
many of her contemporaries for her provocative themes.  
 What unites these diverse authors is a common problematic, unique to them, 
which appears throughout their works—a practice I call “the politics of going 
  
unnoticed.” Political philosophy from Plato to Rancière highlights the process of 
passing from invisibility to visibility within the public sphere. However, these authors 
imagine subjects who purposefully avoid the spotlight and still engage in dissensus. 
While reading the Latin American cultural archive against the grain, my analysis is 
guided by three questions: (1) How can a seemingly unimportant subject enact a 
radical critique while, paradoxically, going unnoticed by dominant institutions? (2) 
How do these authors promote an ethics that open dialogues among political 
adversaries in a democratic framework without relying on exclusive categories? And 
(3), what are the formal strategies they employ to reflect the politics and ethics of 
going unnoticed?  
 I contend that these authors imagine new possibilities for political action far 
from entrenched ideologies (e.g., Peronism, the Cuban Revolution) and violent acts of 
aggression or repression (e.g., the Tupamaros, the massacre at Tlatelolco). Moreover, 
they generate the conditions of possibility for agonistic, democratizing 
transformations of existing institutions and epistemologies that exceed exclusive 
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ARTELETRA al vesre… 
 
 How might the Sixties in Latin America be read yet again? It was a 
fascinating era of tensions, ruptures, and infinite possibilities, but it was also a period 
of violence and terror. Put in broad terms, what was opened as a moment of 
revolutionary fervor and celebration for some with the triumphant arrival of the 
barbudos from the Sierra Maestra in Havana, was closed with the massacres and 
disappearances of students, laborers, and so-called dissidents across Latin America 
who were not necessarily working to reproduce the Cuban Revolution in their own 
regions or to choose sides in the Cold War. Is it possible to return to the Sixties in 
Latin America without disillusionment after this closure and locate other openings 
whose potential has yet to be explored? Furthermore, what does it mean to read the 
Sixties today, from the perspective of the early twenty-first century? This era of hopes 
and dreams, of the belief that true change was not only possible, but already 
underway, today seems so distant. Are there texts from the Sixties still left to be read 
that might speak, albeit indirectly, to the contemporary world?  
 The works of Calvert Casey, Juan Filloy, Héctor Manjarrez, and Armonía 
Somers that comprise the corpus of this study have received minimal attention by 
scholars in and of the Sixties and by reading publics both past and contemporary. 
Only more recently have each of them begun to receive critical attention. The present 
work builds on this scholarship to further demonstrate the contemporary relevance of 




rebelliousness that shies away from the spotlight, from overt political propaganda, 
and from choosing sides in the most visible political, ethical, and aesthetic debates of 
the era, while publishing untimely, but well-written texts with some of the most 
prestigious Spanish-language presses and cultural journals.  
 Born to a Cuban-American family in Baltimore, Maryland, Calvert Casey 
(1924–1969) lived in Havana between 1958 and 1965, writing for Lunes de 
Revolución and Casa de las Américas, before going into self-exile in Poland and 
Italy. He published collections of his short texts at Ediciones R and Seix Barral: El 
regreso (1962), Memorias de una isla (1964), El regreso y otros relatos (1967), and 
Notas de un simulador (1969). This is to say that he chose to live in the center of the 
revolutionary city and published in the centers of the cultural markets of the 1960s, 
documenting volunteers who labored in the Cuban countryside and discussing ways 
to improve Cuba’s national theatre. Yet, he never occupied the Revolution’s center 
stage—like Che Guevara or even Cabrera Infante—and some of his essays subtly 
register his unease with Castro’s growing authoritarianism. After the founding of the 
UMAPs, Casey fled, fearing future imprisonment for being gay. He continued writing 
for a few years but tragically committed suicide in Rome in 1969. Since his death, a 
number of his friends and colleagues, as well as more recent critics, occasionally 
attempt to provoke a revival of his works; he has been the subject of special issues of 
the journals Quimera (1982) and Gaceta de Cuba (2009), but it is only well after the 
closure of the Sixties that he is being paid more significant attention. 
 From Río Cuarto, Argentina, Juan Filloy (1894–2000) is known as the “writer 




to him, he holds the world record. During his life, he wrote more than fifty novels, 
almost half of which remain unpublished today. His first novel, Periplo, was 
published in 1930, and the last, Decio 8A, in 1997. Between the publication of 
Finesse (1939) and the re-edition in 1967 of Op Oloop (1934), he worked as a judge 
in Río Cuarto and refused to publish his works; however, starting in the 1960s he 
began publishing consistently. Among all of these short-story collections and novels 
with seven-letter titles—one of his many obsessions—I focus on Yo, yo y yo 
(Monodiálogos paranoicos) (1971) and Vil & Vil (La gata parida) (1975), as well as 
his collection of palindromes and essays on the art of writing them, Karcino. Tratado 
de palindromía (1988). Most recently, his works are appearing in new editions in 
Argentina.  
 Born in 1945, Héctor Manjarrez lived in Belgrade, Paris, and London during 
the 1960s, and only returned to Mexico in 1971. Unlike the more well-known 
members of his generation and the previous one—the avant-garde writers of the 
escritura camp and of the countercultural onda—he was not part of the student 
protests that culminated in the massacre in Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968. Upon his 
return to Mexico, his first short stories, Acto propiciatorio (1970), and novel, Lapsus 
(Algunos actos fallidos) (1971), were published by Joaquín Mortiz. Since his debut, 
he has continued to publish prose and poetry with Editorial Era, including the 
informal trilogy that retrospectively imagines the 1960s and 1970s: No todos los 
hombres son románticos (1983), Canciones para los que se han separado (1985), and 




Villarrutia in 1983 and his later works have been celebrated, his first two texts remain 
out of print and almost out of the purview of contemporary criticism.  
 Armonía Somers (1914–1994) is the pseudonym for the Uruguayan writer 
Armonía Etchepare. In 1933, she became a school teacher in Montevideo, gaining a 
solid reputation for her research in pedagogy. Her first novel, La mujer desnuda 
(1950), provoked an enormous scandal among the lettered elite of the Río de la Plata; 
they dismissed it as a poorly written pornographic text—based more on hearsay than 
on having read the novel which barely circulated at the time—and assumed the 
pseudonym was hiding a gay male writer. She continued writing and publishing short 
stories and novels with the prestigious Editorial Arca, including Todos los cuentos. 
1953–1967 (1967), De miedo en miedo (Los manuscritos del río) (1967), and Un 
retrato para Dickens (1969), among a number of other works over the following 
decades. In the 1960s, Ángel Rama began a revision of her reception, and since the 
1970s, various waves of feminist criticism and studies on fantastic literature have set 
about to recover and study her dark and complex writings, particularly focusing on 
Sólo los elefantes encuentran mandrágora (1986). Currently, her archives are being 
organized by Cristina Dalmagro at the Université de Poitiers in France.  
 My decision to bring these four writers together in a study of the Sixties in 
Latin America is almost completely arbitrary. I mean this in a sense that is 
comparable to Foucault’s genealogical methodology, by which the historian does not 
search for the origin or the truth, but rather constructs a contingent historical narrative 
built from “an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers” 




was born fifty-one years before Manjarrez. They were born in, lived in, and wrote 
about very different regions of the Americas—North America, the Caribbean, and the 
Southern Cone. In terms of their aesthetic sensibilities, they vary drastically from one 
another; Casey’s texts are brief and fragmented, Filloy’s are highly structured, 
Manjarrez’s tend to drift between topics and narratives, and Somers’s draw from 
horror and fantastic genres. Thematically, they address a wide range of topics, from 
gauchos and Victorian literature, to atomic bombs and LSD. I know of no record of 
there being conversations between any of them or of them having read one another’s 
works. Their ideological positions do not necessarily cohere around any specific 
political party or movement.  
 These are authors whose works do not “belong together” in a traditionally 
canonical or proper sense. Yet the impropriety of this arbitrary decision to bring 
Casey, Filloy, Manjarrez, and Somers together serves as the condition of possibility 
by which I read the Latin American Sixties yet again from the early twenty-first 
century. This individual rereading is meant to join the critical narratives about the 
Sixties. Mine is not an apocalyptic gesture that would dismiss or discard them; this 
would serve only to recast the seemingly unimportant writers I study here as the new 
canon.  
 Instead, I propose to reread the Latin American Sixties in the way that one 
might reread Juan Filloy’s palindrome “ARTELETRA” al vesre. “ARTELETRA” is 
composed of two words in Spanish, “arte” and “letra,” meaning “art” and “letters, 
literature,” respectively. “Al vesre” is a phrase that comes from lunfardo, the late 




developed first among criminals and then gained popularity among the growing 
lower-middle classes in Buenos Aires and often appears in tango lyrics. Many of the 
words, like “zafar” ‘to get by’ and “trucho” ‘fake, shoddy,’ are commonly used today. 
“Vesre” is the lunfardo word for an informal linguistic game—similar but not 
equivalent to Pig Latin—in which the syllables of common words are reversed. For 
example, the word for coffee, “café,” become “feca.” “Vesre” is derived from the 
word “revés” ‘reverse’ by reversing the syllables “re” and “vés.” The word that 
names this game also plays the game it names; it reverses the word “reverse,” but not 
in the same way that a palindrome is a word that can be read perfectly the same in 
reverse. “ARTELETRA” and every other palindrome forms the same word when read 
from left to right and in reverse. If the palindrome alone were the metaphorical 
heuristic for rereading the Sixties, which it is not for me, then this would mean that I 
was simply inverting notions of propriety and impropriety or of the visible and the 
invisible. But inverting binaries only leads to the creation of new binaries. To read 
“ARTELETRA” al vesre is to reverse it imperfectly; it is an improper inversion and 
reversal. Instead of simply turning around and finding the same exact word in reverse, 
the idea is to jumble the syllables a bit and break the palindrome’s crystalline 
perfection and linear logic, thereby creating a completely different word.  
 Reading the Latin American Sixties al vesre is also, as others call this 
linguistic game, to read this era al verse. “Revés” can have its syllables flipped to 
form “vesre,” and this reorganization can slip even further by interchanging the “s” 
and the “r” to form “verse.” Curiously, “verse” is also a homophone for the reflexive 




bring together this arbitrary selection of authors to allow them to face one another in a 
way that is not possible when authors are divided by national origin, generation, or 
aesthetic sensibility. Reading the Latin American Sixties al vesre and al verse creates 
a new option that is not necessarily better or worse than others. By imperfectly 
flipping things around, wandering a bit off course, and allowing different authors to 
see one another, I have fabricated a crossroads where these four authors can engage in 
dialogue with one another, even if such a conversation never took place in reality. 
This is my strategy for narrating the Latin American Sixties yet again. 
 By bringing Casey, Filloy, Manjarrez, and Somers into dialogue with one 
another, I have located certain commonalities between them that serve as the starting 
point for this study. Each wrote texts that received very little critical or popular 
attention in the Sixties, yet each published their works with some of the major Latin 
American and Spanish presses. They were not exactly marginal or totally invisible, 
yet they never passed into complete visibility in the center of the cultural markets like 
the Boom authors. Furthermore, many of their narratives imagine characters who 
actively intend to remain in such threshold spaces; this is to say that they are not 
simply waiting to transcend their specific place nor do they seek any predetermined 
end. This particular position is what I call “going unnoticed.” They are not invisible, 
but no one pays attention to them; they actively inhabit a space in which they are not 
perceived, but it is also possible that they will be perceived in the future.  
 The question that I ask at this point is: To what extent can those who go 
unnoticed still engage in politics? Political philosophy ranging from Plato to Rancière 




passage from the darkness of the cave to the light of the sun, or from invisibility to 
visibility; this is the traditional distinction, as explained recently by Giorgio 
Agamben, between zoē and bios. However, these four authors imagine various 
political subjects who purposefully avoid the public spotlight but still make political 
demands, remaining somewhere in a dimly lit threshold like the one inhabited by 
Agamben’s homo sacer in the state of exception. Therefore, how can seemingly 
minor or unimportant texts and subjects enact a radical critique of dominant cultural 
and political institutions while, paradoxically, going unnoticed within them? 
Moreover, to what extent does going unnoticed promote an ethics that creates the 
potential for dialogues between political adversaries in already crowded spaces 
without establishing new norms or universal categories? These are the questions that I 
explore in this study. 
 In each of the three chapters, I construct a dialogue among all four authors, 
while situating their texts within Latin America’s ubiquitous but precarious cultural 
markets. In Latin America, these became an entangled space in which best-sellers, 
traditional and popular music, reasonably priced literary collections for mass 
consumption, and avant-garde experiments were sold alongside one another and, at 
times, were indistinguishable from one another. Chapter One, “The Itinerary of Errant 
Palindromes,” unfolds the most visible cultural maps of the era—those focusing on 
the Boom writers, violent revolutions, and utopian dreams—within which these 
mostly anonymous protagonists begin to go unnoticed. I define “going unnoticed” as 
a means without ends; it is a temporary state during which these protagonists choose 




this point, reading Filloy’s palindrome “ARTELETRA” al vesre, becomes a 
metaphorical heuristic for the ways in which these subjects can change their 
perspective by turning against the norm of reading from left to right. While going 
unnoticed, these authors’ protagonists end up perceiving other subjects and texts that 
had always been present—like the word already written backwards into every 
palindrome—but that had been ignored in these spaces. Going unnoticed, thus, 
becomes an active strategy for reading cultural maps imperfectly and improperly 
against the grain. 
 A great deal of political thought today is premised on the idea of bringing 
visibility to marginal subjects; this, for example, becomes the definition of politics 
and of the political possibilities of literature and the arts for Jacques Rancière, and 
this is also the basis of most identity politics. However, those who purposefully go 
unnoticed complicate this process of granting institutional recognition to the formerly 
excluded, since these are subjects who are not exactly excluded or completely left 
outside. In Chapter Two, “The Politics of Going Unnoticed,” I advance a theory 
whereby political gestures generate the conditions of possibility for dissensus within 
already crowded political spaces. I begin with Casey’s unnoticed essays published in 
the major Cuban periodical Lunes de Revolución where he slightly errs from the party 
line; he claims to be a committed intellectual, but he laments the impossibility of not 
being committed. Meanwhile, Filloy’s “Yo y los intrusos” becomes an ironic retelling 
of Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” set in the provincial “deserts” of Córdoba, 
Argentina. Through this comparison, I show that it is just as easy to go unnoticed in a 




there is no true outside nor possible escape from modern political and economic 
spheres of influence. 
 After contextualizing Agamben’s paradigms of modern politics within Latin 
America, I turn to Manjarrez’s western/science fiction short story “Johnny” and 
Somers’s horror novel La mujer desnuda. In these texts, I show how subjects who 
could be labeled as a homo sacer, or one who can be killed with impunity at the 
thresholds of a sovereign space, purposefully evade the public spotlight. Manjarrez’s 
American cowboy, Johnny, seeks refuge from the law and the press given his dubious 
immigration status in Mexico. Somers’s nude woman flees to the countryside from 
the repressive confines of her urban family home on her thirtieth birthday—the age at 
which unmarried women in Uruguay at the time were legally allowed to live alone. 
By not passing fully into visibility, those who go unnoticed create a space wherein 
dissensus, which previously had been blocked for them, becomes possible again. 
 Chapter Three, “The Ethics of Being Perceived,” begins with Casey’s short 
story, “La ejecución.” This rewriting of Kafka’s The Trial elaborates on the 
impossibility of contesting the logic of the sovereign. Recognizing this impossibility, 
Casey’s protagonist chooses a path different than Kafka’s K.; although it is not a 
successful solution, he decides to refuse to participate in the legal process. The 
protagonists who go unnoticed must eventually reemerge, thus allowing themselves 
to be perceived. I contend that this exposure takes the form of an ethical encounter 
between radically different subjects with competing demands separated across vast 




among adversaries whose open communication had been blocked by violent demands 
and moralizing, normative boundaries.  
 Drawn from my reading of Filloy’s Vil & Vil and Somers’s De miedo en 
miedo, I argue that these ethical dialogues reject all forms of binary logic, thus 
removing boundaries that divide, for example, us from them, good from evil, or 
propriety from impropriety. Once these protagonists reemerge, it might be said that 
they have failed to remain unnoticed. Nevertheless, as I demonstrate in my analysis of 
Manjarrez’s Lapsus, this failure becomes the guarantee of future renewal. While 
engaging their adversaries in dialogue, these protagonists fail in order to demonstrate 
their inability to arrive at a definitive closure of the public arena. This “failure,” then, 
allows for greater inclusion and future disagreements in the crowded political arenas 
and cultural markets of the Sixties and of today. 
 From this contingent and arbitrary encounter among Casey, Filloy, Manjarrez, 
and Somers, my study intends to open up a space in which the Sixties can be narrated 
once more while still leaving open the possibility for others to do the same. 
Nevertheless, the narrative I construct here also has the potential to point toward new 
options that might be relevant to contemporary political, ethical, and aesthetic 
debates. Of course, this will be for the reader to decide. Overall, what I have learned 
in this study is that the texts and discourses of and about the Sixties still have so much 
to say, so much more than can be registered in this single project. By returning to the 
era with a bit of impropriety, it becomes possible to begin to perceive the fragments 
of seemingly unimportant voices and to cobble together creative, potential options for 




light, where they are utterly exposed and easily reduced to a direct communication of 
simplified ideas, I engage them in an imperfect dialogue during which bits and pieces 
of their ideas and proposals can move in and out of focus without trying to reduce 
them to a singular, clearly identifiable political, ethical, or aesthetic program. The 
politics of going unnoticed, then, is but one way in which the dialogue among them 







Chapter 1: The Itinerary of Errant Palindromes 
 
 
The Lapse of an Era 
 Much invaluable work has been done to show that to study the Sixties is to 
focus on an era that exceeds the ten-year span of a decade. To begin in 1960 would 
already be too late. In Nuestros años sesentas. La formación de la nueva izquierda 
intelectual en la Argentina 1956-1966, Óscar Terán demonstrates that the Sixties 
should not be read as a fixed temporal block. Terán uses the ungrammatical 
construction in Spanish, “los sesentas,” instead of the proper “los sesenta,” to 
highlight the plurality and extension of the era that exceeds the decade. In doing so, 
he traces Peronism, popular political movements, and the changing formation of 
intellectuals both in and out of the university in Argentina, from the mid-1940s 
through the presidency of Arturo Frondizi, as a necessary line of thought for 
understanding Argentina’s particular situation at the time.1 Though his focus is on 
Argentina, it is possible to extend this notion of los sesentas as an era throughout 
Latin America. Borrowing this concept from Terán, Claudia Gilman explicitly refers 
to this period as an “época” or “era” in her study of international polemics in Latin 
America, Entre la pluma y el fusil. Debates y dilemas del escritor revolucionario en 
                                                
1 See Silvia Sigal’s Intelectuales y poder en la década del sesenta for an 
indispensable companion study to that of Terán. 
2 Cold War rhetoric, of course, has not completely disappeared either. Yet, the new 
dominant rhetoric surrounding terrorism is quickly replacing it; Beverley’s book, 




América Latina. This flexible, non-chronological approach allows her to analyze the 
contours of the most visible public debates that raged in Latin America about the 
appropriate roles for being both an intellectual and a revolutionary that today seem 
characteristic of the era. Furthermore, Fredric Jameson’s essay, “Periodizing the 60s,” 
examines a series of cultural, political, and economic concepts and historical events 
that have come to define the long sixties beyond the temporal limits of the decade on 
both ends.  
 I follow in this tradition of talking about the Sixties (with a capital “S”) as an 
era that cannot be restricted to an explicit temporal frame. Instead, “the Sixties” for 
the purpose of the project refers to the lapse of time that spans, quite imprecisely, 
from the mid-1950s into the mid-1970s, from the military coup against Perón in 1955 
to the military dictatorships of Uruguay in 1973 and of Argentina in 1976. It is a 
period in which the rural and urban guerrillas fighting against Batista came to 
establish a Soviet-style Socialist regime that successively cracked down not only on 
political dissidents but on all those who were considered to be out of line with the 
Revolution’s values (e.g. critical artists, foreigners, and queer individuals, among 
many others). During this time in Mexico and in Argentina, popular protests by 
students and workers quickly escalated into state-sponsored violence against its own 
citizens. In Tlatelolco, on October 2, 1968, a peaceful student meeting, after months 
of massive protests in the capital city, turned into a state-sponsored massacre that 
brought an end to the movement. In Córdoba in May of 1969, a popular uprising of 
students and workers initiated the radicalization of the left against General Onganía’s 




This era is one that ends when the possibilities of carrying out utopian ideals 
disappear, be it after the Padilla Affair of 1971 at which time Castro’s intellectual 
supporters publicly declared their break in solidarity with his regime, or after the 
establishment of CIA-backed military dictatorships that employed terror and violence 
as the means for squashing any remaining revolutionary zeal.  
 This is a hasty outline of the Sixties in terms of some of the most well-known 
historical events, and of course, these national histories cannot be easily compressed 
into a linear historical narrative for all of Latin America. I mean for it to serve only as 
a point of departure for mapping and reading this era in retrospect from the early 
twenty-first century. Often I struggle to find solid ground on which to anchor myself 
as I approach the entangled debates, polemics, and disputes of a period that seems to 
be so far in the past. This is not to say that fifty years is an enormous span of time 
separating today from the Sixties. However, from the perspective of a present 
characterized by the triumph of late capitalism, the entrenchment of neoliberal 
economic policies, cultural, political, and economic globalization, the turn to the left 
by many current Latin American governments, the resurgence of indigenous 
movements, the regime changes taking place in Cuba and Venezuela, and the 
technological innovations of the digital era, this distance seems untraversable.  
 As Alain Badiou outlines in The Century, there is a break that occurs around 
the 1980s, radically severing what he calls the short twentieth century that begins 
with the historical avant-gardes and World War I. Badiou’s Century—of which the 
Sixties constitute a sort of climax, a desperate, yet enthusiastic last push to find man’s 




exhaustion, decadence and as absolute commencement” (31). There is a desire to 
destroy the old world, a process carried out by successive wars that continually 
present themselves as the last, great war to end all wars, and create, in its wake, a 
radically new man and new society. However, continues Badiou, the contemporary 
world, since the late 1980s, is better characterized as a second Restoration, a period 
when revolution is generally considered “abominable and impossible” (26). Along 
these lines, the ideals that were once real possibilities in the Sixties appear as naive 
and impossible projects today. This Restoration, as Badiou calls it, is a present 
characterized by a laissez-faire approach to all obstacles that cedes final authority to 
economics and global financial markets: “Basically, the spontaneous philosophy of 
our ‘modernizing’ propaganda is Aristotelian: We must not do, but let be: laissez-
faire. Just imagine the gap between such a stance and the conscience of all those who 
sang, beneath red banners, ‘the earth shall rise on new foundations’” (99). The 
neoliberal world order has taken root, and Badiou claims that the calls to overthrow 
this order no longer spark the same enthusiastic manifestos, protests, and revolts that 
took place around the globe in the Sixties.  
 Paul Virilio also has dealt with the characteristic traits of this contemporary 
period. In Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology, he develops a thesis regarding 
the progress of technology, the obsession with speed and movement, and not only a 
reading of the conditions of production, following the Marxist traditions, but also of 
the means for destruction that accompany Western societies and their war machines.  
As early as 1977, Virilio notes that social ideals, what he calls “the old national 




further develops in The Aesthetics of Disappearance. According to Virilio, an 
individual’s perception loses its focus—as a result of the relentlessly increasing 
speeds of communication, transportation, and military technology, and the constant 
bombardment of rapidly passing fragments of the real—and shifts toward 
automatized and epileptic states (32). Virilio’s analysis is, of course, indebted to Guy 
Debord’s Society of the Spectacle in which the latter examines the assault of images 
and consumerist propaganda on the masses.  
 There is a certain continuity, in this sense, between the Sixties and the present 
that Badiou labels a “Restoration.” Yet, the leap in speed and fragmentation that 
Virilio studies takes on a new quality, as made evident for him by science fiction 
narratives, which is that of “the incompatibilities existing between our presence in the 
world and the various levels of a certain anesthesia in our consciousness that, at every 
moment, inclines us to see-saw into more or less extensive absences, more or less 
serious, even to provoke by various means instantaneous immersions in other worlds” 
(85). This anesthetized state of consciousness is perhaps one of the most profound 
distinctions between the laissez-faire attitude toward politics, ethics, and aesthetics 
today, and the unceasing attempts to raise the political consciousness of the 
proletariat, the masses, or the colonized in the Sixties. 
 Concerning this same shift in the context of Latin America since the closure 
of the Sixties, Jorge G. Castañeda describes the political status quo of the mid-
nineties:  
For many years there has been both a reformist hope and resigned expectation 




on the possibility of change without risk, of justice without violence or social 
and international confrontation. For the defeated or disenchanted radical left, 
the resigned expectation is rooted in the relativity of the lesser of two evils: as 
the idea of a revolution hic et nunc was discarded, a ‘sort of’ justice, a sort of 
change, a sort of independence and equality became increasingly attractive. 
(Utopia Unarmed 129) 
By the 1990s, according to Castañeda, revolutionary programs had given way to a 
highly subjective reformism in which “everyone brings along what he chooses, and 
finds what he or she wants on arrival” (129). He gives as an example the tense 
encounter between Régis Debray and his former comrades in the Cuban Revolution 
when he attempted to convince them to adopt a French brand of democratic socialism, 
now preferring elections and gradual reforms over the armed revolutions in which he 
had participated decades earlier.  
 By the turn of the twenty-first century, this narrative of complete 
disillusionment begins to break down with what has come to be known as the Left 
Turn or the Pink Tide in Latin America. In general, the Left Turn refers to the wave 
of democratically elected leftist or socialist governments throughout Latin America, 
beginning roughly with either the transition to democracy after dictatorship or the rise 
of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1999. Of the rapidly growing bibliography on this 
topic, Castañeda’s doctrine of the two Lefts has been most influential: “One [Left] is 
modern, open-minded, reformist, and internationalist, and it springs, paradoxically, 
from the hard-core left of the past. The other, born of the great tradition of Latin 




the first (for Castañeda, the better) group are, as of 2008, “Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, 
parts of Central America, and, up to a point, Peru”; the latter can be found in 
“Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and to a 
lesser extent, in Argentina, Colombia, and Paraguay” (“Morning” 132–133). But 
perhaps this division is too schematic. As John Beverley has noticed,  
Behind the retrograde/modern, hard/soft Left dichotomy is a premise that the 
“market-friendly” good guys on the Left are those still willing to work within 
a framework conforming to the existing structure of international trade and 
markets, whereas the bad guys question that framework and are looking for 
ways to get out of it (by, for example, repudiating foreign debt). 
(Latinamericanism 12) 
At the same time, Beverley’s position is clearly motivated by his desire to laud this 
marea rosada since it appears to be consistent with his subalternism and, despite what 
Beverley dismisses as some of Chávez’s “authoritarian ‘tendencies,’” has appeared to 
him to be mostly democratic (11). I remain somewhat skeptical that this Left Turn or 
Pink Tide will bear all the utopian fruits it promises. Regardless of the position one 
takes on the topic, what is undeniable is that the generalized disillusionment of the 
1980s and 1990s is ceding its ground to renewed investments in expanding 
democracy and equality throughout the Americas in a global political environment no 
longer completely dominated by Cold War rhetoric.2 
                                                
2 Cold War rhetoric, of course, has not completely disappeared either. Yet, the new 
dominant rhetoric surrounding terrorism is quickly replacing it; Beverley’s book, 
Latinamericanism after 9/11, despite his attempts to justify the title, appears to be 




 As it stands, Badiou’s divide between the short twentieth century and the 
current Restoration is not as clean as he might have it, and perhaps these more recent 
developments in Latin American politics are signs that people are waking up from the 
anesthetized state that, for Virilio, characterized the late twentieth century. Either 
way, in contrast to today, the Sixties was an era in which radical change in the world 
appeared as a historical necessity and a guarantee; therefore, according to the logic of 
the era, it was worth the armed struggle necessary to achieve it. However, I do not 
return to the Sixties from a nostalgic perspective that invents an idealized past. 
Despite all the dreams of the Sixties, it certainly was not ideal or utopian. I cite only 
the Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción ‘Military Units to Support 
Production’ (UMAPs) in Cuba, the forced-labor camps to which many so-called 
counter-revolutionaries, including political and religious opponents and even men 
suspected of being homosexual, were sent to be indoctrinated in the beliefs of the 
Revolution through forced manual labor.3  
 In  my view, the Sixties are, first and foremost, texts and, moreover, 
discourses in the Foucaultian sense (Archaeology 21–39). I have no lived experience 
of that era, having been born at the very end of the Cold War and having begun my 
work in Latin American studies well after Chávez was already in power and not long 
before Fidel Castro handed the reigns over to his brother Raúl. I do not plan to 
                                                
3 See the controversial documentary, Conducta impropia, directed by Néstor 
Almendros and Orlando Jiménez Leal (Barcelona: Egales Editorial, 2008). For a 
measured criticism of the film’s facile comparisons between the UMAPs and the 
violence of Pinochet’s dictatorship or the Nazi concentration camps, see Ian 
Lumsden’s Machos, Maricones, and Gays: Cuba and Homosexuality (Philadelphia: 
Temple UP, 1996). Despite this criticism, Lumsden clarifies, “These were terrifying 
times for many homosexuals, particularly those in entertainment, culture, and 




exhume the period’s canonical discourses in order to revive them today through some 
sort of critical sorcery. Yet, I suggest that my point of departure not be read as 
disillusioned, since I was never personally invested in the projects of the Sixties. I 
accept Martín Hopenhayn’s argument that the distinction between the “apocalyptic” 
and the “integrated” subject has lost its clarity in the twenty-first century (No 
Apocalypse 1–12). I neither find it likely that my research will engender a radical 
destruction of the global capitalist economy defined as an agent of pure alienation, 
nor have I resigned myself to neoliberalism’s triumphant celebrations of its own, 
supposedly democratizing, effects. To go one step further, I also am hesitant to stake 
too much political weight in the successes of the most recent Leftist governments, 
even though I find myself sympathetic, at the very least, with their rhetoric in support 
of expanded democracy and increased economic equality. In returning to the Latin 
American Sixties, I propose nothing more than to provoke a mere opening in the 
multitude of perceptions that have come to organize the era so that one alternative 
narrative can be written here. 
 During the Sixties in Latin America, there was an effort both to develop and 
sustain a regional identity irreducible to the duality of Cold War logic and to establish 
international ties, while transforming major metropolitan centers into internationally 
recognized cultural hotspots. In The Decline and Fall of the Lettered City: Latin 
American in the Cold War, Jean Franco confirms that the Cuban Revolution was 
capable of “mobilizing writers across national borders, publishing younger writers, 
and gaining the support and admiration of intellectuals ranging from Sartre to Sontag. 




fully engage in the dualistic debates of the Cold War, despite the fact that U.S. 
foreign policy approached the region from that perspective, dedicating diplomatic, 
cultural, and economic resources to combat the spread of communism in the region, 
until the Vietnam War distracted their attention. In my view, her analysis of mid-
twentieth century Latin American culture and politics—especially concerning 
economic dependency and cultural imperialism—further complicates the non-
dialectical opposition of the Two that, for Badiou, characterized the century and the 
Cold War from the perspective of the United States and Europe. To paraphrase 
Franco, the Sixties is the time in Latin America when writers turned toward 
anthropology and toward indigenous and African cultures as a way of reacting against 
realism; they created a specifically Latin American literature with the authority to 
stand on its own in the face of Western cultures, both as a form of dissent from post-
Enlightenment rationalism and from the attempts to collapse literature into 
anthropology (169–173).4  
 No longer looking only to Europe or to the United States for political, 
economic, and cultural models, Latin American intellectuals turned their gazes 
partially inward after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. In A Turbulent Decade 
Remembered, Diana Sorensen analyzes major periodical publications that make up 
the “geography of discursive networks” and “of possibilities” in which circulated the 
cultural and political novelties of the time (142). Among the periodicals she studies 
                                                
4 Roberto González Echeverría also studies this turn toward anthropology that begins 
around the 1920s. See Myth and Archive: A Theory of Latin American Narrative 
(Durham: Duke UP, 1998). He attempts to recast, in broad terms, the development of 
Latin American literature without following the trajectory of European and North 




are Argentina’s Primera Plana and Sur, Cuba’s Mundo Nuevo, and Uruguay’s 
Marcha. Also in these networks were the now-canonical Boom narratives of Gabriel 
García Márquez, Julio Cortázar, Mario Vargas Llosa, and Carlos Fuentes, to which 
she returns as an emblematic example “of the complexities of the continental and 
transnational exchanges brought about by post-1945 development” (165). Latin 
American cultural production in this era had reached new reading publics both locally 
and globally, but they ultimately left intact the gender systems that promoted almost 
exclusively male authors, revealing one of “the limitations of the revolutionary 
projects—be they political or artistic” (207).  
 Maintaining a patriarchal order, the rhetoric of the era upheld the idea of 
establishing family ties among Latin American intellectuals and writers. Claudia 
Gilman explains how this project of forming a univocal family was conceived as a 
kinship that would promote the artistic and political activities of their clan across the 
continent and around the globe: “Los nombres más importantes de la ciudad letrada 
latinoamericana se alinearon con Cuba y trataron, en adelante, de consolidar un 
discurso homogéneo, manteniendo las diferencias y discrepancias dentro del ámbito 
interno de las discusiones familiares, mientras fue posible” ‘The most important 
names of the Latin American lettered city aligned themselves with Cuba, and they 
tried, from then on, to consolidate a homogeneous discourse, keeping their 
differences and discrepancies within the internal sphere of family disputes, as long as 
it was possible’ (Entre 142). The Cuban Revolution became both the catalyst for 
developing a regional identity that would attempt to pry open the binary logic of the 




could only be founded on the eradication of internal heterogeneity. At best, this 
“family” lasted until the Padilla Affair of 1971, at which point the majority of the 
Latin American leftist intellectuals and writers publicly broke all ties with Castro’s 
regime, with the infamous exception of García Márquez.5 
 This inward gaze and search for regional homogeneity should not be 
overemphasized. In Fulguración del espacio. Letras e imaginario institucional de la 
Revolución Cubana (1960–1971), Juan Carlos Quintero-Herencia critically analyzes 
the revolutionary discourses that were institutionalized, particularly through the 
journal Casa de las Américas, and required constant intellectual reflection and 
participation. He claims: “Una de las figuras o motivos recurrentes de este encuentro 
de la palabra literaria con el fenómeno revolucionario es lo que denomino una suerte 
de epifanía de la visibilidad. El poder institucional revolucionario armará una suerte 
de régimen óptico que llevará a cabo toda una peculiar espacialización del orden de lo 
real en la isla” ‘One recurrent device or leitmotif of this encounter between the 
literary word and the revolutionary phenomenon is what I call a sort of epiphany of 
visibility. The revolutionary institutional power would create a sort of optical regime 
that would carry out a peculiar spatialization of the order of the real in the island’ 
                                                
5 The “caso Padilla” has been well-documented and analyzed in various studies. The 
multiplicity of texts in which authors publicly weighed in on the situation has been 
collected in Lourdes Casal’s El caso Padilla: Literatura y Revolución en Cuba. 
Documentos (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1971). Heberto Padilla’s collection of 
poetry is also compiled alongside a selection of these public texts surrounding the 
affair in Fuera del juego (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1998). For an analysis of the 
affair, see Martín Chadad’s essay in Marcela Croce’s Polémicas intelectuales en 
América Latina. Del “meridiano intelectual” al caso Padilla (1927–1971) (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones Simurg, 2006); and Claudia Gilman dedicates a chapter to the affair 
in Entre la pluma y el fusil. Debates y dilemas del escritor revolucionario en América 




(18). This optical regime is one that institutes specific “relatos morales e históricos” 
‘moral and historical narratives’ to which all those who appear under the revolution’s 
all-pervading and supposedly all-seeing light must subscribe (18). This is to say that 
the idea of a Latin American “family” and homogenous group of intellectuals is an 
invasive, even militarized demand placed on those subjects who “siempre se sabrán 
tocados por esta luz y obligadas a continuas definiciones y genuflexiones identitarias” 
‘will always be aware that this light shines on them and that they are incessantly 
obligated to define their identity through acts of deference’ (19). As Quintero-
Herencia’s analysis demonstrates, these highly visible spaces, debates, and discourses 
are never as monumental and homogenous as they purport to be, but rather the 
plurality of such an event is often forcibly homogenized and institutionalized under 
the harsh spotlight guided from a hegemonic point of view. 
 Furthermore, in Avant-Garde, Internationalism, and Politics: Argentine Art in 
the Sixties, Andrea Giunta explains how the search for internationalism was not one 
that eschewed the centers of the Western, artistic world. On the contrary, she traces 
how artists came to confirm New York City as the new, global art capital, partially 
replacing Paris. Although Cuba began to attract writers and intellectuals after 1959, 
Giunta emphasizes that Havana “did not have enough appeal to divert artists from the 
route that led them to seek recognition in New York” (284). In turn, Argentine artists 
and institutions planned to develop Buenos Aires into the third point of a global 
cultural triangle. Despite the vibrancy of and enthusiasm for autochthonous projects, 
policies, and institutions, Giunta argues that this international spirit never fully 




world. At the same time, in their desperation to be incorporated into the international 
art scene, many artists and writers ignored or overlooked the propagandistic qualities 
of the Cold War policies that were promoting cultural ties between the United States 
and Latin America. The United States encouraged abstract expressionism as opposed 
to artworks with more explicit political content, and the Latin American artists who 
responded to this preference found themselves trapped by the ethnocentric critique 
that their expressionistic work was nothing more than a provincial variation of a 
universal style already mastered by other U.S. or European artists (189–241).6 In the 
end, neither Buenos Aires nor Havana were able to challenge the new cultural 
hegemony of New York City. 
 This lapse of time, the Sixties, has been mapped over and again. The general 
contours of that map remain intact, while its details come to be edited and 
highlighted, and various artistic and intellectual contributions come in and out of 
focus. Borrowing from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, I read these maps of the Sixties in Latin America as rhizomes, which 
they define in the following manner: 
The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, 
reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, 
adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social 
formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, 
                                                
6 In addition, as Jean Franco shows, Pablo Neruda was criticized for his participation 
in the PEN Club in New York, which was perceived as an affront to the Communist 
Party, and others, including Allen Ginsburg, Mario Vargas Llosa, and Nicanor Parra, 




constructed as a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps the most important 
characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways. (12) 
To read the Sixties, then, as a rhizome which can be mapped, reworked, torn, or 
expanded, and entered from multiple points adequately describes the varied ways in 
which scholars have documented and interpreted its complex dimensions. The era can 
be approached from so many different perspectives: its periodicals and cultural 
markets; the Boom; the conjunction of politics and aesthetics; definitions of 
“internationalism”; Cold War foreign policy, dependency, and imperialism; 
constructions of gender, sexuality, and ethnicity; its protests, demonstrations, and 
violence; or its failures and subsequent disillusionment. Of course, these are only 
some the most visible landmarks of the Latin American Sixties today.   
 Joining this attempt to read the Sixties once more, I propose a different entry 
point, one to be added to the others while becoming entangled with them. My study 
begins with what I read as yet another map of the era that appears in Héctor 
Manjarrez’s novel, Lapsus (Algunos actos fallidos) ‘Lapse (Some Slips of the 
Tongue).’ Manjarrez wrote this novel between 1968 and 1969, and it was published in 
1971 by Joaquín Mortiz, a preeminent Mexican publishing house in the Sixties. The 
following extensive quote from this novel draws a peculiar map for the Sixties from 
Mexico, but one that is never radically different from those mentioned above. 
Meanwhile, this map provokes a rejection or a break from that cartography in the 
opening sentence that creates it:  
y ahora lo único que sabes, Huberto, es que hay en el mundo ciertas cosas que 




 La prensa-liberal, el autor con su eterna Mamiya colgando 
estúpidamente, el steak and kidney pie, el arte por el arte, la novela 
comprometida, la solemnidad, la guerra del Vietnam, el sexo con condón, los 
suplementos dominicales a colores, los intelectuales De Izquierda, el nazismo, 
el Reader’s Digest, la Plaga Emocional, las canciones yucatecas, las novelas 
de la Revolución Mexicana, la burocracia, la vulgaridad, los social-
demócratas, los valores establecidos, los borrachos, los ghettos, la hipocresía, 
los políticos mexicanos, los nuevos ricos, las teorías de los políticos 
mexicanos, los nuevos ricos, las teorías de Teilhard de Chardin, la zarzuela, la 
miseria, el tequila, Dios, el naturalismo, el puritanismo, el comercialismo, el 
imperialismo, el cretinismo, los aforismos, el nacionalismo, el provincialismo, 
el bipartidismo, el fascismo, el liberalismo, la ópera, la virginidad, el 
sistemismo, las buenas familias, el hashishismo, el materialismo, el catsup, el 
conservadurismo, el té con leche, el PRI, la pintura mural mexicana, el 
LSDismo, la hambruna, el mexicanismo, la mexicanidá, los libros sobre el 
mexicanismo y la mexicanidad (y los antimexicanos), la explotación del 
hombre por el hombre, las masacres, la mint sauce, la comida inglesa en 
términos generales, los campos de concentración, el jdanovismo, el 
Establishment, el Establishment anti-Establishment, el macartismo, el 
machismo, el revisionismo, el dogmatismo, el oportunismo pequeño-burgués, 
el comunismo en un solo país, el realismo socialista, el baseball, el lujo 
desmesurado, la clase media, la segregación racial, el stalinismo, los 




élites intelectuales, el academismo, el chauvinismo de gran potencia, el 
bigotito estrecho, los libros de viaje, el peligro BOOM atómico, los líderes y 
mesías, el genocidio, HP Sauce, chop suey, las mañanas, el calor extremo, 
Sociales, la pequeña burguesía, el snobismo, el conformismo, el silencio, el 
maniqueísmo, el tráfago insensato de la vida moderna, la falta de moteles y 
autocinemas en Inglaterra. 
 Y ni siquiera tienes la decencia de ser nihilista sino que todavía andas 
sonriendo en la calle como si pudiese haber un milenio tras lomita. (190–191) 
‘and now the only thing you know, Huberto, is that there are certain things in 
this world that you reject, and we’ll give the following examples: 
 The liberal press, the author with his constant Mamiya hanging 
stupidly, steak and kidney pie, art for art’s sake, engaged novels, solemnity, 
the Vietnam war, sex with condoms, the Sunday supplemental in color, Leftist 
intellectuals, Nazism, Reader’s Digest, the Emotional Plague, Yucatecan 
songs, the novels of the Mexican Revolution, bureaucracy, vulgarity, the 
social-democrats, established values, drunkards, ghettos, hypocrisy, Mexican 
politicians, the nouveau-riche, the theories of Mexican politicians, the 
nouveau-riche, Teilhard de Chardin’s theories, zarzuela, misery, tequila, God, 
naturalism, puritanism, commercialism, imperialism, cretinism, aphorisms, 
nationalism, provincialism, bipartisanism, fascism, liberalism, opera, 
virginity, systemism, good families, hashishism, materialism, ketchup, 
conservatism, tea with milk, the PRI, Mexican mural painting, LSDism, 




Mexicanness (and the anti-Mexicans), the exploitation of man by man, 
massacres, mint sauce, English food in general, concentration camps, 
Zhdanovism, the Establishment, the anti-Establishment Establishment, 
McCarthyism, machismo, revisionism, dogmatism, the opportunism of the 
petit bourgeoisie, Communism in just one country, Socialist realism, baseball, 
excessive luxury, the middle class, racial segregation, Stalinism, professional 
writers, low atmospheric pressure, spineless men, the intellectual elite, 
academicism, chauvinism, thin mustaches, travel literature, the atomic BOOM 
threat, leaders and messiahs, genocide, HP Sauce, chop suey, the mornings, 
extreme heat, personal announcements in the newspapers, the petit 
bourgeoisie, snobbism, conformism, silence, Manichaeism, the senseless 
fluctuations of modern life, the scarcity of motels and drive-in-cinemas in 
England.  
 And you don’t even have the decency to be a nihilist, but you still 
walk through the streets grinning as if there could ever be a millennium just 
around the corner.’ 
 Though I will return to this quote a number of times, as a first attempt at 
untangling it I begin with the verb that frames and founds this rhizomatic 
cartography—rechazar, ‘to reject’ and ‘to turn down.’ Huberto’s knowledge is rooted 
in rejection; the only thing he knows is that there are certain things he chooses not to 
accept. Rejection, thus, becomes his first philosophy, the disruptive, but paradoxically 
creative, foundation of his worldview and his epistemology. These rejections that 




narrative form. Footnotes constantly disrupt and displace the plot and come to be 
more extensive, if not more important, than the body of the text itself.  
 “Lapsus” is the technical term used in Spanish to translate Freud’s 
“Fehlleistung,” or “parapraxis” in English; it is also a Latin word defined as “a 
slipping or falling,” “a span of time,” and “falling into error or away from dogma.” 
“Lapse,” for my purposes, is the best way to maintain this multiplicity of meanings. 
Furthermore, the phrase “actos fallidos” in Spanish is a good equivalent of what, in 
English, we commonly refer to as “a Freudian slip.” However, since Freud’s name is 
not explicitly referenced in the original title and this novel is one that slips in and out 
of more than just Freudian psychoanalysis, I prefer “slips of the tongue” to translate 
the subtitle. In this way, Huberto’s knowledge-producing rejections of the Sixties 
arise from an error, a slip, and a falling away from dogma that assumes the form of 
errancy, digression, and deviation, without ever completely leaving this rhizomatic 
map. 
 I read this quote as the manifesto by which Huberto deviates from the 
preformed itineraries already inscribed on the maps of the Sixties, producing 
something like a line of flight. For Deleuze and Guattari, the line of flight is a rupture 
that is also a part of the rhizome from which it breaks: “There is a rupture in the 
rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight 
is part of the rhizome” (9). For them, there are multiple lines that already exist in any 
rhizomatic cartography—some are imposed and others sprout up at random. Other 
lines of flight, nevertheless, always remain to be intentionally created: “Others can be 




flight, if we are able, and the only way we can invent them is by effectively drawing 
them, in our lives” (202). Huberto’s rejections radicalize this cartography as he errs; 
Huberto purposefully fails to follow the map without leaving it, and creates a 
different path as he wanders around toward an unforeseen horizon. His errancy is not 
a form of nihilism, one that would leave him devoid of all former and future meaning, 
nor does it appeal to the historical avant-garde’s rhetoric of apocalyptic destruction; 
rather, he attempts to produce a different itinerary, a line of flight, in order to create 
his own path through the voices and texts of that era to which he has already arrived 
quite late. This tardy arrival to the Latin American Sixties—both Huberto’s, 
Manjarrez’s and my own—becomes the condition of possibility for perceiving the 





Debidamente investigadas, una frase, una palabra oídas al 
pasar, una carta abandonada sobre una mesa o caída de un 
bolsillo, fragmentos de la conversación escuchada en el breve 
trayecto de un tranvía, un cruce en las líneas telefónicas, 
pueden darnos espléndidas claves, tantos son los que sufren 
desatendidos. 
‘Duly researched, a phrase, a word heard in passing, a letter 
abandoned on a table or that slips from a pocket, fragments of a 
conversation heard during the brief journey on a streetcar or a 
cross in the telephone lines can offer us splendid clues, so 
many of which are left unattended.’  
—Calvert Casey, “Notas de un simulador” (51-52) 
 In this epigraph, the anonymous narrator of Calvert Casey’s “Notas de un 
simulador” ‘An Impostor’s Notes’ (1969) understates the need to research abandoned, 
fragmentary, and almost unheard words, phrases, and texts.7 These bits of language 
slip in and out of perception as they get left behind or lost; they circulate briefly in 
public and private conversations but are of little importance to the passers-by who 
barely hear them. The happenstance interlocutors of these disconnected, fleeting, and 
                                                
7 Many of Calvert Casey’s short stories have been translated into English by John H. 
R. Polt in Calvert Casey: The Collected Stories (Duke 1998). “Notas de un 
simulador” is translated there as “The Master of Life and Death,” but for stylistic 
purposes and because fragments of the original texts are occasionally missing in the 
translation, I provide my own translations of Casey’s works, and of those by the other 




untimely ideas and conversations pay little attention to them. As potential witnesses, 
perhaps they have arrived too early or too late to the conversation of which they are 
not a part, or perhaps they only notice their seemingly quotidian, unremarkable 
aspects and subsequently ignore them. For any number of reasons such texts are left 
unattended, and anything they might communicate goes unnoticed.  
 Casey’s narrator embodies the characteristics of these abandoned voices as he 
dodges in and out of the swirling lights and shadows of the city he traverses at night. 
Narrated in the first person, he recounts his surreptitious excursions throughout the 
city. He provides palliative care to the dying, whether they be homeless or abandoned 
in a hospital, and he observes them in their last moments, taking great care to 
remember their passage from life into death and detail their encounters in his writing. 
To avoid public suspicion, he tries to go unnoticed as he approaches these other 
characters. Going unnoticed for this narrator is not a matter of seeking isolation, but 
rather of stealth and camouflage, of writing and hiding in plain sight.  
 In section XVI of the text, not sure how to react to the hostility of Joaquín and 
his wife in the plaza where he was taking care of the dying young black man, the 
narrator returns to his apartment. The music from the street fair outside his building 
seeps into his refuge, distracting him. Instead of returning to the crowd, he climbs to 
the roof terrace where the noise from the fair did not reach: “Me sentí rodeado de 
silencio, calmado por la brisa apacible que venía del lado de la bahía” ‘I felt 
surrounded by silence, relaxed by the gentle breeze that blew in from the bay’ (Notas 
80). The narrator, while hopping from one roof terrace to another and walking 




beneath and between lit spaces. In a sense, he attempts to step out of the focus of that 
revolutionary light, what Quintero-Herencia calls the “optical regime” of the Cuban 
Revolution (18). He writes of this play of light and shadow not as a classic 
chiaroscuro with its sharp divisions, but as a swirling of various colors, shades, and 
intensities through which he passes: “una luz sucia” ‘a dirty light’; “la oscuridad era 
casi completa” ‘the darkness was almost complete’; “una luz amarillenta me tiñó las 
manos” ‘a yellowish light stained my hands’; “un fulgor remoto” ‘a distant flash’; “un 
brillo pálido” ‘a pale shimmer’ (Notas 80).  
 Also mixing with these shadows and lights is a similar description of the 
bursts of sounds and precarious silences that simultaneously flow through these 
spaces. The tranquil silence with which the scene begins is temporary, and he moves 
in and out of earshot of other sounds: “el inesperado silencio” ‘the unexpected 
silence’ when the fair music suddenly stops for a moment; “el lejano clamor de la 
ciudad” ‘the distant clamor of the city’; “Del pozo subían voces” ‘Voices arose from 
the well’; “Alguien tosió con una tos dura, una voz cantó; oí risas, más voces” 
‘Someone let out a hoarse cough, a voice sang; I heard laughter, more voices’ (80). 
The narrator who goes unnoticed clumsily navigates a complex, shifting field of 
lights and shadows and of voices, noises, and silences. He jumps over low walls that 
separate the various, connected roof terraces, but he never passes from one clearly 
defined space of darkness, invisibility, or silence into another clearly defined space of 
light, visibility, and voice. Such sharply demarcated spaces of perception are not to be 




 In all of the texts under consideration here, the underlying connection is the 
narration of a desire, attempt, or inadvertent experience of going unnoticed. This 
phrase, “going unnoticed,” requires some pause in order to unravel the various forms 
it may take. By no means does going unnoticed require concealment or stasis. One 
may just as easily go unnoticed sitting alone in the middle of the woods or a desert as 
walking anonymously through a crowded urban setting. Neither an origin nor a 
destination, it is a temporary state wherein one is not perceived or paid much 
attention by others, and this state can and will come to an end. Insofar as the “going” 
of the phrase “going unnoticed” necessitates some sort of spatiotemporal movement 
or duration, it names a process, a state of becoming, or a lapse of time during which a 
subject is not noticed and accrues potential energy. One may have gone unnoticed in 
the past, be going unnoticed currently, or go unnoticed at a future time or place. Even 
when this state comes to an end at a given point in time and space, the fact that one 
went unnoticed remains nonetheless significant. 
  While writing on “becoming-imperceptible” in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari briefly mention this phrase: “To 
go unnoticed is by no means easy. To be a stranger, even to one’s doorman or 
neighbors. If it is so difficult to be ‘like’ everybody else, it is because it is an affair of 
becoming. […] This requires much asceticism, much sobriety, much creative 
involution” (279). Going unnoticed takes the form of a becoming that moves between 
perception and imperception. By going unnoticed, one moves through what Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to as “zones of indiscernibility” in which only certain movements 




movement is always dependent upon the viewer’s positional relation to the movement 
or rest of others: “Perception can grasp movement only as the displacement of a 
moving body or the development of a form. Movements, becomings, in other words, 
pure relations of speed and slowness, pure affects, are below and above the threshold 
of perception” (281). Movement is only perceptible from a specific threshold, a 
specific, relative position to that which is moving. To offer a simple example, while 
sitting on a moving train, the other passengers do not appear to be moving in relation 
to me, yet to someone standing on the station platform or watching the train from 
outside, all of the passengers including myself inside the train appears to be moving 
in relation to that viewer. As such, to perceive the movement of a body one must be 
situated in an adequate threshold of perception. In its simplest form, going unnoticed 
involves moving in such a manner as to be unobserved or overlooked by potential 
spectators who could perceive the unnoticed body if they were located in a different 
threshold of perception.  
 The connection between movement and perception is also, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, a matter of becoming. Avoiding metaphysical postulations about being, they 
define “becoming” as that which concerns the immanent relations of alliances that are 
set in non-linear motion within rhizomes:  
Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree. Becoming is 
certainly not imitating, or identifying with something; neither is it regressing-
progressing; neither is it corresponding, establishing corresponding relations; 




Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or 
lead back to, “appearing,” “being,” “equaling,” or “producing.” (239) 
In my analysis, the process of going unnoticed is not a taxonomy; thus, it refuses all 
rigid classification for establishing family ties, whether biological or fictional, as in 
the case of the lettered intellectuals of the Sixties in Latin America who temporarily 
aligned themselves with the Cuban Revolution. Instead, going unnoticed becomes a 
destabilization and an opening up of such categories. It cannot be reduced to 
imitation. It does not have an end goal of becoming like or becoming identical to 
something else, since at that point it would cease becoming and rigidify into being. In 
contrast, going unnoticed necessitates the continuation of this movement that evades 
the stasis of identification. Once one stops moving, the thresholds of perception 
change immediately; one stops going unnoticed and is perceived as similar or 
identical to something else. Going unnoticed, rather, is moving perpetually with no a 
priori end or goal in sight, with no particular destination, transformation, 
transcendence, or telos.  
 Moreover, there is no mask, no persona, and no pseudonym presented to a 
public as a purposefully distorted representation of one’s identity behind which one 
goes unnoticed. Whereas pseudonyms and masks create an epistemological barrier by 
blocking access to knowledge or veiling truths about one’s identity, the process of 
going unnoticed does not attempt to distort reality in favor of a falsehood. What goes 
unnoticed is the act, the subject, or the thing itself presented or represented as itself, 
even though no one pays attention to its taking place or to its existence. In fact, this 




going unnoticed would be an unlikely tactic for identity politics. Finally, those who 
go unnoticed are corporeal subjects, not ghosts, phantasms, or disembodied spirits 
who glide invisibly through spaces; they have bodies that interact with the swirling 
lights and shadows, voices and silences that surround them. Going unnoticed is a 
material practice. Their physical bodies are visible in the sense that they are capable 
of being seen, and all of those who go unnoticed will be perceived eventually, as in 
the case of Rebeca Linke, the protagonist of Somers’s La mujer desnuda, who walks 
around in the nude. Yet, they manage to create a temporary state during which little 
public light is shone on their bodies. When they pass by others, no one pays attention. 
When they speak out, everyone happens to ignore their voice. Still, they continue to 
move. 
 In studying the works of Casey, Filloy, Manjarrez, and Somers, I distinguish 
between two modes of going unnoticed. In the first mode, going unnoticed becomes 
the incidental fate of many of those who aspire to greatness, power, or prestige; 
getting one’s works to a major press or gallery certainly does not guarantee public or 
critical success or even attention. Casey’s works appeared in the journals Lunes de 
Revolución, Casa de las Américas, and the Gaceta de Cuba, and he published with 
the Cuban Ediciones R and, after his self-exile, with Seix Barral in Spain. Despite 
being praised by Guillermo Cabrera Infante, Italo Calvino, and María Zambrano, his 
works never enjoyed much renown in the Sixties, neither in or out of Cuba.8 Filloy 
                                                
8 See Mario Merlino’s introduction to Notas de un simulador (Barcelona: Montesinos, 
1997), an incomplete collection of Casey’s works, and Ilán Stavans’s introduction to 
the English-language translations of some of Casey’s fiction, Calvert Casey: The 
Collected Works (Durham: Duke UP, 1998). In Chapter Two, I address the issues 




returned from his thirty-year editorial silence in the mid-1960s, publishing both with 
small presses in Río Cuarto and with Losada, a major press in Buenos Aires. His 
works were praised by Julio Cortázar at the time, who named him in Rayuela, yet he 
never rose to the status of someone like Macedonio Fernández during the era.9 
Manjarrez spent most of the 1960s living abroad. When he returned to Mexico, he 
published his first two texts with the prestigious Joaquín Mortiz, was included in 
Margo Glantz’s Onda y escritura en México. Jóvenes de 20 a 33 (1971), went on to 
win the Premio Xavier Villarrutia in 1983, and continues to publish with Editorial Era 
today.10 Nevertheless, his first two texts are the only ones to remain out-of-print. 
Somers was published by Editorial Arca in Montevideo, under the direction of Ángel 
Rama, the first critic to publicly praise her work. Though she was subsequently 
studied by prominent feminist critics beginning in the 1970s, responsible for the 
current revival of her works, the critics who reacted to her first novel, La mujer 
desnuda (1950), rejected her as a pornographic writer, attempting to ningunearla, turn 
her into a nobody.11  
 There is no reason to believe that any of the authors under consideration here 
desired to have their works go unnoticed by reading publics, but as can be seen in 
                                                
9 See Mempo Giardinelli’s “Don Juan de las Siete Letras: Vida y Obra de Filloy” that 
appears as the introduction to Filloy’s La potra. Estancia “Los Capitanejos” (Buenos 
Aires: Interzona, 2003) and has been reproduced in the online Suplemento Cultural of 
the newspaper, La Nación.   
10 See the introduction to Christopher Domínguez Michael’s recent edition of two of 
Manjarrez’s short stories, titled Héctor Manjarrrez (Mexico: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 2011).  
11 For a summary of the reaction to this publication in 1950, see Cristina Dalmagro’s 
Desde los umbrales de la memoria. Ficción autobiográfica en Armonía Somers 
(Montevideo: Biblioteca Nacional, 2009), particularly the section on the publication 
history of her works and how she purposefully isolated herself from the literary 




retrospect, they inadvertently went unnoticed in the cultural markets of their time. 
This occurred despite having appeared in some of the most prestigious publishing 
houses at the heart of the Latin American and Spanish cultural markets responsible 
for the success of the Boom authors, in addition to having been translated into other 
languages and praised by some of the most prominent authors and critics of the era. In 
different ways, each author was a bit untimely or somewhat out of place despite their 
proximity to so many canonical figures and polemics. For example, Casey dedicated a 
handful of texts published in Lunes de Revolución to documenting the early years of 
Cuba’s revolutionary government, the Playa Girón/Bay of Pigs invasion, and 
analyzing and translating for the theater with the idea of helping Cuba become a 
world-renowned center for the performing arts.12 Still, these authors never became 
leading voices for any of the period’s vibrant political or artistic movements, nor did 
they receive much public attention for their declarations of support for or disavowal 
of political projects when compared to the attention received by the Boom authors, 
Julio Cortázar, Gabriel García Márquez, Mario Vargas Llosa, Carlos Fuentes, and 
even to José Donoso, Guillermo Cabrera Infante, Juan Carlos Onetti, or Manuel Puig. 
 More than a description of the place of these intellectuals and their written 
works in the political debates and cultural markets of the Sixties—although it is 
inseparable from this position—the second mode of going unnoticed involves an 
intentional desire on the part of the various protagonists of these four authors to stay 
                                                
12 See the articles that Casey published in Lunes de Revolución between 1959 and 
1961, for example, “Cuba: nación y nacionalidad,” “La Revolución Cubana llega a 
Oxford,” “Los caminos a Playa Girón. Fotos Mayita,” “1959-1961. El teatro en la 
Revolución,” “El buen teatro y el pueblo,” and “El teatro nacional hace historia,” and 




out of the public spotlight. These often anonymous protagonists actively seek out 
shelters, refuges, and closets, or attempt to write and hide in plain sight and to pass 
for something unworthy of further attention, albeit without masquerading as 
something or somebody else. Casey’s many protagonists are closeted or secretive, 
both in terms of their sexuality and their general attempts to remain anonymous in 
public spaces. Filloy imagines, among others, a cave-dwelling writer and a quietly 
insubordinate military conscript. Manjarrez’s American cowboy, Johnny, for 
example, attempts to assimilate into a Mexico of another century than his own. 
Somers’s Rebeca Linke in La mujer desnuda and the anonymous man in De miedo en 
miedo seek quiet spaces where they encounter unexpected confidants in the 
countryside and in the city. I argue that this active gesture to go unnoticed is what 
connects many of the texts here and will be the primary focus of my analysis on the 
politics and ethics of going unnoticed as I bring these authors into a dialogue that 
exceeds their national contexts.  
 In both modes of going unnoticed, there is an intimate connection with that 
which is untimely or fails, whether this is the result of happenstance or actively 
achieved. For Deleuze and Guattari, untimely or failed elements are an expected, 
even necessary part of any assemblage in a rhizome:  
And if there are in fact jumps, rifts between assemblages, it is not by virtue of 
their essential irreducibility but rather because there are always elements that 
do not arrive on time, or arrive after everything is over; thus it is necessary to 




themselves part of the plane of immanence. Even the failures are part of the 
plane. (255)  
On the plane of immanence, there is a flattening out that takes place; within any 
rhizomatic cartography, hierarchies and value judgments are suppressed, and these 
assemblages are composed of heterogeneous multiplicities. This can be seen in 
Huberto’s map of everything he rejects and knows about the Sixties in which no one 
part is held above or below the others. In this flattened, heterogeneous plane, even 
that which is untimely or arrives as a failure can be located there. More importantly, 
these elements have the potential to open alternate points of entry into the rhizome 
“out of that which had been previously blocked” (Deleuze and Guattari 258). Not 
only can going unnoticed be a desire, a chosen line of flight within the rhizome, but 
the failure of inadvertently going unnoticed, of arriving too early or too late, can 
become that which allows one “to rearrange the overall assemblage” (259). In this 
sense, going unnoticed should not be read as a failed endeavor or as a purely passive 
undertaking; there is a potential energy stored in the movement of going unnoticed 
that can be unleashed in order to open up a new point of entry or to pass through a 
blockage.  
 I propose that the authors under consideration here be considered just as 
contemporary as their more visible, vocal, and timely cultural comrades. In 
Agamben’s essay, “What is the Contemporary?,” he discusses the relationship 
between that which is untimely and the contemporary: “Those who are truly 
contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly 




means to be contemporary—within any era—diverts its attention toward that which is 
not easily confused with the dominant trends of its own time. There is something 
anomalous, but not abnormal, about that which is contemporary. For Agamben, those 
who are contemporary are not only those who establish a relationship with that which 
is easily perceived, but those who know how to notice the darkness of their own time: 
The ones who can call themselves contemporary are those who do not allow 
themselves to be blinded by the lights of the century and so manage to get a 
glimpse of the shadows in those lights, of their intimate obscurity. […] On the 
contrary, the contemporary is the person who perceives the darkness of his 
time as something that concerns him, as something that never ceases to 
engage him. Darkness is something that—more than any light—turns directly 
and singularly toward him. The contemporary is the one whose eyes are struck 
by the beam of darkness that comes from his own time. (14) 
The contemporary is the one who perceives the darkness, that which failed to arrive 
on time to the illuminated stage of any given era. Agamben clarifies that there is an 
activity involved in perceiving darkness: “Darkness is not, therefore, a privative 
notion (the simple absence of light, or something like non-vision) but rather the result 
of the activity of the ‘off-cells,’ a product of our own retina” (13). There is an active 
perception involved in seeing darkness. The contemporaries, therefore, do not get 
blinded or dazzled by the bright lights, but rather turn toward the shadows that swirl 
all around them in order to seek out the darkness that others struggle to perceive or 




 In this sense, the anonymous narrator in Casey’s “Notas de un simulador” 
could be called a contemporary of his era as he dodges in and out of the lights and 
shadows, the sounds, noises, and silences of his city. He achieves this by going 
unnoticed. The untimeliness of his actions, his evasion of the popular street fair, is 
precisely what allows him to produce a line of flight throughout the same space, but 
from a different threshold of perception. He goes unnoticed, he becomes untimely, 
and he becomes capable of perceiving that which also goes unnoticed in the nearby 
darkness.  
 While spying on a neighbor’s house from its shadowy corridors, he stumbles 
across “una luz potente” ‘a powerful light’ coming from a bedroom. Under that light, 
an unexpected exchange takes place as the anonymous narrator notices a set of 
anonymous eyes noticing him. A sort of unequal symmetry takes place along the 
narrator’s errant line of flight through the city; these anonymous subjects exchange 
glances—engaging in the type of ethical encounter I detail in Chapter Three—that 
begin to move from left to right and back again effortlessly:  
Por el hueco abierto que remataba la ventana, unos ojos me miraban 
fijamente. Me desplacé un poco para observar mejor el interior. La mirada me 
siguió hasta que desaparecí de su campo de visión, para volver a desplazarse 
conmigo cuando volví a entrar en él. Las sábanas ocultaban unos pies. El resto 
de la casa, a oscuras, permanecía en silencio. Volví a mirar los ojos abiertos 
bajo los párpados inmóviles. (81) 
Through an open hole at the top of the window, a set of eyes stared at me. I 




disappeared from their field of vision, but they moved with me when I entered 
it again. The sheets hid a pair of feet. The rest of the house, in the dark, 
remained silent. Again I looked at the open eyes under immobile eyelids. 
These two sets of eyes mutually observe one another in their happenstance encounter 
along the narrator’s errant itinerary. However, the eyes that seem to follow the 
narrator are practically dead eyes. The person who appears to be watching him is 
barely mobile, and the body’s description closely resembles those of the other 
inanimate objects in the room, particularly the ceramic angel and photographs beside 
the bed. The narrator continues along his errant route, stumbles, and once more, 
without consciously intending to return to this spot, finds himself seeing these eyes 
watching him: “Cuando volví a asomarme al patio, tropecé otra vez con la mirada 
inmóvil bajo la luz cegadora” ‘When I stepped onto the patio again, I stumbled once 
more into that immobile gaze coming from under the blinding light’ (82). The 
blinding light is practically ineffectual, since the eyes it should be blinding remain 
open, staring at the narrator in the dark; instead, the light only serves to keep vigil 
over this person, not unlike the task carried out by the narrator who goes unnoticed 
throughout public spaces where he cares for the alone and dying inhabitants of his 
city.  
 Over the next day or so, the narrator intentionally returns and exchanges 
glances with this person whose eyes ultimately “parpardearon con un saludo de 
despedida” ‘blinked in order to say goodbye’ (84). The narrator had taken great care 
to not be noticed by anyone else while he observed this otherwise unnoticed person’s 




in order to escape the racket of the street fair, but he becomes capable of peering into 
the shadows and bearing witness to this lonely, dying person’s last moments. He goes 
unnoticed and unintentionally begins to notice his contemporaries who go unnoticed 
in the darkness, and they notice him noticing them as he wanders back and forth like 




Attending to Errant Palindromes 
 Writing new palindromes is not an easy task. There is a mathematical 
precision and an obsessiveness involved in constructing intelligible words and 
phrases that read exactly the same from left to right as they do in reverse. 
“ARTELETRA” is one of the thousands of palindromes that Juan Filloy created over 
the course of his life. It combines the words “arte” and “letra,” or “art” and “letters, 
literature,” to form a palindrome in which the two words refer back and forth to one 
another.  
 In Karcino: Tratado de palindromía ‘Karcino: A Treatise on Palindromes,’ 
Filloy published his collection of palindromes that range from two to seventeen words 
long. In the final section, titled “ARTELETRA,” Filloy composes poems from his 
palindromes. The shorter ones are conceivably simpler to write and to notice as 
palindromes. Filloy offers the following examples in different languages: “NEVER 
EVEN”; “ROBA SABOR”; “AMOR ¿BROMA?”; “MADAM ADAM”; “BON SNOB”; “LUZ 
AZUL”; and “AMO IDIOMA”, among many others (Karcino 74–75). As they become 
longer, the task of writing them becomes more difficult, and the likelihood of them 
going unnoticed as palindromes increases among inattentive readers. A seemingly 
simple, yet unimportant phrase, such as “ACASO HUBO BÚHOS ACÁ” ‘perhaps there 
were owls here,’ if not written in capital letters to draw attention to itself might go 
unnoticed as a palindrome (81). Some can be read as poetic aphorisms, as in the case 
of a seventeenth century palindrome by John Taylor that Filloy references: “LEWD 
DID I LIVE & EVIL DID I DWEL” (49). Others may appear to be nothing more than 




as in one of Filloy’s Spanish palindromes: “EUFEMIA, JAIME FUE… ¡EUFEMIA, JAIME 
FUE!” This translates simply as ‘Eufemia, Jaime left… Eufemia, Jaime left!’ (101).  
 Yet, others tend to catch one’s attention, begging to be noticed as the 
ingenious constructions that they are. I have selected just three examples: 
ES RE-MAL EROS EN ESO: RELAMERSE (105).  
ACA, CAROLO ADONIS, AMO LA PALOMA… SI NO DA OLOR A CACA (183). 
ADA, GORDA DROGADA, DI LOS NOCIVOS A COROLA CLAY. Y, AL CALOR OCASO, 
VI CONSOLIDADA GORDA DROGADA (195).  
The following is my literal translation of these phrases; maintaining them as 
palindromes is, if even possible, beyond my skills: 
‘Eros is incredibly bad at one thing—taking pleasure.’ 
‘Here, Carolo Adonis, I love the dove… as long as it doesn’t smell like shit.’ 
‘Ada, a fat drug addict, give what’s harmful to Corola Clay. And, at twilight’s 
warmth, I saw a strengthened, fat drug addict.’ 
A single reading will always leave the palindrome unnoticed as such, but the comedic 
strangeness of these expressions is capable of provoking a reader into giving them a 
second glance. By reorienting one’s reading practices and reading in reverse, from a 
different threshold of perception, the palindrome can come into view as such.  
 The famous Sator Square is a well-known enigma of Western cultures. Filloy 
describes it as “uno de los jeux d’esprit más intrigantes de todos los idiomas” ‘one of 
the most intriguing intellectual games of any language’ (59). The following is the 
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The Sator Square is composed of four Latin words, “sator,” “tenet,” “opera,” and 
“rotas,” and the unknown word “arepo,” which is assumed to be a proper name but 
has no fixed meaning. The letters in this arrangement form a crystalline, closed 
structure when read from top to bottom and from left to right before being read in 
reverse as a multidimensional palindrome. Its earliest inscriptions have been dated to 
the first century AD, and they were found among Roman ruins and in Pompeii before 
the arrival there of Christianity. It has been an object of historical and theological 
speculation for centuries, since it also forms an anagram for the phrase “Pater noster” 
that can be spelled twice crossing at the letter “n”; this formation leaves as its 
remainder two As and two Os, which are often interpreted as the alpha and the 
omega, the beginning and the end. However, its appearance in Pompeii challenges 
this possible solution, and other interpretations attribute it alternately to pre-Christian, 
gnostic, Jewish, stoic, and even Satanic traditions (Sheldon 2003, 233–250).  
 Magical, miraculous, and metaphysical qualities aside, what is certain about 
this and other palindromes is that they challenge the reader’s hermeneutical skills. As 
Sheldon shows, there have been innumerable attempts at deciphering this potential 
cryptogram since the late nineteenth century by mathematicians, philologists, and 




meaning they all assume it must contain.13 What I find curious is how different 
intellectuals can be so skeptical regarding scholarly interpretations of the Sator 
Square made by others, yet these same scholars uphold the generalized belief that this 
is a puzzle with a hidden solution that is simply yet to be deciphered, despite all of the 
contradictions present in each of these “solutions.” In the end, this may be nothing 
more than a clever word game into which so many readers have found so many 
meanings and uses.  
 It is not my intention to reignite a debate about hermeneutics nor to pretend to 
have arrived at a definitive uncovering of the meaning hidden in these and other 
palindromes and texts. Instead, it is the process of noticing that which is inscribed on 
the surface of the palindrome and the process by which these enigmas and games go 
unnoticed that interests me here. My contention is that Filloy’s palindromes—not 
unlike the voices heard in passing and the abandoned fragments of texts in Casey’s 
“Notas de un simulador”—need some tending in order to be recognized in all their 
complexity. Otherwise, they remain unnoticed only to be dismissed as trivialities 
unworthy of further attention that get left to wander in the darkness. 
 Filloy’s Karcino: Tratado de palindromía includes two elegant and playful 
essays on the art of constructing palindromes. In addition to being a seven-letter 
word—all of Filloy’s fifty-odd novels have seven-letter titles—the Greek word 
“karcino” has a particular relevance to palindromes. Filloy elaborates on his choice 
for the title in an interview with Mónica Ambort: “En griego, Karcino quiere decir 
                                                
13 See Rose Mary Sheldon’s article, “The Sator Rebus: An Unsolved Cryptogram?” 
(2003). The author has compiled an annotated bibliography and summary of the state 




cangrejo, animal que camina al sesgo formando zig zags, casi en la forma en que se 
leen los palíndromos” ‘In Greek, “karcino” means “crab,” an animal that walks 
sideways forming zigzags, which is almost the same way that palindromes are read’ 
(Juan 27). The Greeks were quite fond of palindromes and had various words or 
phrases to name them; Filloy extracts the symbol of the crab, as he explains, from one 
of these phrases: “karkinike epigrafe,” or “the inscription of the crab.” Another word 
used for “palindrome,” Filloy explains, is the Greek “hysteroproteron,” which is the 
same as saying “lo posterior y lo anterior” ‘the subsequent and the former,’ and the 
word “palindrome” is a derivative of “palin dromos,” which suggests that these are 
words and phrases that “corren de nuevo” ‘flow again’ (Karcino 16).  
 Regarding this movement that flows in multiple directions, Filloy describes an 
issue similar to the one I noted above in relation to the threshold of perception:  
las letras son jánicas: presentan dos caras, una a la izquierda y otra a la 
derecha, manteniendo gestos, rictus y matices diferentes. Vale decir: una cara 
visible, orgullosa de expresar lo que ostenta; y otra cara secreta, exclusiva 
para iniciados en el culto esotérico de la palindromía. (13)  
‘letters are Janus-faced: they present two faces, one to the left and another to 
the right, each with different gestures, sneers, and nuances. It’s worth saying: 
one face that is visible, proud to flaunt what it has to show; and another secret 
face, one that is exclusively reserved for those initiated into the esoteric cult of 
the palindrome.’ 
Filloy states that reading only in one direction unnecessarily limits what can be 




always be confining and proscriptive; it will always limit one’s perception to that 
which can be seen from only one threshold, whereas palindromes require a change in 
perspective in order to be noticed. In this way, Filloy proposes something similar to 
Slavoj Žižek’s practice of looking awry: when a straightforward view produces 
nothing more than confusion and blurriness, Žižek suggests stepping off to the side 
and reorienting one’s gaze in order to bring the unclear object into focus (Looking 
Awry 11). For both Filloy and Žižek, to read only from left to right or to look at 
something only in a straightforward manner is to read only that which is perceptible 
from and flaunts itself to that single point of view, while other subjects and objects 
remain out of focus or go unnoticed nearby. 
 Filloy is not content to have his vision and knowledge limited, and he starts 
writing backwards, concocting strange phrases that can be read from different 
directions. The first reading, from left to right, is the common and visible reading. 
The second, from right to left, is that which occurs when one arrives at an end, limit, 
or blockage and turns around, finding exactly the same letters in reverse. 
Nevertheless, this is not the same reading as the first; this reading is the one that 
confronts the “cara secreta” ‘secret face,’ which is not an invisible face, but the one 
already inscribed in the other that nonetheless goes unnoticed.  
 There is also a third way to read palindromes that still goes unnoticed in this 
dualistic reading: 
La palindromía, por lo mismo que es jánica, es bífida, bifronte. Partida en dos, 
la frase se comide en ser UNA, sin embargo; porque, si una parte orienta, no 




unitivo; pues, al orientar con idéntico sentido lógico desde atrás, no implica 
que lo que orientó al principio se desoriente, ya que se cierra así la lectura 
doble de la misma locución. (19) 
The palindrome, just as it is Janus-faced, it is bifid, bifurcated. Split in two, 
the phrase exercised restraint in order to be ONE, nevertheless; because, if one 
part orients, it is not that the other disorients. Its divided state takes on, then, a 
united logos; so, orienting with an identical, logical meaning in reverse does 
not imply that what oriented at the beginning disorients, since the phrase itself 
closes the double reading.  
By reading ARTELETRA from the “L” toward the left and toward the right, the two-
part, Janus-faced reading (from left to right and then from right to left) is completely 
and perfectly closed for Filloy. When referring exclusively to palindromes, he is 
correct to affirm that three detailed readings are necessary to unravel all the 
complexities of each one. Yet, I am not exactly interested in the ontological and 
epistemological stability that Filloy locates in his crystalline palindromes, those little 
words unto themselves that are closed off to play their autonomous games.  
 Filloy’s palindromes are linear and precise, being read from the defined 
beginning to the defined end and then back again, or from the exact center toward the 
two finite limits of the palindrome. However, his essays already provide the key for 
thinking of palindromes as a metaphor for opening up different readings in the face of 
a blockage or an obstacle that I will show to be compatible with Manjarrez’s and 
Casey’s errant itineraries. “Art” and “literature,” the words inscribed in 




since the historical avant-gardes of the early twentieth century, they tend toward that 
which infinitely opens and unfolds as opposed to that which closes in on itself. 
Further, Filloy asserts that “[el] hábito de leer de izquierda a derecha” ‘the habit of 
reading from left to right’ of Western culture has rooted itself into our ways of seeing 
the world:  
Vale decir que el lector se deja llevar por el rumbo de la mirada. De tal suerte, 
no va mentalmente contra la corriente escritural, no se empaca en ella ni se 
opone zurdamente al raciocinio. Esa propensión explica que pocas veces se 
detuvo a escrutar o auscultar el misterio implícito en las palabras del texto. 
(25) 
‘It is worth saying that the reader gets carried away by the course of his gaze. 
In doing so, he does not go against the scriptural current in his head, he does 
not stand his ground, nor does he clumsily refuse its reason. This tendency 
explains why he rarely stopped to scrutinize or probe the mystery that is 
implicit in the words of a text.’  
Filloy proposes extending what he learned from writing palindromes into a metaphor 
for reading any text by stubbornly refusing the effortless rationality and imposed 
limitations inherent in any unidirectional practice. In standing one’s ground, turning 
around, and moving against the scriptural current, the thresholds of perception are 
immediately reorganized allowing one to see that which had gone unnoticed—in the 
case of the palindromes, the same phrase repeated in reverse.  
 Without a doubt, this metaphor of turning against the current has an affinity 




task of the historian is “to brush history against the grain” (257). Unlike the easy back 
and forth reading of a palindrome, Filloy’s fluvial metaphor suggests the difficulty of 
wading through moving water. Reading against this current in order to attend to that 
which goes unnoticed becomes as difficult as the task of writing palindromes; 
however, it also involves a certain level of imprecision and unpredictability. One’s 
perspective changes drastically while moving in the opposite direction within the 
same space, and the force of any current is bound to prevent the one wading against it 
from retracing the original path with precision.  
  Here is the crossroads where Huberto’s rejections and Casey’s protagonist’s 
errant paths stumble into ARTELETRA, one of Filloy’s many palindromes—what he 
likes to call, in one of his many lapses of humility, “frases filloyanas” ‘Filloyan 
phrases’ (Karcino 17). At this crossroads, ARTELETRA acquires an irreverence that 
exceeds the palindrome’s crystalline structure. Within this space, Filloy’s “andar 
palindrómico” ‘walking-like-a-palindrome’ (Karcino 17) can be transformed into 
what I call “errar palindrómico” ‘erring-like-a-palindrome,’ or the practice of 
attending to errant palindromes. It is not an ex nihilo invention or a unique 
innovation, but rather a shift, an awry glance, and a subtle change of perspective. To 
read “ARTELETRA,” to read art, literature, or any form of cultural production against 
the current as if one were reading a palindrome, is to wander off course, to become 
errant, and to propose a reading from an alternative perspective of that which had 
gone unnoticed despite being written on its surface. 
 In this way, Filloy’s treatise on palindromes gives way to a multiplicity of 




through a given cultural map. Though this practice of reading against the currents 
arises from the crystalline structure of palindromes, it cannot be reduced to linear, 
rigid movements between a fixed origin and a definitive end. It is undesirable, even 
impossible, to fix the specific point and time at which a subject began to go unnoticed 
while moved through an era. Like the line of flight, the itinerary of the errant 
palindrome flows again along an uncertain path that cannot be reduced to a linear, 
rigid movement between a fixed origin and a predetermined end. Even when those 
who go unnoticed become perceived, this end should not be interpreted as a failure, 
but rather as having the line of flight cut off by another obstacle or blockage. As a 
result, a new errant palindrome will have to be created, even if by someone else.  
 The intersection of Huberto’s errant itineraries, Casey’s unattended voices, 
and Filloy’s treatise on palindromes becomes a point of departure for sounding out 
the political, ethical, and aesthetic practices of their own works and of those by 
Armonía Somers. This crossroads becomes the place where I can begin to perceive 
something that went unnoticed in the major currents of the cultural markets. In turn, I 
propose to read the Sixties al vesre, like an errant palindrome, by looking past what 
that era was proud to flaunt in order to attend to a few more untimely, yet 
contemporary voices. By changing directions and reading in retrospect without neatly 
following other paths (e.g., literary generations, aesthetic movements, and national 
traditions), I open a space in which the texts of Casey, Filloy, Manjarrez, and Somers 
engage in an invented dialogue that, if it ever did exist, left almost no trace. These 
four authors were minor characters in the story of the Latin American Sixties for 




with those who spoke more loudly. It is here that I propose to chase after them and 
the characters they imagine like errant palindromes that continue to go unnoticed and 




Engaging in Difficult Dialogues 
 Cristina Dalmagro has detailed the early reception of Armonía Somers’s 
fiction in Desde los umbrales de la memoria (2009). The first reviews presented 
Somers as a hermetic, unapproachable, even bad writer. Emir Rodríguez Monegal 
dismissed her for demonstrating an “obsesión erótica” ‘erotic obsession’ and for 
creating “una prosa no muy transparente” ‘a prose that is not very transparent’ 
(“Onirismo” 14). According to Mario Benedetti, she might one day become a good 
writer, but she “obstinadamente insiste en ocultarlo” ‘obstinately insists on hiding 
[her good writing]’ (“El derrumbamiento” 115). It is not until a decade later that 
Benedetti recanted his first judgment of her works, finally seeing her as a 
praiseworthy Uruguayan writer.14 Only Ángel Rama publicly defended her as a part 
of what he calls the Critical Generation or the Generation of ‘45 within Uruguayan 
literature, whose most well-known writer is Juan Carlos Onetti. Rama praised the 
originality of her work, thus bringing credibility to it: “Todo es insólito, ajeno, 
desconcertante, repulsivo y a la vez increíblemente fascinante en la obra narrativa 
más inusual que ha conocido la historia de nuestra literatura: la de Armonía Somers” 
‘Everything is unheard of, foreign, disconcerting, repulsive and at the same time 
incredibly fascinating in the strangest narrative work that our literary history has 
come to know: that of Armonía Somers’ (“La insólita” 1963). Nevertheless, his 
defense is still one that marginalized her works in comparison with his conception of 
the national literary tradition of the 1950s and 1960s by other female writers, calling 
                                                
14 See the chapter on Somers, “Armonía Somers y el carácter obsceno del mundo,” 
that appears in the expanded edition of Mario Benedetti’s Literatura uruguaya siglo 




her “un bicho tan fuera de serie que es imposible ubicarla con respecto a las restantes 
criaturas femeninas” ‘such an exceptional critter that it is impossible to situate her 
alongside the other feminine creatures’ (“Mujeres” 1966). Seen from today, it is clear 
that Rama’s interventions simultaneously praise Somers’s works for their uniqueness 
and relegate her to the margins along with the other “feminine creatures” who were 
writing in the Sixties. Nevertheless, the good press brought by Rama is what 
ultimately motivated the gradual reception of her works, mostly by feminist critics 
and by those studying fantastic literary traditions since the 1980s.15  
 In a dialogue with Miguel Ángel Campodónico—one of the few interviews to 
which Armonía Somers agreed—he asks her the following question: “¿Su literatura 
es hermética o abierta? ¿Qué hay de cierto en esta controversia?” ‘Can you comment 
on the controversy as to whether your literature is hermetic or open-ended?’ (Cosse 
239). To which she responds:  
Sí, concedo eso también, que mi literatura pueda juzgarse a veces como poco 
iluminada, y para algunos de difícil acceso. Confieso que a veces no 
comprendo que lo parezca, ya que por haber salido de mí tengo confianza de 
mano a mano con ella. Pero si alguna vez yo misma quedo atrapada en el 
cuarto oscuro de lo que he creado, un personaje, una situación, un desenlace, 
me doy a pensar que lo hice para salvar, para rescatar, para no inmolar a 
                                                
15 For a thorough summary of the reception of Armonía Somers’s works through the 
2000s, see Cristina Dalmagro’s Desde los umbrales de la memoria (2009), 
particularly the chapter titled, “Armonía Somers/Etchepare: las huellas biográficas” 
(45–98). These articles by Monegal, Benedetti, and Rama, as well as many others, are 
documented in her exhaustive archival research on Armonía Somers; the bibliography 
she has compiled at the end of this monograph is indispensable for studying Somers. 
Dalmagro is currently organizing her archive, “Fondo Armonía Somers,” at the 




alguien o a algo en la excesiva luz del signo, y en la espantosa claridad que 
encierran todas las convenciones. (239) 
‘Yes, I concede that my literature can be judged at times as being barely 
illuminated and that for some it is difficult to follow. I must confess that at 
times I don’t understand why it seems to be that way. Since it’s a product of 
my creation, I have an intimate confidence with it. Although, sometimes even 
I get trapped in a dark room that I have created, a character, a situation, an 
ending; I figure that I did it in order to save, to rescue, to not sacrifice 
someone or something to the excessive light of [linguistic] signs and to the 
atrocious clarity that all conventions lock up.’ 
Despite the varying value judgments made for and against Somers’s at times hermetic 
narratives, she engages in an aesthetic of opaqueness as a means of eschewing 
conventions. There is an unease for her in that which too easily reveals and flaunts  
itself, and she claims there is a certain heroic action in writing about saving these 
characters and situations from being excessively illuminated. There is an affinity 
between her aesthetic of opaqueness and Calvert Casey’s aforementioned novella 
“Notas de un simulador.” For these writers, some things are best left amongst the 
swirling shadows and pale lights of a era in order not to be sacrificed to plain 
language and exposed to established social codes.  
 Armonía Somers’s statement echoes, although without necessarily repeating, 
the opening phrase of José Lezama Lima’s La expresión americana: “Sólo lo difícil 
es estimulante” ‘Only that which is difficult is stimulating’ (49). There is a 




if they wished to create a renewed shock by reviving the historical avant-gardes. This 
gesture takes place within Somers’s novel, De miedo en miedo (Los manuscritos del 
río) ‘From Fear to Fear (The River Manuscripts)’ (1965), which is her least studied 
novel to date. The male protagonist who works in a book store begins to have 
frequent conversations with a female customer. Both remain anonymous to the 
reader. They continue to meet and engage in long dialogues that wander around all 
sorts of topics, from the boredom of their lives to escapist fantasies and memories of 
the past. In the following selection from this errant dialogue, the conversation turns 
briefly to a discussion of a non-existent novel the male protagonist imagines: 
—¿Tú sabes cómo se escribiría una novela? Pero una novela para la que no se 
necesitara ser escritor ni nada de eso. Que se pudiera componer con otros 
elementos más a la mano de cualquiera, por ejemplo de dibujos mal hechos, 
cajones llenos de esas cosas que tanto significaron alguna vez y luego se 
hicieron basura. Trapo quemado de vida que se gastó diciendo buenos días a 
todo el mundo, gente fotografiada en el momento de perder el orgullo, con la 
boca, las uñas y los ojos agarrados del aire al errar un pasamanos. Y muchos 
materiales más….Quién sabe si con largos períodos en blanco, en los que se 
oyera como a las ranas de un pantano cada pequeño ser sin importancia en la 
explosión acompasada de su vida que nadie ha tomado en cuenta, pero que es 
suya y está llena de sus historias. Y que algunos solamente supiésemos 




—¿Y para leerla nosotros? 
—Pues con sacrificio, como quien buscase una pequeña tuerca entre montones 
de chatarra. ¿Sabrías algo? 
—De novelas de ese tipo nada en absoluto. (66) 
‘—Do you know how to write a novel? I mean a novel that doesn’t require 
you to be a writer or anything like that. That could be composed of anything 
you have just lying around, like poorly done drawings, boxes filled with 
things that used to be really meaningful and later became worthless. A burnt 
rag of a life spent saying good day to everyone, people photographed in the 
moment they lost their pride, with their mouth, fingernails, and eyes grasping 
for air after missing [errar] the handrail. And so many other materials… Who 
knows, maybe with big white spaces, in which one could hear, like frogs in a 
swamp, each small, unimportant individual amidst the rhythmic explosion of 
his life that no one has ever considered, but that belongs to him and is full of 
stories. And that some of us only knew how to translate as long as the receiver 
was adjusted to the right setting.  
—Then how could we read it? 
—Only with a great deal of effort, like someone searching for a small screw in 
a heap of scrap metal. Do you know anything about that? 
—About novels like that? No, nothing.’  
When read alongside the interview with Campodónico, the novel begins to delineate 
its own aesthetic, a manifesto comparable to Manjarrez’s map, at this precise 




perspective can be reoriented toward seemingly unimportant individuals brings 
Somers’s works into dialogue with those by Casey and Filloy.  
 The mundane, perennially bored male protagonist imagines a text made out of 
elements typically discarded or deemed unworthy of literary or artistic consideration; 
at the same time, this could be a description of Somers’s De miedo en miedo itself. In 
the sections that compose his manuscripts that he throws into the river each night, the 
protagonist considers drawing instead of writing to tell part of his story about a priest. 
The drawing appears in the novel on the same page in which he claims enigmatically 
to have comprehended “el grandioso mensaje de la mala pintura” ‘the grandiose 
meaning of bad paintings’ (45). He also states that he has arrived at a low point in his 
life and considers committing suicide. His life could easily be described as small and 
unimportant, as one that goes unnoticed by everyone else even though it is full of the 
rhythmic explosions of life. The only one who hears these stories is the woman with 
whom he engages in these errant dialogues, but she inadvertently makes the ironic 
claim that she has no idea how to read or notice such stories and voices while she is in 
the process of doing just that.  
 This process of reading piecemeal novels and errant dialogues is described 
here as being more difficult to perceive than finding a small screw among scrap 
metal. When compared with Filloy’s fluvial metaphors of reading against the current, 
Somers’s metalic metaphor points to the incredible difficulty, and also potential 
danger in attending to what goes unnoticed. For comparison, the English idiomatic 
expression, “Like finding a needle in a haystack,” describes the futility of a particular 




contrast, Somers’s metaphor imagines the difficulty of locating one specific screw 
among a pile of indistinguishable scrap metal, not to mention the inevitable cuts and 
scratches from digging through this rusty, jagged metal to which one would be 
subjected. This search for what goes unnoticed is precisely the activity in which the 
female interlocutor is engaged during their dialogue. She seems unaware that she is 
tending to stories that would otherwise go unnoticed. Their dialogue follows an errant 
itinerary along which otherwise unheard voices and stories come into focus and is 
built out of discarded and underappreciated elements.  
 At times the difficulty of reading Somers’s novels lies in simply deciphering 
her hermetic prose; at others it lies in noticing that the simplest, most superficial 
dialogues—like the one written throughout this novel—generate the possibility for 
noticing the mundane, unattended stories that exist in the world. In sum, De miedo en 
miedo revives the avant-garde for its hermetism, its use of bad art, and its shock 
value, and in doing so, Somers recuperates some unattended voices in the heart of the 




The Avant-Gardes of the Cultural Markets 
 The common project of the historical avant-gardes of the early twentieth 
century is generally theorized as a critique of the institutions of literature and art in 
their various manifestos, literary journals, poems, prose, and plays (Bürger, Theory). 
Bürger’s theory has been critiqued for dismissing the possibility of neo-avant-garde 
artworks and maintaining a chronology of artistic innovation despite the avant-
garde’s rupturing of teleology (Foster, Return). In Latin America, the historical avant-
gardes both critiqued the institution of literature and created new literature (Prieto, 
Desencuadernados). Furthermore, many of the Latin American historical avant-garde 
projects were celebrated and financed by national institutions as part of their pursuit 
of modernization (Giunta, Avant-Garde). Their destructions did not bring about the 
end of the literary establishment, but rather they provoked radical changes within the 
institution itself, shattering the idea that the work of art could be isolated from 
political and economic influences (Unruh, Latin).  
 In turn, the historical avant-gardes authorized a plethora of new techniques 
and possibilities for literature and art in general, many of which are derived from the 
formal innovations of photography, film, radio, and television—the technologies of 
mass reproduction and the culture industry (Benjamin, “Work”). At the same time, 
Beatriz Sarlo demonstrates that the sentimental narratives that circulated in Latin 
American periodicals between 1917 and 1927—the contemporaries of the historical 
avant-gardes—put into circulation older aesthetic forms, borrowed from modernismo 
or late Romanticism. She argues that the residues of outdated forms were still habitual 




of the art scene in the Sixties, the avant-gardes were entangled with new technologies 
and popular forms of culture as they appropriated past and present styles and 
sensibilities while being reproduced by and circulated throughout the expanding 
cultural markets. 
 By the Sixties, Latin American literature is irrevocably situated within cultural 
markets, but it does not follow that literature must be read as succumbing to the 
demands of those markets as postulated by the Frankfurt School and others. In 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer oppose high art (Modernism) to 
the culture industry.16 Habermas’s Transformation of the Public Sphere builds from 
their analysis to argue that the public sphere is no longer conducive to a public, 
rational-critical debate now that it has been invaded by private interests and the 
culture industry (Transformation).17 In this sense, the Frankfurt School position relies 
too strongly on the broader early twentieth century trope that regards the masses as a 
homogenizing force that “crushes everything different, everything outstanding, 
excellent, individual, select and choice” (Ortega y Gasset, Revolt 10) and as irrational, 
petty, and superficial in their search for “vicarious experience and faked sensation,” 
that is, for propaganda disguised in the mass-produced simulacra of the avant-garde 
(Greenberg, “Avant-Garde” 10).18 These critiques fail to adequately study the 
                                                
16 For an analysis of Adorno’s theories regarding the culture industry, see Andreas 
Huyssen’s After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986). 
17 For a summary of the various critiques of Habermas, see Nancy Fraser’s 
“Transnationalizing the Public Sphere” in The Scales of Justice: Reimagining 
Political Space in a Globalizing World (New York: Columbia UP, 2009). 
18 For an analysis of Ortega y Gasset’s position, see Jesús Martín-Barbero’s 
Communication, Culture and Hegemony: From the Media to Mediations. (London: 




entanglements of avant-garde gestures and pop art, popular culture, and mass 
technologies that critically engaged one another in the Sixties. 
 In contrast, in El valor de la cultura. Arte, literatura y mercado en América 
Latina (2007), the editors, Luis E. Cárcamo-Huechante, Álvaro Fernández Bravo, and 
Alejandra Laera, propose that marketplaces be studied in the plural, and not as one 
hegemonic or totalitarian economic structure dominated by global cycles of supply 
and demand that function solely as propaganda for the masses. They assert that these 
markets in Latin America are both ubiquitous and precarious:  
Por un lado, el mercado parece estar en todas partes y afectar todas las áreas 
de la cultura. [...] Por otro lado, se trata de un mercado débil y precario, ya sea 
por una estandarización altamente unificada de la producción como sucede en 
los casos con gran cantidad de consumidores, ya sea por la desproporción 
entre una baja tasa de consumo y el excedente de productos ofrecidos sin un 
claro criterio de intervención en las transacciones culturales. (13) 
On the one hand, the market appears to be everywhere and to affect all areas 
of culture. [...] On the other, it is a weak and precarious market, either because 
of a highly unified standardization of production like what happens in the case 
of the majority of consumers, or because of the disproportion between a low 
rate of consumption and the excess of products offered without a clear criteria 
for intervening in cultural transactions.  
                                                                                                                                      
Latin America, especially in José Martí, see Julio Ramos’s Divergent Modernities: 
Culture and Politics in Nineteenth Century Latin America (Durham: Duke UP, 2001). 
For an analysis of how these gender roles were reconfigured in twentieth century 
Latin American revolutionary movements, see Ileana Rodríguez’s Women, 
Guerrillas, and Love: Understanding War in Central America (Minneapolis: U 




To enter into circulation, cultural products inevitably pass through the markets tied to 
the culture industries, but these precarious markets lack the ability to fully coopt 
every commodity and determine all value. While the means of production and 
circulation certainly leave their mark on literature as it enters and passes through the 
culture industries, the symbolic value of literature cannot be reduced to its use value 
or its exchange value in these markets. For this reason, the editors employ the term 
“mercado cultural,” or ‘cultural market,’ in order to study that which exceeds the 
horizon of consumption (11). The influence between literature and cultural markets 
does not have to be read as a unidirectional hegemonic force flowing from the 
markets to the texts, since these texts can always be read from multiple 
perspectives—like the palindrome ARTELETRA when read al vesre—that exceed the 
analyses of its sociopolitical or economic use value.19 
 In Juegos de seducción y traición. Literatura y cultura de masas (2000), Ana 
María Amar Sánchez explores how Latin American writers throughout the entire 
twentieth century have worked with or cited themes, styles, and entire works of 
popular or mass culture and how they have incorporated them into their fiction. Her 
particular interest is in talking about the use of popular forms as a mode of seduction, 
a way to lure in readers and provoke interest in their literature, even if they fail to 
produce the object of desire or if they never intended to produce it in the first place. 
As a result, according to Amar Sánchez: “En el presente ya no puede pensarse la 
                                                
19 See Brett Levinson’s The Ends of Literature: The Latin American “Boom” in the 
Neoliberal Marketplace (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001). He demonstrates how there 
are no pure spaces of radical or conservative economic values, nor are there clearly 
defined divisions between experimental or popular forms of culture. The Boom was, 
instead, the most visible example of how literary culture navigated the rise and 




cultura como un sistema totalizador sino que se trata de un conjunto de discursos en 
conflicto, a menudo contradictorios, en lucha por legitimarse como formas 
privilegiadas de representación” ‘In the present it is no longer possible to think about 
culture as a totalizing system, but rather as an ensemble of often contradictory and 
conflicting discourses, fighting to legitimize themselves as privileged forms of 
representation’ (20). Instead of being scandalized by the mixture of avant-garde 
literature and the seductive forms of popular and mass cultures, I prefer to follow in 
the footsteps of Amar Sánchez to avoid the reductive binary that sets the two in an 
unnecessary, purely antagonistic opposition. Therefore, I situate the works of Casey, 
Filloy, Manjarrez, and Somers at the crossroads of avant-garde experimentation and 
the cultural markets. In this sense, I understand that the work of art is not 
autonomous, original, or unique, but rather entangled within complex webs of 
competing sensibilities. 
 To fully establish a dialogue between Casey, Filloy, Manjarrez, and Somers it 
seems timely to return to the extensive quote from Lapsus cited at the beginning of 
this chapter. Within Huberto’s rhizomatic cartography, there is a series of rejected, 
but related, objects and ideas: art for art’s sake, engaged novels, the Sunday 
supplemental in color, Reader’s Digest, the novels of the Mexican Revolution, the 
books on Mexicanism and mexicanidadá (and the anti-Mexicans), Zhdanovism, and 
travel literature. Obviously, these items relate to art, aesthetic theories, and a range of 
literary genres. What interests me, in particular, is the breadth of Huberto’s rejections, 
ranging from artworks that aspired to isolate themselves as autonomous objects, to 




writing, and from foundational, national, and anti-national literatures to travel writing, 
snippets of English-language literature, and the mass media. His rejections level the 
categorical divisions into which different forms of writing have been divided; 
distinctions such as that between high and low art, or between elite, mass, and 
popular cultures—as in Canclini’s formulation (Hybrid)—are erased. Huberto rejects 
them all, but he does not reject writing itself. He does so from within a fictional 
narrative in a way that prohibits his own text from being reduced to any one of these 
categories. By engaging in the reading pact that Huberto proposes here, Lapsus 
cannot be claimed only as an autonomous artistic object, a politically engaged novel, 
or a text that continues to build or reinforce a national patrimony; nonetheless, his 
errant ways never slip out of the realm of art or into a patronizing recuperation or 
appropriation of a lost or primitive popular culture, nor do they blindly celebrate the 
commodification of literature and mass reproduction.  
 Huberto flattens out the values and distinctions attached to all these categories 
in a narrative that was published and distributed (at least within Mexico) by a 
successful publishing house—Joaquín Mortiz—whose prestige at the time developed 
from its intrepid support of economically risky, avant-garde writers. Joaquín Mortiz 
was founded in 1962 by Joaquín Diez-Canedo. Building from twenty years of 
editorial experience at Fondo de Cultura Económica, he worked with Jorge Flores and 
Vicente Polo to take advantage of the favorable publishing environment in Mexico 
and establish a publishing house dedicated to Mexican literature (Anderson 8–9). 
From the beginning, Joaquín Mortiz celebrated innovative literature, including 




often divide Mexican literature in the Sixties, but which simply conformed different 
modes of writing avant-garde literature in the era when seen from today.20 This 
careful selection of texts published by Joaquín Mortiz contributed to the consecration 
of a space in which more economically risky works could be published. In order to 
finance these inversions, the publisher created three series of informative and 
pedagogical texts for a more general public that “provided a solid economic annual 
return for the company but also reinforced its image as a cultural publisher without 
detracting from the literary reputation associated with the highly visible narrative 
lines” (Anderson 16-17). Manjarrez’s novel, Lapsus, for all of its slipping and sliding, 
its rejections and renunciations, might not have ever been published without such a 
structure in place.  
 In the case of Uruguay, Hugo J. Verani asserts that, despite the country’s 
economic crisis, “[a] partir de 1960 se dan por primera vez las condiciones esenciales 
para la labor literaria: surgen editoriales (Alfa, Arca, Banda Oriental) que 
promocionan el libro nacional y lo convierten en producto de alto consumo” ‘since 
1960 the necessary conditions for literary work come about for the first time—
publishing houses (Alfa, Arca, Banda Oriental) are formed to promote national books 
and convert them into highly demanded products’ (De la vanguardia 33). Armonía 
Somers’s novel, La mujer desnuda, was published in the journal Clima in 1950, and 
republished in 1966 by Tauro, despite the scandal it provoked on both sides of the Río 
                                                
20 The “escritura” or “writerly” camp played with dense linguistic constructions (e.g., 
Salvador Elizondo and José Emilio Pacheco), while those of the “onda” or the “vibe” 
were more interested in capturing the slang and popular use of language by the urban 
youth (e.g., José Agustín and Gustavo Sainz). See the “Estudio preliminar” by Margo 
Glantz in Onda y escritura en México. Jóvenes de 20 a 33 (1971) that includes Héctor 




de la Plata for its overt eroticism. Her collected short stories, Todos los cuentos. 
1953–1967 (1967) and two novels, De miedo en miedo (1965) and Un retrato para 
Dickens (1969) were published by Arca. Arca and the weekly cultural journal 
Marcha, both under the direction of Ángel Rama, “desempeñaron un papel 
fundamental en la legitimación de critierios estéticos nuevos e instancias de 
consagración en la literatura de las décadas del 50, 60 y comienzos del 70” ‘played a 
fundamental role in bringing legitimacy to new aesthetic criteria and in generating 
recognition for literature in the 50s, 60s, and the early 70s’ (Dalmagro 79).  
 In fact, Arca published a wide breadth of material in the decade of the 1960s 
alone, including best-selling, canonical writers like Alejo Carpentier, Gabriel García 
Márquez and Juan Carlos Onetti, as well as others who have gone on to be recognized 
as some of the most important Uruguayan writers. In addition to publishing some of 
Ángel Rama’s major essays, Arca made available new editions of Juana de 
Ibarbourou’s poetry, the complete works of Felisberto Hernández, and multiple 
volumes of Horacio Quiroga’s short stories, novellas, and previously unpublished 
materials. Other notable Uruguayan writers contributed to Arca’s impressive catalog, 
among them Eduardo Acevedo Díaz, Enrique Amorim, Mario Benedetti, Amanda 
Berenguer, Híber Conteris, and Teresa Porzecanski. The publisher also circulated 
editions of notable Latin American essayists: Eduardo Galeano, Tulio Halperín 
Donghi, Noé Jitrik, Ezequiel Martínez Estrada, and Augusto Salazar Bondy. As can 
be seen here, at least some of the cultural circuits of capitalist markets in the Sixties 





 Furthermore, Ángel Rama argues a similar position in his essay, “El Boom en 
perspectiva,” at least in regard to publishing houses like Arca and Joaquín Mortiz in 
which the expanding networks of capitalist markets were also creating the 
opportunity to finance less commercially viable works, generate publicity for them, 
and create greater access to them and other texts, including educational textbooks and 
bestsellers. He calls these specific publishers “editoriales culturales” ‘cultural 
publishing houses’ in order to emphasize this excess to profit-driven models for 
capitalist marketplaces (66–67). The examples he gives of these cultural publishing 
houses include the following: in Buenos Aires, Losada, Emecé, Sudamericana, 
Compañía General Fabril Editora, Jorge Álvarez, La Flor, and Galerna; in México, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, Era, and Joaquín Mortiz; in Chile, Nascimento and Zig 
Zag; in Uruguay, Alfa and Arca; in Venezuela, Monte Ávila; and in Barcelona, Seix 
Barral, Lumen, and Anagrama (66). Overall, he argues that these cultural publishing 
houses, such as Fondo de Cultura Económica in Mexico and EUDEBA in Argentina, 
expanded and created new, intellectually rigorous and popular reading publics in 
Latin America, thus solidifying the necessary conditions for the success of the Boom 
writers (70).  
 In Argentina, a similar project was developed in Buenos Aires by Jorge 
Álvarez who, throughout the Sixties, published an impressive list of Argentine 
writers, including Rodolfo Walsh, David Viñas, Manuel Puig, and Ricardo Piglia. 




first Argentine recording company for national rock music.21 While Juan Filloy did 
not publish with Jorge Álvarez, all of his texts are bound indisputably to Argentina’s 
cultural markets and publishing houses. On the one hand, he has maintained some 
distance from them, notably during the twenty-eight year editorial silence between the 
publication of Finesse in 1939 and approving a new edition of Op Oloop in 1967, 
when he did not publish anything, but continued to write. There are still roughly 
twenty manuscripts that remain unpublished. At the time of writing this study, El 
cuenco de plata is publishing new editions of a great number of his works. On the 
other hand, Filloy did publish almost the same number of texts throughout the 
twentieth century (the last book published in his life, Decio 8A, appeared in 1997). 
Despite the distance he maintained at times from the center of the Argentine cultural 
markets in Buenos Aires (by publishing many of his works in the provincial city of 
Río Cuarto) and from the publishing houses of the Boom (by not publishing with 
Sudamericana in Buenos Aires or with Seix Barral in Barcelona), he published with 
Paidós and Losada, two major Argentine presses, the latter of which figures among 
Rama’s list of major cultural publishing houses. 
 In Cuba, at least until 1961, the year in which cultural production was brought 
fully under the auspices of national organizations like the UNEAC and the ICAIC, the 
newspaper Revolución, its cultural supplemental Lunes de Revolución, and the 
publishing house related to it, Ediciones R, were willing to publish works by writers 
like Calvert Casey who did not always subscribe dogmatically to ideological 
positions, and they published many debates about the state of the Cuban Revolution 
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and its future.22 Of course, the rising influence of the Spanish publishing houses 
cannot be overlooked. While Sudamericana in Buenos Aires published Gabriel García 
Márquez’s Cien años de soledad, Seix Barral in Barcelona published the majority of 
the authors now consolidated as part of the Boom: Guillermo Cabrera Infante, Mario 
Vargas Llosa, Manuel Puig, and José Donoso.23 Although never considered one of the 
Boom authors, Calvert Casey also published with Seix Barral in the second half of the 
1960s after his self-exile from Cuba, giving him, in theory, the same exposure to the 
mass reading publics that turned these other authors into worldwide bestsellers.  
 Published within these cultural markets, these four authors do not simply 
conform a neo-avant-garde or the second coming of the avant-gardes. In Children of 
the Mire, Octavio Paz explains the historical avant-garde as the end of a tradition 
dating back to Romanticism; he states, “The avant-garde is the great breach, and with 
it the ‘tradition against itself’ comes to an end” (103). The violence and radicalism of 
these works cannot be but an end to a particular project, against which he postulates 
“an other avant-garde,” that of his own generation, one that rebels against the failures 
of the historical avant-garde since the mid-1940s (147). Paz goes on to explore the 
                                                
22 William Luis has studied the context surrounding these cultural publishing houses 
and their eventual closure in 1961 in his book, Lunes de Revolución. Literatura y 
cultura en los primeros años de la revolución cubana. For a reading of the 
relationship between Lunes de Revolución and Casa de las Américas, see Juan Carlos 
Quintero-Herencia’s Fulguración del espacio. Letras e imaginario institucional de la 
Revolución Cubana (1960-1971) (Rosario: Beatriz Viterbo, 2002). I return to the case 
of Lunes in more detail in chapter 2, where I explore Casey’s public position in these 
journals in relation to his more explicitly political writings. 
23 For a history of Seix Barral and the ways in which the Boom authors navigated the 
competing interests between censorship and the desire to rebuild the Spanish 
publishing industry during Franco’s dictatorship, see Alejandro Herrero-Olaizola’s 
The Censorship Files: Latin American Writers and Franco’s Spain (Albany: SUNY 




mythical origins of Mexico in El laberinto de la soledad, while Jorge Luis Borges 
experiments with fantastic literature and detective fiction in Ficciones, and José 
Lezama Lima indulges in the excesses and accumulations of the Baroque in the 
journal Ciclón and later publishes his masterpiece, Paradiso in 1966. When Héctor 
Manjarrez begins to publish in Mexico, he comes not only after Paz’s self-proclaimed 
neo-avant-garde, but also after the escritura and the onda writers. These examples are 
chosen from a densely populated literary field, and they are evidence of the attempt, 
after the so-called failure of the historical avant-gardes, to critique and to continue 
those projects in a renewed capacity that further entangles technology and mass 
culture with literary experimentation.   
 How, then, can that which goes unnoticed in the works of Casey, Filloy, 
Manjarrez, and Somers be meaningful from within the discourse on the avant-gardes 
if they circulated within the cultural markets and appeared well after the destructive 
tendencies of the historical avant-gardes and the subsequent provocations of the neo-
avant-gardes? In The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century, 
Hal Foster insists that neo-avant-garde artworks be studied not for their novelty or 
repetition, but as demonstrative of the “deferred temporality of artistic signification” 
(8). He argues that the transformations and ruptures enacted by the historical avant-
gardes were not immediately apparent; only in retrospect was their impact felt, and it 
was not until the neo-avant-gardes that the historical avant-gardes were first 
comprehended. In sum, Foster notices a paradigm shift enacted by avant-garde works 
in which they overturn “any simple scheme of before and after, cause and effect, 




artistic significance to, and act on the failures of chronologically earlier avant-gardes; 
they reconfigure other avant-garde projects at their point of failure, but without the 
promise of emancipation or happiness inscribed in modernist aesthetic theories. In the 
wake of Foster’s analysis, it no longer matters which avant-garde project came first 
and which second, third, or even fourth, as in the case of the quite untimely writers 
under consideration here. In studying the Sixties from today, establishing a 
chronological teleology of ruptures in constant succession holds little meaning for the 
analysis of twentieth-century literature and culture. 
 In “Los relatos de la vanguardia o el retorno de lo nuevo,” Julio Premat 
claims, “Día a día, seguimos siendo modestamente milenaristas, postulando que todo 
está acabándose a cada momento, en pequeñas crisis apocalípticas” ‘Day by day, we 
continue to be modestly millenarianist, postulating that everything is coming to an 
end at every moment, in small apocalyptic crises’ (58). The “we” in his statement is 
directed at past and contemporary artists, critics, and academics. For Premat, the 
problem today seems to be that the avant-gardes always already happened for us: “La 
vanguardia, siempre, ‘ya fue,’ pero sigue siendo, también para los críticos y no solo 
para los escritores, un vector de producción de teorías, pensamientos y textos. Una 
maquinaria de discursividad” ‘The avant-garde, always “already was,” but it 
continues to be, both for critics and not only for writers, a vector that produces 
theories, ideas, and texts’ (60). I would like to add that not only did the avant-gardes 
already happen, but for my own generation, the Sixties “always already was” as well. 
Perhaps this is why it is not surprising that, for Premat, the avant-gardes that resonate 




vanguardia de los sesenta” ‘the avant-garde of the sixties’: “Al evocar el periodo se 
convoca, también, toda una efervesencia contestataria y se valoriza un revival posible 
de posiciones rebeldes multiformes” ‘Evoking this period is also to convene all of its 
non-conformist effervescence and to value a possible revival of multifarious, 
rebellious stances’ (61). It is in this vein that I return to the Sixties from within the 
discourses on the avant-gardes as being entangled in cultural markets to create an 
errant dialogue among these four authors; at this crossroads, it becomes possible that 
other options for political, ethical, and aesthetic thought relevant to today might arise. 
 I will now return to the last line quoted above from Manjarrez’s novel Lapsus. 
After listing everything he rejects, the narrator addresses Huberto directly, and the 
reader indirectly, as is always the case with second-person narration: “Y ni siquiera 
tienes la decencia de ser nihilista sino que todavía andas sonriendo en la calle como si 
pudiese haber un milenio tras lomita” ‘And you don’t even have the decency to be a 
nihilist, but you still walk through the streets grinning as if there could be a 
millennium just around the corner’ (Lapsus 191, my italics). The indecency of 
Huberto’s line of flight that takes on the qualities of an errant palindrome eschews 
nihilism despite all of his rejections. In my view, Huberto commits himself to 
carrying out this unfulfillable project of both going unnoticed and attending to that 
which goes unnoticed as if a future utopia could be possible. Huberto thus displaces 
the historical avant-gardes’ apocalyptic and anarchist tone, and he cultivates an open-
ended, creative, and regenerative rejection of the institutions of art and literature and 
everything else that makes up his cartography of the Sixties. Meanwhile, his project’s 




haber,” as if there could be. There remains in this phrase a cynical optimism, a need 
to continue his own project, even though he is aware of its ultimate futility. He 
refuses to renounce his project in the face of pure nihilism, just as he refuses to give 
up his rejections even if they always already had been rejected by another before him. 
And he does so with a smile on his face. 
 Huberto’s avant-garde desires appear in a narrative that Héctor Manjarrez 
published in the heart of the Latin American cultural markets of the Sixties, alongside 
Calvert Casey’s appeal to pay attention to unattended voices, Juan Filloy’s errant 
palindromes, and Armonía Somers’s novel composed of heterogeneous elements. 
While these authors never engaged in any documented dialogue among themselves, I 
create my own errant itinerary to return to the Sixties and stumble into an invented 
crossroads where there works can establish a dialogue. By turning around at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century and reading against the currents of what the 
Sixties flaunted as its most visible characteristics, I open a different possibility for 
regarding the intersection of politics, ethics, and aesthetics in the Latin American 
cultural markets of the era.  




¡SOMETAMOS O MATEMOS! 
 
 Filloy’s palindrome, “¡Sometamos o matemos!,” is gruesomely perfect 
(Karcino 79). It can be translated as ‘Let’s subjugate or let’s kill!’ The “we” 
emphatically constructed in this phrase is one that is united by a violent mandate—to 
subjugate or to kill a “them” excluded from this “we.” The exclamation points that 
surround this palindrome can be read as the signs of an enthusiasm to protect at all 
costs the unity and hegemony of the group enclosed in this discursive space. Though 
there is an explicit option here—we can subjugate or we can kill—the latter is little 
more than an extension of the former. One could quibble as to whether living in 
submission to a powerful, authoritarian order regimented as perfectly as this 
palindrome is a better or worse fate than being killed. What I find important here, 
rather, is the totalizing vision and demands made by the speaker of this palindrome 
around whom his allies gather as they prepare to dominate or eradicate their enemies. 
The only real opposition here is not between the choices named in the palindrome, 
but between the explicit “us” and the implicit “them.” This sort of division and the 
violence that is justified to uphold it serves as an example of the political landscapes 
within which many of the protagonists I study may choose to go unnoticed. Instead of 
picking sides, they seek non-violent options for engaging in dissensus and 
disagreement through dialogue within a democratic framework.  
 Before choosing to go unnoticed, they will have to locate or create an errant 
itinerary that can loosen the perfection of this palindrome. Simply reading it in 




turn to the novel Un retrato para Dickens ‘A Portrait for Dickens’ by Armonía 
Somers, published in 1969. (The “we” I invoke in this “Let’s” is purely imaginary; 
the reader may prefer not to join along.) Like the majority of her fiction, this 
structurally and linguistically complex novel operates within the realm of fantastic 
literature, provoking a number of questions for the reader along the way. In particular, 
the writing in Un retrato illuminates various surfaces that appear to block 
introspection and impede access to certain ideas or forms of knowledge much in the 
way that Filloy’s palindrome occludes any fracture in its closed rallying cry.  
 To begin, Un retrato breaks with the unity of the nineteenth century realist 
family romance that she cites in the example of Charles Dickens’s Oliver Twist; 
Oliver, an orphan boy, is ultimately reunited with his family and his inheritance, 
while Somers’s orphan girl is left raped and abandoned at the novel’s end, grasping 
desperately for a sense of humanity. Many of the mysteries that arise toward the 
novel’s beginning will ultimately be explained. For example, the reason the 
protagonist is in a police station as well as the connection between the three, 
seemingly disparate narrative threads is made clear within the final chapters. There 
are so many strange and fantastic elements at play in the novel’s foreground that a 
number of other enigmas easily go unnoticed on its surface. In contrast to the 
mysteries that can be resolved, the truth blocked by these enigmas can never be 
attained, but focusing attention on them can become a means of prying open rigid 
totalities and binary oppositions. 
 In Stanzas, Agamben considers the classical figures of Oedipus and the 




Every interpretation of signifying as the relation of manifestation or 
expression (or, inversely, of coding and eclipse) between a signifier and a 
signified (and both the psychoanalytic theory of the symbol and the semiotic 
theory of language belong to this type) places itself necessarily under the sign 
of Oedipus; under the sign of the Sphinx must be placed every theory of the 
symbol that, refusing the model of Oedipus, focuses its attention above all on 
the barrier between signifier and signified that constitutes the original problem 
of signification. (138–139) 
The Oedipal interpretations are those that claim to find the meaning hidden within an 
enigma; they employ a hermeneutical strategy (e.g., psychoanalysis or semiotics) to 
reveal a true meaning to the light of knowledge. Interpretations under the sign of the 
Sphinx, in contrast, mark the opening within language. In his analysis of Aristotle and 
Heraclitus, Agamben explains that the enigmatic provides “a glimpse into the abyss 
opened between signifier and signified,” somewhere between “the legein (saying) and 
[…] the kryptein (hiding)” (139). Enigmas do not hide any meaning under the surface 
that is to be illuminated; rather, they signal the infinite distance that only imperfect 
and improper discourse can attempt to traverse. Similarly, going unnoticed is not 
something that hides or veils a truth to be revealed at some future instance. Somers’s 
enigmas can be read like a palindrome or the Sator Square; they may appear to hide a 
specific truth, but there is not necessarily a secret meaning tucked away in some fold 
that is awaiting the arrival of the most astute analyst, the cleverest hermeneutical 
exercise, or someone’s lucky guess in order to be revealed, illuminated, or otherwise 




 In Elementos fantásticos en la narrativa de Armonía Somers, Ana María 
Rodríguez Villamil engages in a structuralist analysis of the fantastic elements—from 
a primarily Todorovian framework—in La mujer desnuda and a number of Somers’s 
short stories. In the conclusion, she briefly mentions Un retrato para Dickens 
alongside other novels by Somers as additional examples of the fantastic: 
La fusión de lo real y lo imaginario se da, entonces, al final de la novela. Si 
bien la contaminación se da también a lo largo de los capítulos supuestamente 
realistas, por la inclusión del loro Asmodeo. La ambigüedad creada por la 
contaminación de ambas esferas […] se produce aquí al final. (190) 
‘The fusion of the real and the imaginary is produced, therefore, at the end of 
the novel. Also, this contamination arises within the supposedly realist 
chapters because of the presence of Asmodeo the parrot. The ambiguity 
created by this contamination of both spheres […] is produced here at the 
end.’ 
There is a sense in her analysis that the final chapter allows for a culmination, in 
which the two seemingly unconnected narratives of the novel come together, and in 
retrospect, Asmodeo the parrot can be read as their point of articulation from 
beginning to end.  
 The ambiguity that is produced in this final fusion, for Rodríguez Villamil, is 
the ambiguity that allows her to classify the novel as fantastic, an ambiguity that in 
the end is not all that ambiguous. Rodríguez Villamil attempts to overcome the 
criticism leveraged against Somers that her literature is dense and almost illegible, 




unfairly ignored author; however, I contend that her brief reading of Un retrato 
verges on explaining all too well the enigmas of Somers’s writing. Rodríguez 
Villamil insists that all of Somers’s narratives find different formulas that “buscan la 
vía iluminativa es decir, la de la revelación, ya sea por la belleza o la fuerza de una 
imagen, ya por un sentido oculto que finalmente salta a la vista, ya por la irrupción de 
lo insólito” ‘search for an illuminating path, that is, for a revelation, whether it be 
because of the beauty or the force of an image, because of the hidden meaning that 
finally bursts into view, or because of the irruption of the unusual’ (192). She is 
correct to assert that certain mysteries are resolved or illuminated toward the end of 
the novel, often confirming the presence of the fantastic within Somers’s writing. But 
not everything is quite this clear by the novel’s end, nor do the vast majority of 
Somers’s narratives allow the reader access to a tidy truth by their end.  
 Leaving certain enigmas unresolved in the novel does not have to be judged a 
failure on part of the writer, nor is it necessary to resolve these enigmas in order to 
contest the negative criticisms leveraged against Somers by her earliest critics. In 
Idea of Prose, Agamben argues that in order to avoid a closure, “it is important that 
representation stops an instant before the truth; this is why the only true 
representation is that which also represents the gap that separates it from the truth” 
(107). In fact, Somers’s fiction abounds in syntactical structures and symbolic writing 
that is difficult if not impossible to interpret, and in this way, her writing avoids the 
type of metaphysical closure that seems to take place so easily in Filloy’s violent 
palindrome “¡Sometamos o matemos!” Within the central plot of Un retrato, an 




decipher it from her juvenile perspective, what she calls “mi limitado margen de 
conceptos” ‘my limited range of concepts’ (41). She tends to draw attention to ideas 
and events she does not understand. However, she does not necessarily go about 
searching for explanations of everything, and the reader is limited to her first-person 
narrative. Even when the narrative changes over to that of Asmodeo, a caged parrot, 
the narrative is just as limited to what he can see and hear from his cage. Overall, the 
girl does not flee from these enigmas, what she calls “mensajes sin clave” ‘messages 
without a code’ (28). Rather, she chooses to confront them as impossibilities that can 
only be dimly illuminated on the text’s surface. This refusal to explain away their 
mysteries can even be politically productive. 
 For example, the little girl finds a recipe book that has seventy-seven recipes 
for bizcochuelo, a type of sponge cake. She reacts as follows: “Lo que quisiera saber 
es qué gusto tiene una cosa, una cosa que se puede hacer de setenta y siete maneras, y 
que se llama siempre bizcochuelo” ‘What I would like to know is what bizcochuelo 
tastes like, since it can be made seventy-seven different ways and always be called 
“bizcochuelo”’ (43). In one of the Documents inserted in the novel, there is a 
prologue from this recipe book titled “La verdad esclarece e ilumina” ‘Truth clarifies 
and illuminates.” The Argentine—not Uruguayan—author of these recipes proclaims 
the greatness and purity of “nuestra Cocina Nacional” ‘our National Cuisine’ with no 
irony at all (30). His prologue is dedicated to clarifying how his recipes had been 
stolen, copied, and reprinted without his permission in other volumes of Argentine 
recipe books, and here—in a text that has been copied and reprinted in a novel—he 




 Overall, his prologue is constructed as the synecdoche of the nation, as a 
monument that flaunts the unique face of “our National Cuisine” for public 
consumption—the food is to be digested, the book, bought and read, the monument, 
viewed and praised. However, the little girl is not so easily convinced of this unity. 
She insists on confronting the enigma of the seventy-seven recipes for “our” National 
Bizcochuelo by turning against the current of this exclusive, political narrative. At 
first, her question seems naïve, since no one would question the idea of there being 
multiple variants of a recipe, no one except the little girl who knows the importance 
of scrutinizing what seems to be trivial. There are seventy-seven versions of 
something (of bizcochuelo, which serves as a synecdoche of the nation) that ignores 
its own plurality in order to construct itself as a unique, total, and true entity. The 
little girl is the one who knows how to illuminate this enigmatic surface on which the 
universalizing vision of the prologue’s author is revealed to be as particular and 
limited as her own perspective. 
 While reading the surface of this document in Somers’s novel, an abundance 
of spelling errors that do not exist in the rest of the novel become apparent. They are 
not errors made by the publishers of the actual novel; they are made on purpose only 
in these selections that are said to be copied exactly from the recipe book. There is a 
footnote that certifies that this document is a “copia fiel” ‘exact copy’ of the 
expanded second edition of the recipe book, a second edition that still has many 
mistakes despite being elevated as the National Recipe Book (33). These errors are 
very easily perceived. In adopting the little girl’s limited perspective and paying 




edition that possibly had an even greater number of errors already announces a 
fracture in the supposedly deeper message about the unity of the nation.  
 The prologue’s author intends to erase this multiplicity and these fractures 
with his single text on National Cuisine—exemplified by the bizcochuelo—and with 
a single subject—us—but he makes too many mistakes in his foundational gesture. In 
the face of the little girl, his only hope might be to appeal to his fellow countrymen 
with the rallying cry, “¡Sometamos o matemos!” By paying attention to the innocent 
statements the little girl makes, the seriousness of her seemingly unimportant and 
naive questions can be perceived. She confronts her uncertainty and lack of clear 
knowledge (about the seventy-seven recipes for the same thing) and asks apparently 
simple-minded questions, but her questions are the ones that point to something 
strange that only a perspective attuned to that which goes unnoticed on the surface of 
a text can notice.  
 By reading these enigmas like the little girl in Un retrato para Dickens, by 
concentrating one’s gaze on that which goes unnoticed on the surface of the text, it is 
possible to make out a political opening within a stage on which only the loudest 
voices fight for the spotlight by crying “¡Sometamos o matemos!” In contrast, the 
little girl illuminates the enigmas that must be ignored for this consensus-building to 
take place. What Somers’s enigmas demonstrate is that, at times, one has to know 
how to attend to that which goes unnoticed in order to open a moralizing consensus. 
Instead of being imperfections in Somers’s fiction, these enigmas undermine the 
cookbook author’s prologue in his attempt to produce a totality by exclusion and 




Chapter 2: The Politics of Going Unnoticed 
 
 This Sixties is frequently characterized as an era in which everything was 
political. Artists and intellectuals traveled to Cuba to publicly register their support 
for the Revolution. Students and workers took to the streets to demand radical 
transformations of their governing institutions and working conditions. Cold War 
politics situated Latin America at the heart of some of its most intense stand-offs as 
the United States and the Soviet Union sought to guarantee the supremacy of their 
respective regimes in the Western hemisphere. Regarding this perception that in the 
Sixties everything was political, Claudia Gilman proposes a more subtle description 
of the era. She concludes that “más adecuado sería afirmar que la gramática 
característica de los discursos [políticos] fue antes excluyente que acumulativa” ‘it 
would be more adequate to assert that the characteristic structure of [political] 
discourse is better described as being exclusive rather than accumulative’ (Entre 32). 
Instead of reading the Sixties as an era in which everything was political, as if 
everything were included in this all-encompassing politicization, she recalls that such 
totalizing narratives are always the result of multiple exclusions.  
 The Sixties was certainly consumed by impassioned, highly visible debates 
regarding, in particular, the politics of art and literature. Yet, alongside these debates 
about how to be a committed writer and how to best write about Latin America, so 
many other political gestures were left unattended. Those who upheld positions not 




as counterrevolutionaries or as ivory tower intellectuals, if they were paid any 
attention at all. Just as the art and literature that goes unnoticed is not outside of the 
cultural markets of the Sixties and, therefore, not permanently inaccessible to the 
consuming public, the politics of going unnoticed in the Sixties is not a politics set 
outside of the highly saturated public sphere and its conflicting discourses.  
 In this chapter, I turn to Calvert Casey’s journalism, and short fictional texts 
by Juan Filloy, Héctor Manjarrez, and Armonía Somers in order to explore the 
politics of going unnoticed in the Sixties. These unnoticed texts and protagonists seek 
positions within the heated polemics that raged throughout Latin America about the 
role of art and literature, but they hesitate or openly disagree with certain widespread 
assumptions and categorizations. As I will show, they propose a form of politics that 
is not built upon the exclusive totalities of the Sixties that tried to produce or institute 
revolutions. The politics of going unnoticed opens a space within an already occupied 
place wherein dissent becomes possible by dissolving the facile schemes that 




A Double Negative in Cuba 
 Whenever I begin explaining my research to friends, colleagues, and new 
acquaintances, the most common immediate response is, “Calvert…. Who?” Whether 
they recognize the other authors or not, so many people are caught off guard by 
Calvert Casey’s anglophone name, which seems quite out of place for discussing the 
Sixties in Latin America. Of course, the underlying question here becomes: How 
could an author with such a striking name be worthy of study if his works have gone 
unnoticed during an era when the worldwide attention being paid to Latin American 
writing, or at least to the Boom writers, had never been more enthusiastic and far-
reaching? It is precisely this fact, however, that makes Casey’s works the ideal focal 
point for asking what political importance can be attributed to going unnoticed in the 
Sixties. In his situation, just how does one simultaneously do politics while going 
unnoticed under the all-pervading light—the “optical regime” (Quintero-Herencia 
18)—that was ushered in with the Cuban Revolution?24 In order to answer this 
question, it will be necessary to examine how Casey situates himself as a committed 
Cuban writer who has traveled to the island in order to participate actively in the 
Revolution and in the construction of its new society, its new men, and its new 
cultural markets.  
                                                
24 Concerning this all-pervading light, Juan Carlos Quintero-Herencia examines the 
politics and discourses that sought to give historical weight to the Revolution in the 
Sixties by examining the institutional literary space of Casa de las Américas, its much 
larger connections to and influences over the complex web of the Cuban cultural 
industries and markets, and the competing ideologies that came into conflict. Casey’s 
short story “El regreso,” published in Casa, is studied in this context. See 
Fulguración del espacio: Letras e imaginario institucional de la Revolución Cubana 




 Calvert Casey published a number of short, inconsequential essays in Lunes 
de Revolución, the Cuban weekly cultural journal which appeared every Monday 
between March 23, 1959, and November 6, 1961. Casey was a frequent participant in 
this journal’s activities during the brief two years it existed. This suplemento literario 
accompanied the Cuban newspaper, Revolución, edited by Carlos Franqui. 
Revolución was founded under the auspices of the Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de 
Julio (MR-26-7), the group led by Fidel Castro that carried out the failed 1953 attack 
on the Cuartel Moncada against Fulgencio Batista and that later began the rural 
guerrilla warfare in the Sierra Maestra. Guillermo Cabrera Infante served as editor of 
Lunes, with Pablo Armando Fernández as assistant editor. The magazine’s staff 
operated a radio station and a television channel which broadcast plays. In addition, 
Sonido R, a record company, and Ediciones R, a publishing house (where “R” stands 
for “Revolución”), were also organized under the auspices of Revolución and Lunes.  
 This intellectual circle became a major player in establishing the new cultural 
markets in the founding years of the Cuban Revolution. “During its publication 
history,” explains William Luis, “Lunes was a new and innovative supplement, and 
unlike previous magazines that were limited to a particular literary current, ideology, 
genre, or region, it provided a home for writers and artists from a range of positions 
and locations” (“Exhuming” 257).25 This point is worth highlighting, because Lunes 
is a good example of the degree to which free speech and even criticism of local 
                                                
25 The opening essays of William Luis’s monograph, Lunes de Revolución: Literatura 
y cultura en los primeros años de la Revolución Cubana (Madrid: Editorial Verbum, 
2003), provides most of the same information as his essay “Exhuming Lunes de 
Revolución.” In addition to the history of Lunes, Luis’s book provides a detailed 
index of each number of the journal to which I am indebted for facilitating my task of 




realities were permitted in Cuba. This remained true, at least, for the first two years of 
the Revolution, during which the exact shape that it would take in the future remained 
uncertain. Yet after the suspicious explosion of the munitions freighter, La Coubre, 
on March 4, 1960, then after the failed counterrevolutionary invasion of Playa 
Girón/Bay of Pigs in April of 1961, freedom of expression would no longer be a 
guarantee. This is to say that as early as 1961, a full decade before the Padilla Affair, 
cultural production already was being subjected to state censorship. 
 Lunes quickly found itself at the center of a heated debate regarding 
appropriate cultural expression in the Revolution after having aired on its television 
channel the documentary P.M. (1961), directed by Sabá Cabrera Infante and Orlando 
Jiménez Leal. Lunes defended the documentary against the criticisms of the Instituto 
Cubano de Arte e Industria Cinematográficos (ICAIC). The ICAIC, controlled by the 
orthodox Marxists of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), was gaining favor with 
Fidel Castro over the MR-26-7, and the debate over P.M. formed part of a larger 
ideological struggle between the two groups over the control of cultural production on 
the island (Díaz Martínez 154). This debate prompted a series of well-documented 
conferences in the Biblioteca Nacional José Martí on June 16, 23, and 30, 1961, 
during which Fidel Castro read his notorious speech, “Palabras a los intelectuales,” 
and publicly pronounced the well-known phrase, “Dentro de la Revolución: todo; 
contra la Revolución ningún derecho” ‘Inside the Revolution—everything; against 
the Revolution there are no rights’ (n. pag.). Castro is quite direct about the demand 
for unity, while at the same time incredibly ambiguous in that he does not specify 




 According to Quintero-Herencia, this text “puede ser leído como una poética 
de la representación del ‘buen terreno’ para la producción intelectual; este texto 
producirá un interior y una imagen de la institucionalidad que regirá la actividad del 
intelectual cubano” ‘can be read as a poetics that represents the “good sphere” of 
intellectual production; this text will produce an inside and an image of how Cuban 
intellectuals’ activity will be regulated institutionally’ (349). Thus, the topology of 
the Revolution acquires a legal and moral framework wherein what is inside has 
rights and is good; everything else is against—but not outside—the Revolution and 
therefore legally inadmissible and morally reprehensible. Within the Cuban 
Revolution, within the first, unidirectional reading everything is to be found; against 
the Revolution, or against the current of the Revolution’s ideology, there is nothing 
that would be granted the legal or moral right to exist within the sovereign space of 
the Cuban state. There are no acceptable neutral or ambiguous relationships to the 
Revolution after this speech, which clearly prohibits intellectuals from creating their 
own itinerary throughout this space.  
 Ultimately, P.M. was censored, and five months after these conferences 
Revolución and Lunes de Revolución were closed, officially due to a shortage of 
paper. The ICAIC became the State-sanctioned institution that would go on to 
approve or censure Cuban film and culture, while Casa de las Américas assumed 




y Artistas de Cuba (UNEAC) and the Consejo Nacional de Cultural (CNC) were 
founded to ensure further unity in Cuban cultural production.26 
 I continually come across references to Calvert Casey that offer his name as 
one more intellectual to have been in Cuba in the early Sixties and to have 
participated in the major cultural journals, including Lunes and Casa de las 
Américas.27 Jean Franco’s The Decline and Fall of the Lettered City: Latin America 
and the Cold War, for example, only mentions Casey in passing alongside Cabrera 
Infante and Severo Sarduy as examples of not explicitly committed writers who were 
able to get published in Cuba (97). Franco’s claim is not incorrect, but a bit too 
general, and I will further elaborate on this below as I detail Casey’s specific position 
in relation to the discourses and debates on the role of the writer in times of 
revolution. Another examples is Emilio Bejel’s Gay Cuban Nation where he 
examines the works mainly by gay Cuban writers in which queer Cubans are 
narrated; Bejel demonstrates how queerness has been present in even the most 
canonical Cuban texts, ranging from José Martí to Severo Sarduy and Achy Obejas. 
However, Casey’s works here only merit a few, brief sentences in which he appears 
anecdotally as a gay writer who committed suicide in 1969 (105). Although Bejel’s 
exclusion of Casey’s writings from the corpus of texts he studies may be due to the 
                                                
26 While the general proceedings of these conferences are well-known and frequently 
summarized, I have paraphrased this information from William Luis’s previously 
cited works and from a more recent essay by Manuel Díaz Martínez, “La pistola 
sobre la mesa,” that appeared in a dossier in the Revista de Encuentro de la Cultural 
Cubana on Castro’s “Palabras,” the conference at the Biblioteca Nacional José Martí, 
and the fate of Revolución and Lunes. 
27 This is the case of both William Luis’s and Manuel Díaz Martínez’s previously 
cited works, although it should be mentioned that the purposes of their studies is not 
to explore any one writer’s texts in particular, but rather to narrate the context of 




paucity of references to male homosexuality in them, there are a handful of texts in 
which the topic is explicitly present (e.g. “Notas sobre la pornografía,” in its 
uncensored version, and the posthumous short story, “Piazza Margana”), and many 
others in which a sensibility toward exploring sexuality and questioning gender roles 
is readily apparent (e.g. “El paseo” and “In Partenza”). While an initial reflection 
might assume that Casey’s works went unnoticed primarily because of his sexuality, I 
would argue that the lack of critical and popular attention paid to Casey when 
compared with other writers of the era should not be explained away as a case of 
generalized homophobia, although homophobia was prevalent in the Sixties.  
 There are a handful of quite insightful studies of Casey’s writings. Víctor 
Fowler-Calzada’s essay, “Casey’s Nineteenth Century and the Ciclón Project” 
focuses on Casey’s critical essays about nineteenth century Cuban writers that he 
published in Ciclón. Gustavo Pérez-Firmat’s chapter, “Mother’s Idiom, Father’s 
Tongue” from his book Tongue Ties: Logo-Eroticism in Anglo-Hispanic Literature 
studies Casey’s posthumous text, “Piazza Margana,” and his alternation between 
writing in Spanish and English. In the previously mentioned Fulguración del espacio, 
Quintero-Herencia analyzes the short story “El regreso” and its relation to the Cuban 
journal Casa de las Américas, in which the story first appeared alongside other texts. 
In “‘El regreso’ de Calvert Casey: una exposición en la playa,” Quintero-Herencia 
further situates this short story in dialogue with Jean-Paul Sartre’s essays on Cuba, 
collected in English as Sartre on Cuba (1961).  
 Beyond these, other essays dedicated exclusively to Calvert Casey are 




not explored in depth.28 There have also been a few well-organized, yet incomplete 
anthologies of Casey’s fiction and essays in both Spanish and English translation; 
these collect mainly the stories that Casey had published at Casa de las Américas, 
Ediciones R, and Seix Barral. In addition to Stavan’s previously mentioned anthology 
in English, these collections include Mario Melino’s Notas de un simulador (1997); 
Cuentos (casi) completos (2009); and an edition of three of his short stories in Tres 
relatos rituales (1986). It would seem, based on these anthologies, that nothing of 
interest, or at least very few additional texts had been published by Casey in Lunes.  
 However, Casey wrote more than thirty texts exclusively for Lunes that have 
yet to be republished in any form. These include essays and criticism on Cuban 
music, theater, dance, and opera, translations of essays on modern theater and acting 
techniques, and journalistic writings based on testimonies from men who fought 
during the Playa Girón/Bay of Pigs invasion and from volunteers, like himself, who 
came from around the world to help build the Cuban Revolution. It is unknown why 
Casey never included these texts in his other book-length collections of fiction and 
essays, which are composed of materials that had been previously published in a 
                                                
28 The 1982 dossier on Calvert Casey that appeared in the Spanish cultural magazine, 
Quimera, which included essays by Cabrera Infante, María Zambrano, Severo 
Sarduy, Italo Calvino, Vicente Molina Foix, and others, provides mostly biographical 
anecdotes. Cabrera Infante’s “¿Quién mató a Calvert Casey?” first appeared in this 
dossier and has become, with little critical reflection, the basis for a great number of 
biographical data often repeated as historical fact. I would caution reading this essay 
as little more than historical fiction, which has certainly been dramatized by Cabrera 
Infante who makes its “incerteza biográfica” ‘biographical uncertainty’ clear in the 
essay (45). In addition, Víctor Fowler’s La maldición: una historia del placer como 
conquista (La Habana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1998) provides a mostly 
biographical account of Casey based on these texts. Ilan Stavans has attentively 
collected Casey’s biographical information in his introduction to the English-
language translations of his short stories, Calvert Casey: The Collected Stories 




variety of journals, nor why they have been ignored by his subsequent editors. In 
looking at the nature of these texts, what becomes clear is that Casey was invested in 
using his skills as a committed writer both to document lived Cuban reality in the 
early 1960s and to offer his intellectual labor as a sympathetic, constructive critic 
with the goal of improving Cuban culture and society, while also providing 
theoretical tools in translation that had been previously unavailable in Spanish.  
 I mention all of this because of the dearth of scholarship on Casey, in general, 
and especially with regard to his participation in Lunes. In my view, these texts must 
be further explored in order to comprehend how he positioned himself inside the 
Cuban Revolution before he fled the island in 1965 fearing imprisonment as a 
counterrevolutionary. In addition to his sexuality, what I will show is that Casey also 
began to declare a certain apprehension about conforming to the party line without 
reservations. Although the texts I study are among Casey’s most explicitly political 
writings that outline and publicly declare his position as a committed intellectual 
within the context of Lunes and in dialogue with the other contributors to the journal, 
they are among the ones that have gone unnoticed more than any others over the past 
fifty years. 
 The first text that interests me, “Un ensayo oportuno” ‘A Timely Essay’ 
(1960), can be read as Casey’s attempt to understand the current state of the 
intellectual in the time of revolution as well as to provide a plan of action for his 
contemporaries—the habitual topic of writers in the Sixties. The “timely essay” to 
which the title refers is a speech given by José Antonio Portuondo in 1938 that was 




Portuondo’s speech, titled “Pasión y muerte del hombre” ‘Man’s Passion and Death,’ 
is the spirit of the revolutionary, Marxist man and, in particular, the role of the 
intellectual in relation to the masses. Portuondo begins by outlining the failure of 
intellectuals to connect with the masses since turning to irrationalism at the start of 
the twentieth century. Irrationalism, Portuondo explains, can be understood as a 
rejection of the Cartesian method, that is, a rejection of a strictly logical, linear, 
technical, and empirical approach to interpreting the world; however, he argues that 
this has led to the intellectual’s complete solitude and isolation from the masses since 
World War I (“Pasión” 117–121). In order to combat this solitude, Portuondo 
proposes the intellectual be “heroicamente razonable” ‘heroically rational’ without 
handing himself over “al torrente de su tiempo que lo arrastra” ‘to be swept along by 
the currents of his time’ (121). This heroically rational intellectual, says Portuondo, 
must be humble and honest, while capable of recognizing his own limitations as well 
as his duty to continue learning and to search for other ways of perceiving the world. 
Furthermore, Portuondo believes intellectuals should “meterse desnudo en la pelea de 
los hombres y decirles con su voz lo que aprendimos, en los libros y en la vida, para 
que ellos lo hagan fructificar” ‘jump nude into mankind’s struggle and tell them in 
their own words what we have learned, in books and in life, so that they may put it 
into practice’ (122–123). In a sense, Portuondo insists that intellectuals—with whom 
he identifies—must find a way to translate their knowledge into a language that can 
be comprehended and appropriated by the masses for the success of the socialist 




 While reading this speech, which Casey feels Portuondo had written “para los 
hombres de 1960” ‘for the benefit of men in 1960,’ he updates Portuondo’s ideas 
from the 1930s by translating them for his contemporaries in order to formulate and 
publicly declare his own position in the debate about intellectual commitment (“Un 
ensayo” 13). Casey confesses his and other intellectuals’ sense of isolation and regret 
at not having participated directly in the armed struggle at the moment the Rebel 
Army triumphantly arrived in Havana: “El único sentimiento honrado que podíamos 
permitirnos al ver pasar a ‘los otros’, a los hombres anónimos de las ciudades y el 
campo, a los que hasta ayer considerábamos la incolora e inculta medianía, era el de 
remordimiento y un enorme complejo de culpa, bajo el cual aún vivimos” ‘The only 
honorable emotion that we could allow ourselves when we saw “the others” go by, 
the anonymous men from the cities and the countryside, the ones we had considered 
uncouth and uncultured nobodies until yesterday, was regret and an enormous guilty 
conscience, with which we still live’ (13). Casey opens with his own freely offered 
mea culpa—one that would not be demanded of him under the threat of further 
imprisonment as in the case of Heberto Padilla a decade later. He publicly confesses 
his own guilty conscience, employing the religious rhetoric that permeated Cuban 
revolutionary discourse, while simultaneously adopting the first person plural (e.g. 
“Nuestra primera tarea” ‘our first task’; “Mucho hemos adelantado en un año” ‘We 
have progressed a lot in one year,’ my emphasis) to situate himself firmly inside the 
Cuban Revolution (13).  
 Having lived much of his life in the United States, the need to publicly assume 




of directly benefitting from the imperialism against which the Revolution was 
fighting. In fact, this gesture is comparable to Virgilio Piñera’s attempts to “decir 
Presente” ‘say Here,’ as Quintero-Herencia has shown, like a schoolboy responding 
to the teacher’s roll call in the public space of the Revolution (Fulguración 93–95). 
More than a political stance, Quintero-Herencia argues that this declaration is a moral 
stance as well: “La necesidad de probarse moralmente en un escenario público cifrado 
por la guerra es notable entre los comentarios de Piñera. Ese gesto defensivo anota 
una atmósfera ‘moral’ de reclamos y de afanes demostrativos dirigidos hacia la 
‘insuficiencia’ política de la práctica literaria en lo revolucionario” ‘The need to 
prove oneself morally in a public space encoded by war is notable among Piñera’s 
comments. This defensive gesture makes note of a “moral” atmosphere full of 
demonstrating one’s demands and ambitions against the political “insufficiency” of 
literature in the revolution’ (94). The writers in the Revolution had to make up for 
their deficiencies by declaring their commitment and loyalty to the regime under the 
bright lights of the public sphere. 
 Of course, Casey did return to Cuba with the intent purpose of participating in 
the Revolution before 1959. Ítalo Calvino, for his part, asserts that Casey could have 
easily chosen to hold on to his “nacionalidad yanqui” ‘Yankee nationality’ yet he 
“vivía la revolución como una experiencia moral individual y colectiva” ‘lived the 
revolution as an individual and collective moral experience’ (“Las piedras” 55). 
Cabrera Infante recalls that the exact date of Casey’s return to Cuba, as well as his 
place of birth, are not entirely known, but that these historical data are of little 




menor acento” ‘spoke Spanish as well as anyone from Havana without a foreign 
accent’, a Spanish that was “en realidad su lengua madre” ‘in reality his mother 
tongue’ (“Quién” 45). Thus, Casey must rehearse this gesture like Piñera because of 
his choice to be a writer in the Revolution more so than because of his ties to the 
United States; in 1960, his choice of profession seems to be more problematic than 
his national, and perhaps even his sexual, identity.  
 In the essay, Casey goes on to quote Virgilio Piñera as one who had critiqued 
the writers and intellectuals who, under Batista’s rule in Cuba, “optó por refugiarse en 
el barroquismo o en el hermetismo” ‘chose to take refuge in the Baroque or in 
hermeticism’ (13). While Casey does not name Lezama Lima directly, Piñera’s 
reference to the hermetically Baroque writer and the Cuban journal Orígenes is 
certainly alluded to in this phrase.29 Indirectly, Casey declares himself to be an 
intellectual guilty of remaining neutral during the armed struggle, but he manages to 
keep his distance from those who might be slightly more guilty—assuming one can 
differentiate degrees of guilt—like Lezama Lima and other members of the petty 
bourgeoisie. Casey constructs a space for himself somewhere between those who 
sought refuge and isolation in the aesthetic and those who took up arms to combat 
Batista’s regime that subjugated Cuba to neocolonial powers. Yet, Casey knew all of 
this was not sufficient to earn the trust of the barbudos, nor did it meet the demands 
of some of the most public intellectual and revolutionary figures of the era: Fidel 
Castro, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and Règis Debray. In what follows, 
                                                
29 For a more detailed reading of the debates surrounding the distinctions between the 
Orígenes group and the Lunes group, see Duanel Díaz, “Orígenes, Lunes, 




I have chosen to situate Casey within the discursive space created by these figures 
who articulated a definition of the role of the intellectual leading up to Castro’s 
“Palabras a los intelectuales” in 1961.30 
 Jean Paul Sartre’s What is Literature?, published originally in 1947, has been 
studied in depth as a central text for understanding the relationship between writing 
and revolution in the Cold War era. Freedom, for Sartre, is the central topic and 
demand of all good writing, and every act of good writing is an engaged or committed 
act. For Sartre, in this writing there should not be any opposition between form and 
content nor between the personal and collective needs expressed therein:  
Thus, in a society without classes, without dictatorship, and without stability, 
literature would end by becoming conscious of itself; it would understand that 
form and content, public and subject, are identical, that the formal freedom of 
saying and the material freedom of doing complete each other, and that one 
should be used to demand the other, that it best manifests the subjectivity of 
the person when it translates most deeply collective needs and, reciprocally, 
that its function is to express the concrete universal to the concrete universal 
and that its end is to appeal to the freedom of men so that they may realize and 
maintain the reign of human freedom. To be sure, this is utopian. (108) 
                                                
30 Debray’s text, while published in 1967, is primarily an analysis of the armed 
struggle and the early years after its triumph, thus making his ideas relevant for this 
limited time span. For a more detailed analysis of the various positions taken in this 
debate ranging from Castros “Palabras” to the polemic Padilla Affair in 1971, see 
Ana Serra’s The “New Man” in Cuba: Culture and Identity in the Revolution 
(Gainesville, Fla.: UP Florida, 2007), particularly Chapter 2, “Body versus Mind: An 




Not only is this utopian, but his concern with concrete universals and the abstract 
pursuit of freedom develop within the immediate post-World War II context over a 
decade before the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. As such, this formulation of the 
state of literature and the goals of the revolutionary writer derive from Sartre’s desire 
to conceive of a literature and a form of commitment that might lead to revolution. 
Ultimately, the political endgame of Sartre’s existentialism would be a “democratic 
socialist society” that focused on the well-being of the working class (Aronson 45). 
As Aronson demonstrates, Sartre found inspiration in Camus which led to his 
advocation of “the engaged but not starry-eyed or ideological writer, at once ‘poet of 
freedom’ and political activist” (55). But what is of more interest here is how these 
formulations of the role of the writer acquire a specific historical form after 1959.  
 In 1960, Sartre visited Cuba like so many other committed intellectuals of the 
time, and he published a series of essays based on his experiences there, which have 
been translated into English as Sartre on Cuba. Not unlike Casey’s voluntary mea 
culpa, Sartre emphasizes the errors of his ways and thoughts before setting foot in 
Cuba. “I had misunderstood everything,” Sartre declares. “What I took to be signs of 
wealth were, in fact, signs of dependence and poverty” (12). Referring to a speech 
given by Oscar Pinos Santos on July 1, 1959, he explains how the Cuban case taught 
him to reevaluate his prejudices by looking at the world upside down:  
There is, said Pinos Santos, a sort of disease of the eyes called retinosis 
pigmentaria which manifests itself by the loss of lateral vision. All those who 
have carried away an optimistic view of Cuba are quite sick. They see directly 




me. But for several days already I have misunderstood my profound error. I 
felt my prejudices vacillating. To discover the truth of this capital, I would 
have to see things upside down. (11)  
Upon arriving at the island where Sartre’s utopian aspirations from a decade earlier 
might materialize, he immediately narrates this experience as one in which everything 
he thought he knew would have to be reevaluated under the light of the Cuban 
Revolution. As Quintero-Herencia has shown, Sartre acquires a new, morally 
appropriate and historically correct position regarding the Revolution: “Al mirar 
‘correctamente’ la Revolución, esta se presentará a sí misma translúcida ante su 
observador” ‘By learning to see the Revolution “properly,” it will present itself as 
translucent before its observer’ (“El regreso” 387). Any sense of optimism about 
Cuba would have to be completely eradicated once the economic realities structuring 
the country’s dependence on foreign imperial powers were taken into consideration. 
These essays, thus, document Cuba’s status as a dependent “semi-colony” and clearly 
articulate the United States’ “economic imperialism” since Cuba gained 
independence from Spain (Sartre 26). As such, Sartre justifies the need for agrarian 
reform to return possession of the land to those who work it, following Marxist 
dogma, instead of allowing it to belong to the latifundistas who no longer lived in 
Cuba (69–79). He arrives at the conclusion that Cuba is not underdeveloped because 
of a national or geographical deficiency, but because of “a complex relationship 
between a backward country and the great powers that have maintained it in this 
backward condition” (81). As such, Sartre comes to see Latin America indirectly 




Theory. After seeing these realities from his new, upside-down perspective, Sartre’s 
concept of intellectual commitment is reformulated not just as commitment to 
freedom and revolutionary thought in the abstract—ideas which still operate at the 
heart of Sartre’s essays in 1960—but now as the defense of Cuba’s freedom as a 
sovereign state and of its independence from the imperial powers that had subjugated 
it to foreign economic and political interests for centuries.  
 In the same year, Ernesto “Che” Guevara published his Guerrilla Warfare for 
the benefit of other revolutionaries who might learn from the Cuban experience when 
planning their own armed struggle. Without a doubt, for Guevara the guerrilla 
fighter—not the traditional intellectual—is the true vanguard of the revolution. 
However, in addition to military strategy and guerrilla tactics, Guevara underscores 
that “intensive popular work must be undertaken to explain the motives of the 
revolution, its ends, and to spread the incontrovertible truth that victory of the enemy 
against the people is finally impossible” (56). This apparently intellectual labor is not 
assigned to the traditional intellectuals. In fact, there is no mention of intellectuals in 
this treatise. Women combatants, however, can readily fill the role of guerrilla 
teacher, according to Guevara. While he does state that women should be allowed to 
fight and that they “can perform every class of combat task that a man can at a given 
moment,” he dedicates most of the section on women to explaining the traditional 
gendered roles to which they are best assigned: deceiving enemy forces with tricks, 
performing civilian tasks such as cooking and sewing, teaching literacy, serving as a 




success of the armed struggle and the subsequent revolution, but it is a clearly 
gendered activity.  
 In a section titled “Training and Indoctrination,” after explaining how to teach 
new recruits to shoot a rifle, Guevara explains the need for indoctrination: “this is 
important because the men arrive without a clear conception as to why they come, 
with nothing more than very diffuse concepts about liberty, freedom of the press, etc., 
without any clear foundation whatever” (124). These vague concepts, while ideal for 
inspiring men to join the fight, are limited in securing the people’s dedication to the 
specific, concrete goals of the Cuban revolutionaries—namely, the fight against 
Batista and economic imperialism as explained above by Sartre. Thus, all free time 
should be dedicated to education in order to solidify the unity of the guerrilla fighters 
toward a common goal; they must learn the history of their country “with a clear 
sense of the economic facts that motivate each of the historic acts,” as well as “the 
national heroes” (124–125). The teachers should also be trained so as to agree upon a 
choice of texts, further ensuring a sense of national unity (125). Education, however, 
is a task to be carried out by other guerrilla fighters already within the armed struggle. 
Curiously, these teachers are not considered to be intellectuals, but rather a necessary 
component of the armed struggle, even if they are its feminine counterpart; this direct 
participation and contribution to the armed struggle exculpates them from the guilt 
that intellectuals like Casey, who never bore arms, felt the need to publicly confess.  
 There is something paradoxical in Guevara’s attempt to cleave unarmed 
intellectuals from the revolutionary process. In El último lector, Ricardo Piglia 




reading and on another scene in which he waits to begin an ambush by reading a book 
while laying in a hammock (“Ernesto” 106–107). Piglia recalls that Guevara states his 
own “tendencia a aislarse, separarse, construyéndose un espacio aparte” ‘tendency to 
isolate himself, to separate himself by creating a separate space for himself’ (107). It 
is in this separate space where he spends his time reading, a space and an activity that 
shares an undeniable similarity to the paradigm of the ivory tower intellectual. It 
should be recalled that the journals that were found on Guevara’s body after being 
captured and killed in Bolivia include a long list of books that Guevara either read or 
planned to read, including books by G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky, William Faulkner, Graham Greene, Rubén Darío, and Julio Cortázar, 
among many others (“Facsímil” n.pag.). In Piglia’s assessment, Guevara becomes yet 
another intellectual in a long literary tradition who desperately wants to know “cómo 
salir de la biblioteca, cómo pasar a la vida, cómo entrar en acción, cómo ir a la 
experiencia, cómo salir del mundo libresco, cómo cortar con la lectura en tanto lugar 
de encierro” ‘how to leave the library, how to pass into life, how to engage in action, 
how to go toward experience, how to leave the world of books, how to break with the 
act of reading as a space of enclosure’ (“Ernesto” 127). In this way, Guevara is 
caught somewhere between the ideal armed revolutionary that he appears to embody 
and the intellectual that he cannot quite shed from his own life who reads and writes 
incessantly.  
 Of course, a revolution on the scale of the Cuban Revolution would not be 
possible without any form of intellectual activity to guide its new institutions. 




in his 1965 open letter “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” which he wrote to Carlos 
Quijano, director of the Uruguayan journal Marcha, and also published in Verde 
Olivo in Cuba. He explains:  
To sum up, the fault of our artists and intellectuals lies in their original sin: 
They are not truly revolutionary. We can try to graft the elm so that it will 
bear pears, but at the same time we must plant pear trees. New generations 
will come who will be free of the original sin. The probabilities that great 
artists will appear will be greater to the degree that the field of culture and the 
possibilities for expression are broadened.  
Our task is to prevent the present generation, torn asunder by its conflicts, 
from becoming perverted and from perverting new generations. We must not 
bring into being either docile servants of official thought, or scholarship 
students who live freely at the expense of the state—practicing “freedom.” 
Already there are revolutionaries coming who will sing the song of the new 
man in the true voice of the people. This is a process which takes time. (18) 
Guevara appears resigned in front of the task of transforming the already existing, 
guilty intellectuals into true revolutionaries; the current generations were, to use 
Guevara’s term, “perverted,” a word with undeniable sexual connotations that would 
indirectly reinforce the link between the weak, effeminate intellectual (e.g. women 
were apt for becoming teachers) and the sexual “perversions” of gay men who would 
around 1965 be imprisoned in the UMAPs as counterrevolutionaries. Guevara’s 
rhetoric clearly borrows from the Catholic tradition while remaining metaphysically 




certain traditional gender roles as it constructs the role of the intellectual in the 
Revolution. Ultimately, Guevara encourages patience until more men like him are 
born. He expects the new generations, the new men which will grow out of the youth 
of the revolution, to fill this void and become a new type of revolutionary intellectual 
who will speak as one among the people, as men born of the Revolution, as a 
generation modeled on his own combined military and intellectual practices.  
 Furthermore, a major defining point for revolutionary thought in the Sixties is 
to reaffirm the originality of Castro’s and of Guevara’s actions and thoughts by 
differentiating their writings from the theoretical writings not only of traditional 
intellectuals, but also of other major revolutionary figures in the world. In Revolution 
in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America, Debray 
confirms this position in his study of armed struggle in Cuba and the regime’s 
institutionalization after military victory. In a footnote, Debray clarifies that Castro 
clearly “drew his fundamental political inspiration from Martí” and allows room for 
“the ideas of Marx and Lenin” that structured his interpretations of Cuban reality 
(20). However, in the main text he insists that “it was only at the end of the war, when 
their tactics were already defined, that the rebels discovered the writings of Mao” 
(20). Given that Cuba by 1967, when Debray published this study, had become a 
model for many armed revolutionary groups across Latin America, part of Debray’s 
task in demonstrating the originality of their ideas is to emphasize the need to develop 
military strategy and guerrilla tactics from experience in local realities as opposed to 




 By this formulation, the true revolutionary is the one who acts to create a true 
revolution, not one who theorizes politically or only speaks of his revolutionary 
intentions based on foreign models. Regarding this point, Debray explains Castro’s 
mistrust of intellectual activity that pays more attention to theory than to experiential 
praxis: “Fidel once blamed certain failures of the guerrillas on a purely intellectual 
attitude toward war. The reason is quite understandable: aside from his physical 
weakness and lack of adjustment to rural life, the intellectual will try to grasp the 
present through preconceived ideological constructs and live it through books” (21). 
The scrawny, city-dwelling (queer or effeminate, I would add, in relation to 
Guevara’s texts) intellectual, therefore, must learn to overcome his penchant for 
substituting physical action with pure ideology when it comes to “confronting 
imperialism with acts and not merely with words” (125). This assumption of the 
physical deficiency of intellectuals further supports the distinction between them and 
the guerrilla fighters in Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare, since the guerrilla fighter must 
be of the strongest physical character, “indefatigable” and “able to endure 
extremities” without food, water, shelter, and often while wounded or sick (76).  
 In case there were any lingering doubts about the reasons to mistrust these 
intellectuals, in another footnote Debray summarizes his position on the role of the 
intellectual in the Revolution: “Let us speak clearly. The time has passed for 
believing that it suffices to be ‘in the Party’ to be a revolutionary. […] In Latin 
America today a revolutionary is not defined by his formal relationship with the 
Party, whether he is for or against it. The value of a revolutionary, like that of a party, 




intellectual will ultimately disappear as each revolutionary individual will work to 
dissolve the differences between intellectuals and peasants or guerrillas by 
redistributing the division of intellectual and manual labor. Guevara’s new men will 
not fall into these clearly differentiated categories, because they derive from 
bourgeois, capitalist structures of class division that are to be eliminated.  
 As I read “Un ensayo oporuno” in this context, Casey situates himself as a 
Cuban intellectual who must assume his personal guilt, shed the bourgeois upbringing 
that allowed him the privilege of becoming an intellectual in the United States while 
so many other Cubans barely subsisted under the country’s neocolonial status, and 
invest all of his present and future efforts in the active creation of the Revolution. 
Alongside many of his contemporaries, Casey will not give in to Guevara’s 
resignation, and he seeks a plan of action, without taking up arms, to at least partially 
suture the gap separating intellectuals like himself, on one side, from the Cuban 
people and the true revolutionaries on the other. In order to do so, Casey turns to 
Portuondo’s concept of the “heroically rational” intellectual whose guiding 
characteristics must be “humildad y aprendizaje” ‘humillity and learning’ (13). 
Rereading Portuondo’s ideas for 1960, Casey proposes that the Cuban intellectual’s 
first task be “expresar en términos de razón el sentido de la Revolución […] 
construyendo nuevas formas” ‘to express in rational terms the meaning of the 
Revolution […] by creating new forms’ (13). Instead of turning to the past, Casey 
insists that intellectual labor must express the goals and highlight the 
accomplishments of the Cuban Revolution in logical terms that are universally 




struggle, they may be useful for profoundly understanding the Cuban Revolution and 
finding ways to disseminate this knowledge in practical terms for the benefit of the 
Cuban people, particularly in its early years. For the purpose of clarifying this role, 
Casey concludes this brief essay with the following mission statement: “Aprender, 
formular las verdades de los hombres de pasión, servir, señalar los peligros, crear 
incesantemente, ayudar a mantener el frente ancho e irresistible de la Revolución: 
esos objetivos han de constituir la misión de los escritores en 1960 y en los años de la 
Revolución” ‘Learning, expressing the truths of passionate men, serving, pointing out 
dangers, creating incessantly, helping to maintain the wide and irresistible front of the 
Revolution: those objectives should constitute the writer’s mission in 1960 and in the 
years of the Revolution’ (13). The revolutionary writer, therefore, must be heroic, 
humble, and honest, and his labor has to be at the service of creating, expanding, and 
defending the Revolution. There is little doubt after reading this particular, brief essay 
that Casey is a publicly declared committed intellectual in 1960 who has devoted 
himself to the task of repenting for his past sins and actively working to become a 
true revolutionary. 
 Casey also participated in the occasional round-table conversations organized 
by Lunes de revolución, and I am particularly interested in the conversations with 
Pablo Neruda in December 1960, with Nazim Hikmet in June 1961 just before the 
conferences in the Biblioteca Nacional José Martí, and with Nathalie Sarraute in 
September 1961 just two months before Lunes would close. Each of these invited 
authors advocates for artistic freedom, rejecting State-prescribed forms similar to 




Lunes group in general. In the conversation with Neruda, Casey asks if he thinks he 
has succeeded in overcoming “el problema de la comunicación oral con el pueblo en 
un alto nivel” ‘the problem of communicating verbally with the people at a high 
level’ (40). Casey’s preoccupation with communicating with the people without 
simplification takes precedence, and he seems to have found in Neruda a model for 
traversing that distance between the U.S.-born intellectual and the Cuban people. 
Neruda deflects the question, saying the people will have to answer as to whether or 
not he was successful. Instead, Neruda decries dogmatism in literature and in politics, 
which he defines as “una visión parcial de la vida y de los acontecimientos. Una 
visión única, determinada y que no puede ser alterada” ‘a partial vision of life and of 
events. A single, determined vision, one that cannot be altered’ (41). Neruda defends 
remaining open to an exploration of artistic expression as long as this expression is 
committed to engaging the people in dialogue—a vision which seems to be supported 
by Casey and the intellectuals of Lunes. In my view, it will be this commitment to 
remaining open to various forms of dialogue that will come to characterize the 
politics of going unnoticed. But for now I only want to make the point that such an 
open, unbounded exploration would become problematic, especially after Castro’s 
decree in 1961. 
 Nazim Hikmet, for his part, proposes that the group hold an amicable 
discussion on the topic of the role of the writer in the Revolution. Casey is the first to 
express his point of view: “Pienso que el escritor es testigo de su época. Entonces, 
uno ve, poniendo sobre los libros, sobre los cuentos, sobre los artículos, no importa 




de su país; y también haciendo buena literatura ayudará a su país” ‘I think that the 
writer is a witness to his era. Therefore, he observes, placing in books, in short 
stories, in articles, it doesn’t matter where, everything that occurs around him, and he 
will contribute to the historical and political development of his country; and also by 
creating good literature he will aid his country’ (2). More than communicating with 
the people, Casey begins to define a content for his writing: Cuban reality. To this, 
Hikmet adds, according to his recent reading of José Martí, that the writer should also 
“educar” ‘educate’ and “propagar” ‘spread information,’ since “el rol del escritor no 
es solamente un rol objetivo, porque es necesario que él participe en el movimiento, 
subjetivamente también” ‘the role of the writer is not only an objective one, because 
it is necessary to participate in the movement subjectively as well’ (2). In agreement 
with Neruda, Hikmet declares that there cannot be one, dogmatic path for successful 
intellectual labor, but he draws certain limits to this notion of subjective expression. 
Some writers, he admits, will only have “una posición no neutra, pero en fin 
generosa” ‘a non-neutral, but ultimately generous position’ (5). Hikmet, however, 
does not accept the intellectual in the ivory tower as being sufficiently committed: 
“no creo que sea una posición digna de un intelectual que, en fin de cuentas, debe 
todo a su pueblo” ‘I don’t think it is a position that is worthy of an intellectual who, in 
the end, owes everything to his country’ (5). There will be, for Hikmet, a plurality of 
intellectual approaches to contributing to the Revolution; yet, these approaches will 
only be valid insofar as they actively and directly work toward the common goals of 
defending and expanding the Cuban Revolution from a non-neutral position. 




 Despite the rivers of ink used to explain, defend, and debate the role of the 
revolutionary intellectual, and despite the generally accepted sounds bites that are 
incessantly repeated in these highly visible debates, this role remains quite nebulously 
defined. Its outline is hazy, and there is no agreed upon rubric for adjudicating the 
revolutionary qualities of any particular work or act. By situating anti-dogmatism at 
the center of this debate, as many intellectuals struggle to do in these first years, they 
simultaneously defend their right to free, artistic experimentation and subject 
themselves to potentially harsh criticism and persecution dependent upon entirely 
subjective interpretations of their works. As long as these intellectuals had good faith 
in the Revolution’s commitment to remaining anti-dogmatic, this would not be 
perceived as a problem. However, Castro’s “Palabras a los intelectuales,” for all its 
ambiguities, was the first warning that the official position regarding the role of the 
intellectual would not be so open to their latent bourgeois proclivities. The Lunes 
group was the first to come under attack. Calvert Casey, in particular, did publicly 
declare his commitment and his positions seem to be more moderate than those put 
forth by his contemporaries in these debates. Without meaning to deny the sincerity 
of his commitment, I also perceive that it was his publicly declared position that 
secured for him a certain amount of public trust and allowed some of his other, less 
directly committed ideas to go unnoticed.  
 Calvert Casey is listed as one of the participants in the conversation with 
Nathalie Sarraute—alongside Manuel Díaz Martínez, Guillermo Cabrera Infante, 
Heberto Padilla, Edmundo Desnoes, and others—but each question, unlike in the 




explained as a hesitation on part of the Lunes group to be perceived as operating 
against the Revolution while inside it, since it was published after Castro’s “Palabras 
a los intelectuales” in the last months of the group’s operation. To clarify, this 
editorial change is not explained in the article. During the conversation, Sarraute 
repeats what has been a fairly common idea: focusing on concrete, local situations 
instead of universal theories and creating new forms to correspond with the new ideas 
and situations of the era (4). What particularly is of interest for my discussion of 
Casey is how Sarraute goes beyond just the concrete cases: “No me interesa la 
sicología convencional. Pretendo captar aquellas cosas, pequeños incidentes, muchas 
veces banales que están en el límite de la conciencia y que pueden ser lo más 
importante” ‘I’m not interested in conventional psychology. I attempt to capture those 
small, often times banal things and incidents that are at the limits of one’s conscience, 
which can be of the utmost importance’ (3). This emphasis on that which is 
seemingly minor or unimportant, on that which is left unattended and goes unnoticed, 
becomes in my analysis a curious point of dialogue between Sarraute and Casey. For 
both, a writer can tell the story of that which goes unnoticed, of voices heard in 
passing and of the abandoned fragments of a text, and still be a committed 
intellectual.  
 At the very least, both Sarraute and Casey still conceive of a fruitful 
relationship between the writer and the Revolution while telling these stories. In 
making such claims, however, they may already be walking along an errant path of 
their own invention that has led them astray or potentially turned them against the 




intellectual, these are the only two who promote a political commitment with the 
Cuban Revolution and with revolutionary ideology, while also defending the 
possibility of exploring that which is barely perceived both in public and in private. In 
fact, this dedication to what Sarraute locates at the limits of consciousness might 
come dangerously close to a defense of a European, bourgeois aesthetic obsessed 
with individualism or irrationalism that proves to be of little use for indoctrinating or 
raising the collective, revolutionary consciousness of the people; even if it were 
useful, it still might be too hermetic to engage in direct communication with the 
people, since the people—a group defined even more ambiguously than the 
bizcochuelo in Somers’s Un retrato—are often spoken of as a group who can only 
understand simple, direct language with little to no complexity. Writing about that 
which goes unnoticed already appears in a hazy, indistinct zone on the threshold 
between commitment and autonomy. 
 In a sense, I have returned to this question of the political potential of writing 
about that which goes unnoticed. Casey, who declares a commitment to politics in 
Cuba, also writes a literature rooted in exploring these fragments of abandoned voices 
and texts. To what extent is his commitment, which was undeniably genuine, actually 
in line with the political demands placed on intellectuals at the time? There is a 
minor, errant moment in which Casey takes a slight detour from this publicly declared 
commitment to the Revolution. Published in Lunes, in “El Premio Nobel y la muerte” 
‘The Nobel Prize and Death” (1960) Casey takes up the question once more. The 
purpose of this article was to intervene in the international polemic that reappeared in 




who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1958. Casey, in a rare moment of vehement 
disgust, condemns the foreign press as a “terrible ámbito desfigurador” ‘deplorable, 
distorting space’ and a “monstruo” ‘monster’ for having given such attention to a 
speculative debate about whether Pasternak truly deserved the Nobel Prize or 
whether, for the sake of Cold War politics, he was chosen in order to manipulatively 
promote him among the capitalist countries as a writer who was critical of the Soviet 
Union (24). In particular, Casey is appalled at the way a somewhat mediocre writer, 
quietly composing a respectable novel, “de pronto se ve violentamente impelido a la 
arena política mundial, sin él esperarlo, ni jamás pedirlo, pues tal cosa evidentemente 
repugna a su naturaleza” ‘all of a sudden finds himself violently thrown into the 
global political arena, without ever wanting that, and certainly without asking for it, 
since he evidently finds such things to be naturally repugnant’ (24).  
 This particular polemic is of little interest for my argument. Within Casey’s 
text, however, lies what I read as a slip of the tongue—recalling Héctor Manjarrez’s 
“actos fallidos”—during which Casey’s general timidity gives way to an unexpected, 
aggressive tone. At first, Casey cautiously retraces the line laid out for him by so 
many other committed intellectuals of his time, clearly situating himself within the 
limits of this group: “Para nosotros, comprometidos, la actitud pasiva, neutral, no 
comprometida, de Pasternak, es contraproducente, incluso dañina, pero la 
respetamos” ‘For us, the committed, Pasternak’s passive, neutral, uncommitted 
attitude is counterproductive, even damaging, but we respect it” (24). Through this 
enunciation, “nosotros, comprometidos” ‘we, the committed,’ Casey once more 




this statement. His caveat allows for the inclusion of an author like Pasternak whose 
neutral, counterproductive, and even damaging lack of commitment goes against the 
revolutionary struggle while remaining within this “we, the committed.” Casey’s brief 
text in 1960 employs a logic of inclusion of those who might also be antagonistic to 
one’s particular cause in stark contrast to the exclusive logic of Castro’s decree in 
1961. Casey claims a certain authority to extend his individual voice as the one who 
can speak in the plural and invite Pasternak into the fold, supposedly with the tacit 
approval of his fellow committed intellectuals.  
 By declaring his respect for Pasternak’s isolation, Casey contradicts his own 
publicly declared position as a committed intellectual. With the same gesture, the 
attempt to be inclusive and respectful of Pasternak cracks the image of the committed 
intellectual, even with its ambiguous traits and hazy outline. He then continues along 
this errant path in the concluding, disjunctive paragraph of his essay in which he 
further slips into an emotional outcry against a cold, unjust, and painful world: 
Pero lo terrible había sucedido. Un artista modesto, silencioso, que no 
aspiraba más que hacer su obra, buena o mediocre, limitada o de aliento, se 
había visto atrapado en medio de la furia, fríamente utilizado por unos, e 
injustamente alocado por otros. Los últimos años de su vida fueron quizás un 
ejemplo doloroso de que en nuestra época es imposible “El no 
comprometerse”. (24) 
But something terrible had occurred. A modest, quiet artist, who only aspired 
to create his work, whether it was good or mediocre, limited or encouraging, 




unjustly driven mad by others. The last years of his life were perhaps a painful 
example that in our era it is impossible “To Not Be Committed.” 
Casey never directly states that he would have preferred to live like Pasternak, 
modestly creating his work in silence. His choice to move to Cuba would suggest 
quite the opposite. But he could not remain quiet in the face of the foreign press’s 
brazen manipulations of a solitary writer’s works within the fury of the Cold War 
propaganda machine.  
 As a critique of imperialist propaganda, Casey’s vehement criticisms could be 
justified as a completely committed position as long as he distances himself from a 
figure like Pasternak; however, Casey authorizes the other unnamed, committed 
intellectuals to respect Pasternak. Recognizing the ambiguities of Pasternak’s 
position, since he never publicly declared his politics, Casey laments the “painful 
example” proving that such a solitary life and literature is now impossible, because it 
leaves one’s works too open to manipulative interpretations in the public sphere. The 
double negative with which Casey expresses the current state of affairs for 
intellectuals—the impossibility of not being committed—registers a closure in the 
public and the private spheres. It is no longer possible, Casey claims, to maintain an 
apolitical stance, even when living in a peripheral, isolated area. Being committed is 
now a demand, a requirement of the Sixties. And Casey finds this utterly painful and 
regrettable.  
 It would seem that his “original sin,” as Guevara would have it, has 
resurfaced. Casey has erred ever so slightly in his defense of Pasternak, and he subtly 




condition as an intellectual who has yet to fully rid himself of his bourgeois 
sensibilities. But precisely because of his public confessions as a committed 
intellectual, which in 1960 were sufficient to at least generate a precarious trust 
between the barbudos and the intellectuals, his line of flight seems to go unnoticed. 
Casey’s public declarations paradoxically allow him to be swallowed into the 
seemingly homogeneous mass of intellectuals in the Revolution; by taking a public 
stance like everyone else, he opens the possibility of going unnoticed in public. 
Inadvertently, since his commitment to the Revolution was undeniably genuine in its 
early years, Casey steps onto the public stage under the light of the Revolution and 
becomes indistinguishable as an individual, thus opening the possibility for his less 
explicitly committed writings to go unnoticed. Meanwhile, Pasternak’s isolation has 
the opposite effect; in trying to hide in the periphery and avoid public, political 
statements, he attracts even more attention to himself. Ultimately, Casey’s public 
image makes it possible for him to err-like-a-palindrome along a dissenting, political, 
and temporarily unnoticed itinerary and still be offered a job at Casa de las Américas 




An Errant Allegory in Argentina 
 Quite similar to Boris Pasternak, and in stark contrast to Calvert Casey, 
Maximiliano Konsideransky lives alone in his inverted, subterranean tower located 
somewhere in the provincial lands outside of Río Cuarto, Argentina, and he refuses 
any and all external contact. The 2.7 meters (8’10”) tall Konsideransky claims to be 
his own God, priest, faithful worshipper, temple, martyr, shoemaker, tailor, 
interlocutor, and onanist, all in one. His self-sufficiency is impressive, although no 
mention is made of how he procures foodstuffs given that he needs thirty percent 
more than the average man to survive, according to his own calculations. He resides 
alone in order to contemplate the outside world and the starry skies as he hides 
himself from all forms of social interaction.  
 Konsideransky is the main character in one of Juan Filloy’s “monodialogues” 
entitled “Yo y los intrusos” ‘Me and the Intruders’ from the short story collection Yo, 
yo y yo (Monodiálogos paranoicos) ‘Me, Myself, and I (Paranoid Monodialogues)’ 
published originally in 1971.31 The narrative begins when a man arrives at 
Konsideransky’s front door asking to see the inside of his house and, at the very least, 
for water for his mule. This provokes Konsideransky’s extensive monodialogue in 
                                                
31 These “monodialogues,” as I have chosen to translate Filloy’s neologism, 
“monodiálogos,” constitute a rhetorical structure that I will explore further in the 
following chapter in its relation to ethics, that is, to interacting with others and to 
engaging in dialogue across unfathomable distances. While each of the seven 
monodialogues slightly varies in its number of speakers and interlocutors, the general 
structure is comprised of one person, always a man, who dominates the entire 
discussion while ignoring most of what is said by the rest. The monodialogues often 
end in an ironic turn of events that undermines the force of the speaker who will not 





which he explains his state as “un hombre póstumo” ‘a posthumous man’ who must 
not be disturbed (129). Konsideransky tries to dismiss his visitor, a reporter with a 
bunch of new-fangled electronics, but when asked why he has created this refuge, he 
replies with the following sermon: 
Ya no hay distancias ni discreción. Eso es todo. Antes el mundo ponía muros 
de distancia y discreción para proteger la intimidad. Ahora no. Siete infames 
intrusos se han lanzado al abordaje de la felicidad del hombre: el Miedo, la 
Moral, la Propaganda, la Política, el Cine, la Radio, la Televisión… Actúan 
sueltos o en pandilla, desquiciando, mortificando, o trucidando al ser inerme, 
al zoon politikon que pulula en campos y ciudades. Felizamente, ya estoy 
inmunizado a su influencia deletérea. ¡Libre! ¡Libre en la autonomía de mi 
soledad! ¡Libre en el goce de mis sentidos! ¡Libre de la despersonalización 
forzada que embiste por doquiera. (135–136) 
‘There are no longer any distances or discretion. That’s why. The world used 
to create distance and discretion by putting up barriers to protect privacy. Not 
any more. Seven infamous intruders have launched an attack on man’s 
happiness: Fear, Morality, Propaganda, Politics, Film, Radio, Television… 
They act alone or in gangs, driving mad, tormenting, and reaving defenseless 
beings, the zoon politikon who mill around in the countryside and the cities. 
Fortunately, I am already immune to their deleterious influence. Free! Free in 
the autonomy of my solitude! Free to enjoy my feelings! Free from the forced 




Konsideransky desires to isolate himself and create a semblance of freedom from 
these seven infamous intruders (once more, the obsession with the number seven in 
Filloy’s works). However, his freedom is not that of Sartre and the other committed 
intellectuals, but rather a freedom gained by isolating himself in a purely autonomous 
state. He has dedicated his life to restoring the barriers that would allow him privacy, 
because he perceives the all-pervasive public sphere and the all-consuming 
biopolitical relations of the modern state of exception, not unlike those studied in 
Agamben’s homo sacer saga, to which I will return. 
 This cave-tower is his magnum opus, the most recent iteration of an 
experiment in architectural design that could provide him with a refuge from the 
overwhelming politicization of his era. Previously, he had attempted to live in the 
Argentine Pampas, but he found them to be adorned with parrots (“orlas de loros”) 
and was annoyed by the public cries of the roosters (“pregones de gallos”) that 
invaded his desire for silence; then, he moved to “un promontorio en medio del mar” 
‘a promontory in the middle of the ocean,’ but the flying fish seemed to be “espiando 
mi soledad” ‘spying on my solitude,’ not to mention the unrelenting waves 
“golpeando mis nervios” ‘beating at my nerves’ (137). Finally, he found complete 
solitude in the desolate deserts (“la desolación y el desierto”) of Córdoba Province 
(133). Now standing at the entrance to his refuge and lecturing the reporter, he 
launches into a didactic sermon that turns his cave-tower into an allegory about the 
need for silence, isolation, and self-contemplation away from the seven infamous 
intruders—Fear, Morality, Propaganda, Politics, Film, Radio, Television. Since he 




the reporter is recording and transmitting everything he says back to a radio station in 
Río Cuarto to be disseminated around the country without his consent (152). His 
masterpiece will prove to be as porous and insecure as his former abodes, and as 
such, it will be divested of its potential to be read as a serious allegory.  
 Proposing “Yo y los intrusos” as an allegory of the cave-tower raises the 
question of its relation to Plato’s allegory of the cave in The Republic—a comparison 
through which I will show the errant path taken by Konsideransky’s allegory. Plato’s 
classic allegory is but one of three interrelated narratives by which Socrates  
illustrates the linear path from the darkness of the likenesses, shadows, and 
reflections, into the light of the Good that generates Truth. In the classic allegory, 
there are slaves chained in the cave who only perceive the shadows of objects being 
cast on the wall. One of these slaves is freed and drug up and out of the cave with 
difficulty. The harsh light of the outside sun blinds him at first, but eventually his 
eyes adjust and can peer into the light of knowledge represented by the sun. Finally, 
he is able to return to the cave and reveal the truth to the rest of the chained slaves 
who only see the shadows. Since they have no experience of the outside realm, he 
struggles to convince them of the Truth he now possesses; this is the struggle of the 
philosopher-king (240–245).  
 Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” narrates how the process of illuminating 
intelligence for the human mind permits the creation of a consensual community, that 
is, of a political order called the Republic. The light of the sun, as an analog for the 
Good, opens the path toward reason and logic, which will be at the service of the 




illuminate the truth for those still chained in the cave is certainly comparable to the 
task set for the revolutionary intellectuals of the Sixties who sought to make their 
knowledge communicable to the people. Since Plato, visibility, light, and consensus 
building have been set at the heart of the political; without the light of the Good that 
all are able to perceive, the Republic cannot pass from becoming into being. 
However, I am not interested in creating such a passage. Going unnoticed, as I have 
argued, is a form of becoming, a perpetual movement through various thresholds of 
perception that does not aim to pass clearly from invisibility to visibility or from the 
darkness into the light and then back to its origin. It is simply an errant passing, and 
its politics will arise along this dimly lit path. If Filloy’s allegory is to be relevant to 
the politics of going unnoticed, it will have to take a detour from the Platonic text. 
 My reading of Plato’s The Republic for its fictional elements—its analogies 
and allegories—cannot be dissociated from Jacques Derrida’s revision of Plato 
without Platonism in his essay, “Khôra.”32 Derrida turns his attention to Plato’s 
Timaeus, showing it to be nothing less than a “general ontology” that “includes a 
theology, a cosmology, a physiology, a psychology, a zoology” (103). Its 
encyclopedic scope claims to situate all things, all “mortal or immortal, human and 
divine, visible and invisible things” (103). In order to achieve this comprehensive 
study, the Timaeus presents itself as a text that moves forward toward an end not 
                                                
32 Derrida advances a related argument in “Plato’s Pharmacy” about the impossibility 
of arriving at any origin outside of logos, and writing becomes more closely 
associated with myth than it does with knowledge or the truth: “And at the same time, 
through writing or through myth, the genealogical break and the estrangement from 
the origin are sounded” (74). The pharmakon, which in the Phaedrus is associated 
with writing, is both a remedy and a poison; it is necessary for seeking “the origin or 
cause of logos,” but that external origin or cause can never be investigated outside of 




unlike the unchained prisoner in the allegory of the cave: “Its encyclopedic end must 
mark the term, the telos, of a logos on the subject of everything that is” (103). In 
contrast, what interests Derrida is establishing that the Socratic dialogues written by 
Plato only succeed in taking the first of many “backward steps” whose telos is, in 
actuality, nothing more than a mythos, a fictional origin only accessible through 
writing (125). Plato’s Timaeus attempts to move forward, toward the light and the 
Good, toward an a priori end defined as the logical, rational order of all things. In 
contrast, Derrida claims that such a logical, rational order is only a mythical fiction 
employed to establish a foundational narrative for the Republic that masks an 
originary void. Derrida enumerates these short fictions from one to seven (a curious 
coincidence with Filloy’s obsession with the number seven). The first fiction is the 
dialogue in the Timaeus, and the second fiction, “the conversation of the evening 
before,” can be, without saying it must be, Plato’s The Republic and the Politeia 
(121).  
 In Derrida’s assessment, Plato’s writing serves not to achieve this 
encyclopedic account of all things, of their origin and their end, but rather it buries 
itself further into the retelling and rewriting of myths and fictions that supplement the 
lack of an origin and the lack of an end:  
[The excess of irony] accentuates the dynamic tension between the thetic 
effect and the textual fiction, between on the one hand the “philosophy” or the 
“politics” which is here associated with [Socrates]—contents of identifiable 
and transmissible meanings like the identity of a knowledge—and on the other 




“saying” (legomenon), whose origin appears always undefined, pulled back, 
entrusted to a responsibility that is forever adjourned, without a fixed and 
determinable subject. From one telling to the next, the author gets farther and 
farther away. (124) 
In returning to the originary texts of Western philosophy, that is, the texts that write 
the fictional origins of Western civilization, Derrida shows them to be incapable of 
reaching an origin or an end. As the text drifts and wanders toward the mythos which 
constantly pulls itself back, it ironically loses sight of its former telos, the attainment 
of the Good by reason and logic. Plato’s writing remains within a space between the 
origin and the end, between its mythos and its telos. 
 The possibility of transcendence from the visible realm to the intelligible 
realm, from becoming to being, gets lost in the space opened by this errant writing—
the spaced called “khôra.” Derrida chooses not to translate the term “khôra,” because 
of its semantic density and the irregular ways in which it has been translated by 
others. He considers it to be a space or a receptacle that opens a gap or a chasm 
between logos and mythos, while articulating the link between them. Khôra never 
possesses what it receives nor does it have a referent in the world: “And in fact, khôra 
will always already be occupied, invested even as a general place, and even when it is 
distinguished from everything that takes place in it. Whence the difficulty […] of 
treating it as an empty or geometric space” (109). Khôra opens up in an already 
occupied space, but it becomes different from that space even while sharing it; once 
this opening is located, Derrida is able to read it as the element that ironically 




Plato’s Timaeus in this opening by assuming a first person narrative to speak in the 
place of Socrates, as if Socrates were speaking in Derrida’s text and through 
Derrida’s voice, to the philosophers and the politicians: “I address you from your 
place [place] in order to say to you that I have no place [place], since I am like those 
who make their trade out of resemblance—the poets, the imitators, and the sophists, 
the genus of those who have no place” (108). It is no longer clear if Derrida or if 
Socrates is speaking here. This Derrida-Socrates, I might call him, situates himself in 
the opening in an already occupied space in order to speak as if he were a poet on 
matters that can only be discussed by philosophers and politicians, that is by Plato’s 
philosopher-king.  
 Where have we—Derrida, Socrates, Derrida-Socrates, Plato, and I—
wandered? It seems we have stumbled into the khôra. In order to show the distance 
that Plato’s Timaeus has traversed backward toward myth, Derrida simultaneously 
performs this wandering in his own text that now rewrites the Platonic text. In 
speaking from the place that opens in an already occupied space in the Platonic text—
khôra—this Derrida-Socrates is capable of speaking a different politics than the one 
canonically read in that text. He locates an opening that engages in disagreement with 
the formerly closed and populated space. Khôra, this opening in an already occupied 
space, is what interests me as the place in which a politics of going unnoticed takes 
place.  
 But I have gotten ahead of myself in discussing the opening in an already 
occupied space as the politics of going unnoticed. For now, it will suffice to say, 




just one of many errant steps that do not lead to an origin or a telos, and they do not 
produce a transcendence between becoming and being or between the visible and the 
intelligible realms. Derrida makes it possible to read Plato’s texts outside of 
Platonism’s linear logic, direct analogies, and referential allegories. Thus, the Platonic 
text, once Derrida is finished with it, becomes an errant fiction. He divests the 
allegory of its truth-bearing analogies and referentiality and turns it into a fictional 
text that drifts toward myth. While the man who is unchained from the cave wall can 
be dragged up and out of the cave to pass from one realm to the other, this becomes 
possible, Derrida claims, only within the fictional space of Plato’s allegory.  
 At this point, I propose reading Filloy’s “Yo y los intrusos” as an errant 
allegory of the cave-tower, as if it were a rewriting and an opening of Plato’s text not 
unlike the one carried out by Derrida’s text, but in this case without passing through 
Derrida (Filloy’s short story was published in 1971, a contemporary of Derrida’s 
1968 essay “Plato’s Pharmacy” and well before his 1987 essay “Khôra”). This errant 
allegory, in my view, underscores its own fictionality through irony; nevertheless, the 
errant allegory of the cave-tower counterintuitively recovers some of the referentiality 
lost in Derrida’s reading of the Platonic text.  
 The cave-tower does not function as a prison for its inhabitants as in the 
Platonic text; this is Konsideransky’s refuge from the outside world. This 
underground fortress, or temple to himself, he tells us, is built like an upside-down 
tower that he ascends by going further underground: “Me precipito para arriba 
hundiéndome en ella. Tengo mis raíces en el aire. Soy un árbol invertido” ‘I plunge 




As such, this cave-tower appears to be structured like one of Filloy’s palindromes, 
and every palindrome already has on its surface a reading that potentially goes 
unnoticed and that is only perceived in reverse or, in this case, upside-down. The 
cave-tower is built around “la escalera caracol, por la cual subo y bajo yo, sube y baja 
mi pensamiento, lo mismo que un destornillador helicoidal. Sin moverme, es obvio, 
en ninguna faena inútil” ‘the spiral staircase, along which both my thoughts and I 
move up and down, up and down, just like a helical screwdriver. Without engaging, 
of course, in a single useless task’ (135). Here the potentially unnoticed irony can 
begin to be read. This obsessive back and forth movement is so obviously pragmatic 
for Konsideransky, but it is, of course, not so easily perceived as a useful task by 
everyone else. When read alongside the demands placed on intellectuals, even in 
Casey’s essays, Konsideransky’s cave-tower is simply an underground ivory-tower 
for his intellectual musings and his lack of political commitment. He spends his days 
and nights pacing up and down this spiral staircase, and his movements do not serve 
any purpose other than to stimulate his ability to think and to listen to the echoes of 
the rocks that surround him as he cultivates silence and solitude. He makes no gesture 
toward opening his reflections to anyone else, and he certainly is not volunteering his 
time to promote or document social change. These would be useless tasks for him. 
 At other moments in the narrative, Filloy’s text becomes disjointed from the 
analogically didactic qualities of the classical allegory. First, the geometrical 
perfection of the spiral staircase along which Konsideransky moves up and down 
inside the inverted cave-tower seems to correspond perfectly with the crystalline 




extended four lines of ellipsis, and it closes with an unnecessary ellipsis after an 
exclamation mark: “tu panegírico!...” (153). While the palindrome is a closed set of 
perfectly balanced letters that start and end at precise points, exactly like the lesson in 
Plato’s allegory of the cave, “Yo y los intrusos” is left open at the beginning and the 
end. The starting and closing points of the text become indefinite openings toward a 
before and an after of the plotline that complicate the closed, linear movement of the 
palindrome and the allegory of the cave. There is also an imbalance between the 
enormous ellipsis at the beginning of the story and the short one at the end that throws 
off the symmetry. The cave-tower is not one of Filloy’s crystalline palindromes, but 
rather, in my view, acquires the fluidity of an errant palindrome.  
 Second, the text ironically recreates the structure of testimonial literature. It 
begins and ends with Konsideransky outside of the cave talking to the reporter. The 
entire text is written as a long dialogue without the intervention of a third person 
narrator. As such, it can be interpreted as the transcription of the reporter’s 
recordings, which had been broadcast (“radiotelefoneada”) back to a station in Río 
Cuarto (152). Konsideransky’s story is recorded and broadcast as an eye-witness, 
first-person narrative of his life, his politics, and his surroundings. However, he 
represents the exact image of the bourgeois intellectual obsessed only with his 
individuality and his elitism. As such, Konsideransky is the last subject who would be 
considered the ideal subject of testimonial literature. According to Beverley’s classic 
formulation of the testimonio as a genre, the subject must be an underdog who 
struggles against the status quo, and the text should have an “efecto metonímico” 




individual but as a voice for the entire community (12). Konsideransky, in contrast, 
speaks only for himself. He does not have the desire or the political urgency to seek 
the assistance of other intellectuals to tell the world about his story. Despite its formal 
similarities, this text in no way resembles the content frequently documented through 
testimonio, as in the case of the violence committed in this Sixties during events such 
as the Cordobazo and the massacre at Tlatelolco, or later, as a result of state terrorism 
and death squads. Since Konsideransky’s biography and the details of his cave-tower 
are only available to the reporter by listening to the monodialogue, the reader of the 
recorded monodialogue is even one step further removed from it, only having access 
to the broadcast text. Yet, nothing in the text explicitly claims that the reporter does 
not believe Konsideransky’s story. It is transmitted as a text that upholds a reading 
pact based on journalistic credibility. Testimonial literature similarly operates as the 
story of an apparently true, lived experience that could, at least in theory, be verified 
empirically.33 In contrast, Konsideransky’s cave-tower is a space whose existence can 
only be verified through his monodialogue, which is to say that it can never be 
verified empirically. Konsideransky’s monodialogue unwittingly generates a fictional 
testimonio divested of its explicitly referential, verifiable content. 
 Third, Konsideransky is also drug up and out of the cave-tower similar to the 
the unchained slave in Plato’s allegory. Konsideransky is compelled to open the 
belly-button shaped door when the reporter intrusively arrives at his refuge, but he 
                                                
33 It is not my intention here to add further commentary to the exhausted debate 
provoked by David Stoll’s Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview P, 1999), in which he claims to disprove certain 





comes out of the cave to find, not the realm of the intelligible and the light of the sun, 
but that which forms his ideal world: “la desolación y el desierto” ‘desolation and 
desert” (133). The exterior world surrounding his cave-tower appears to him to be 
completely empty. Since his name, “Konsideransky,” as he explains to the reporter, is 
etymologically related to considerare, which means “contemplar atentamente las 
estrellas” ‘to contemplate the stars attentively,’ this deserted landscape is the perfect 
space where he can contemplate the stars in the night sky while completely alone 
(138). His end goal, contemplating the stars in the night sky, falls one step short of 
contemplating the sun in the Platonic text, another minor deviation from Plato’s 
allegory of the cave.  
 Finally, Konsideransky never reaches Plato’s ideal end point, and his return to 
the cave-tower will not be a journey that seeks to free the other prisoners chained to 
the wall; he returns only to complete solitude. But his solitude is belied by a simple 
detail that he neglected to take into account when constructing his refuge. There is a 
road that leads through the mountains, directly to his cave-tower. The reporter at one 
point notes that he was able to ask for directions by another man who lives in the 
province. The road that leads to the cave-tower serves as the one remaining trace of 
the line of flight taken by Konsideransky into the Argentine “desert”; his home is 
almost completely isolated and would have been practically impossible to find. 
However, Konsideransky seems to have read the nineteenth century narratives of the 
Argentine provinces as a deserted landscape too literally, and he neglected to erase 
the trail leading to his home. In this way, he further embodies the image of the ivory-




Konsideransky blazed a new trail but intended to be the only one to walk down that 
road.  
 The supposedly isolated space in which he chose to construct his hermetic 
cave-tower is an already occupied space. The Argentine deserts were, of course, 
already populated by indigenous civilizations, and their land was violently conquered 
by 1879 during the Campaña del Desierto (Halperín Donghi 143). By the mid-
twentieth century when this story takes place, numerous cities and ranches stretched 
across the country’s interior. It is only Konsideransky, and not Filloy, who believes 
that the provinces are a deserted space. Ironically, it is the trace Konsideransky left, 
the path leading to his front door, that leads the reporter directly to his refuge. 
Whether he desired it or not, Konsideransky’s trail created a path that other’s could 
follow when he went wandering into the Argentine provinces. Whereas the literal 
reading of the cave-tower as allegory would suggest a real desire to construct such a 
refuge, turning against the current of Konsideransky’s literal enunciations by reading 
the text’s irony allows it to be transformed into an errant allegory. This allegory does 
not serve as a direct analogy for Konsideransky’s explicit ideas and desires; rather, it 
serves as an allegory for what is only suggested through irony—that there is no such 
desolate desert, no isolation, and no transcendence made possible even with the 
construction of a cave-tower in the Argentine provinces.  
 What, then, is the politics of this errant allegory? Yo, yo y yo was originally 
published in 1971, and there are many parallels to be drawn with the cultural and 
political landscape of Latin America in the Sixties. The reporter in “Yo y los 




opulence, “no habiendo guerras a la vista ni otros riesgos inminentes” ‘since there are 
no foreseeable wars or other imminent dangers’ (135). The reporter’s statements 
about the relative peace and stability of the times suggest he is caught up in the 
euphoria and utopianism of the era, since any serious reporter would find it difficult 
to describe any historical period as relatively peaceful. The collection of short stories 
was published only two years after the Cordobazo of 1969 and takes place in the 
outlying regions of Córdoba Province, a time and a place that could barely be 
described, especially in retrospect, as one without past, present, or foreseeable violent 
conflicts and confrontations. Certainly, the reporter should have been aware of the 
imminence of Cold War politics throughout all of Latin America, whether it be in the 
form of the Cuban embargo or of the CIA’s intrusions into almost every country of 
the region. The reporter, more realistically, seems to be among those who 
unquestionably championed the need for intellectual commitment during the Sixties 
and radically opposed any form of autonomous, isolated, or socially useless form of 
intellectual activity. In my view, this reporter could be among those who contributed 
to the disfiguring and monstrous foreign press that Casey vehemently attacks in his 
essay on Boris Pasternak.  
 Ultimately, the reporter’s statement is not justified at any moment in the text; 
in contrast, Konsideransky uses this naïve claim to launch into the sermon that I 
began to quote at the beginning of this section. His sermon continues far beyond what 
I quoted and serves to disprove the reporter’s claim, offering an extensive list of the 




—¡Libre en este bastión de protesta perenne contra la trivialización de la vida, 
contra la fragmentación de la especie, contra el amor mecanizado, contra la 
descomposición moral, contra la regresión psíquica, contra la nivelación 
general! 
—¡…! 
—¡Libre de los grupos de presión y de los grupos de interés! ¡Libre del 
imperialismo de los poderes de hecho! ¡Libre del gobierno invisible de la 
plutocracia universal! ¡Libre de la tercera cámara, que constituyen las fuerzas 
armadas! ¡Libre del cuarto poder de la prensa; del quinto, del clero; del sexto, 
de los sindicatos; del séptimo, de los estudiantes; del octavo, de los 
burócratas; del noveno, de la ciudadanía aborregada por los partidos; del 
décimo, del cretinismo ambiente!.... 
—¡…! 
—…¡Y libre también de usted! Sí, de usted… Le traeré agua a su mula para 
que se vaya de una vez. 
—… (136) 
‘—Free from this bastion of perennial protest against the trivialization of life, 
against the fragmentation of the species, against mechanized love, against the 
breakdown of morals, against the socialization of the spirit, against psychic 
regression, against a general leveling out! 
—…! 
—Free from pressure groups and from interest groups! Free from the 




universal plutocracy! Free from the third chamber, which is made up of the 
armed forces! Free from the fourth power, the press; from the fifth, the clergy; 
from the sixth, the labor unions; from the seventh, the students; from the 
eighth, the bureaucrats; from the ninth, the citizenry subdued by political 
parties; from the tenth, the all around cretinism!... 
—…! 
—…And free also from you, sir! Yes, from you… I will bring some water for 
your mule so that you may leave once and for all. 
—…’ 
 The rigorously structured rhetoric of Konsideransky’s sermon to the 
reporter—who only responds with emphatic silences—belies its seeming 
improvisation. This is the speech of a man who has rehearsed these words over and 
again in the isolation of his cave-tower while lying in wait until he could ambush 
someone with his monodialogue. He undermines the reporter’s optimism about the 
future by listing all of the political forces that collaborate, albeit indirectly, to subdue 
the citizenry, while struggling violently among themselves to establish hegemony 
over the others. His list recalls that of Huberto’s rejections in Manjarrez’s novel 
Lapsus (Algunos actos fallidos). Read in conjunction with Huberto’s rejections, 
Konsideransky’s sermon expands this map wherein he traces the pressures and power 
brokers of his time from which he seeks refuge. For him, the world is becoming too 
mechanized as “the powers that be” attempt to create masses of trivialized human 
beings with no genuine emotional connections between them. These power brokers, 




labor unions, and students, certainly correspond to the major competing voices that 
came into visible political conflict in the Sixties. Despite the rhetorical differences 
between them, both Manjarrez’s and Filloy’s texts create a line of flight away from 
the pressures and powers that they map, and in doing so, they leave a textual trace of 
their rejections. Konsideransky rejects these powers, and his search for freedom takes 
place along his meandering path through the Argentine provinces. He opens a line of 
flight along which he attempts to go unnoticed, thus registering his disagreement with 
the political and cultural organization of the era. Yet, the path he takes in order to go 
unnoticed is not an invisible, solitary path; it can be followed, albeit it with difficulty, 
by others. 
 Konsideransky desires to go unnoticed by the seven deadly intruders—Fear, 
Morality, Propaganda, Politics, Film, Radio, Television. Recalling the structure of the 
palindrome, whose third reading is that which takes place from the center toward the 
left and right simultaneously, what orients this list, the Janus-faced idea placed 
exactly in its center, is nothing other than Politics with a capital “P.” According to 
Konsideransky, to the left are the evils that condition human behavior (Fear, 
Morality, Propaganda); to the right are the media through which those evils are put 
into circulation (Film, Radio, Television). Qualifications and judgments aside, 
Politics becomes the organizing axis, the driving force behind Konsideransky’s desire 
to go unnoticed.  
 Konsideransky seeks an alternative to the particular political organization of 
his world by going unnoticed, and in doing so, he engages in a politics of his own. In 




analog for a higher realm in Filloy’s text; it simply provides the fictional isolation for 
Konsideransky’s interior monologues deep inside his cave-tower where he cultivates 
his own political movement: “el yomismo” (146). A first translation of “yomismo” 
might be “Me-ism,” the movement focused on the benefit and development of the 
only person in the political movement. “Yo mismo” also translates literally as “I 
myself,” and it emphasizes the isolation and proclaimed self-sufficiency of such a 
movement. Konsideransky clarifies that he has developed this neologism as an 
alternative to being called an “anarquista” ‘anarchist’ (146). Further, I see this as an 
attempt to differentiate himself from any other already named political philosophy, at 
least in name, whether it be socialism, communism, liberalism, libertarianism, or even 
Peronism, Leninism, Trotskyism or Maoism. While he only speaks of “yomismo” as 
a political movement, this word also invokes the endless “–isms” created to name the 
aesthetic movements of the historical avant-gardes (e.g. creacionismo and ultraísmo). 
Ironically, his aesthetic sensibilities seem more in line with those of the hermetic 
ideal of pure art and autonomy cultivated by Latin American modernismo than by the 
self-proclaimed apocalyptic ruptures of the avant-gardes.  
 Of course, the pun created by turning the phrase “yo mismo” into the 
homophonic name of Konsideransky’s own politics and aesthetics by combining the 
singular first person pronoun with the suffix “-ismo” furthers the ironic effect of the 
text. He believes he is making his own, individual party, which he would share with 
no one: “no divido con nadie mis ideas políticas” ‘I don’t split my political ideas with 
anyone’ (146). He does not say “no comparto mis ideas” ‘I do not share my ideas,’ 




does not seem to be a part of his extensive vocabulary. To share would be to include 
others in his movement, which does not interest him. To split his ideas would be, 
even worse, to break the unity of his individualism, of himself. Yet, any “–ism” 
always implies a program or a manifesto that, in theory, can be adopted by others. In 
choosing “yomismo” over something like “Konsideranskismo,” a term which could 
make it more uniquely his, he unwittingly names his political movement in such a 
way that it can be easily appropriated by someone else. In fact, anyone in the world 
could adopt “yomismo” as the name by which they try to give their personal politics a 
more substantial weight. Thus, Konsideransky is not to be taken seriously, and I 
prefer to read the politics of yomismo ironically, as yet another impossible and 
unviable political movement for the Sixties. What this errant allegory represents via 
irony is, in its own way, the lesson learned by Calvert Casey: In the Sixties, it is 
impossible to not be committed. 
 In the end, the cave-tower is neither the Platonic cave nor the intellectual’s 
ivory tower, but the space of an errant allegory that opens up in the already occupied 
fictional deserts of the Argentine provinces. The politics of going unnoticed is not 
Konsideransky’s yomismo. His cave-tower can be read as one that makes claims 
about a politics in the Sixties, but only when read as an errant allegory, as one that 
states its claims through irony. Ultimately, Konsideransky’s defense of isolated 
intellectual practices and autonomous art becomes a comic proposition. The politics 
of going unnoticed, then, is not the creation of such an autonomous, individual 
political movement. Even Konsideransky cannot guarantee his position as yomismo’s 




secret political party is broadcast nationally by the reporter. Not only is it impossible 
to not be committed, as Casey regrettably explains, but as Filloy’s errant allegory 
suggests through irony, it is also impossible to locate an autonomous space for both 
politics and aesthetics in the Sixties. The countryside is no longer a refuge from the 
political city. With these negative outlines in place, I can now turn toward defining 
the politics of going unnoticed as a gesture that opens a place for disagreement within 




The Politics of Going Unnoticed 
 It is not surprising that by the Sixties a breakdown of the strict divisions 
between the city and the countryside had become irreversible given the recognizable 
expansion of the public sphere into all aspects of private life. In The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas explores the process by which 
these theoretically divided spaces came to overlap one another by the mid-twentieth 
century. First, he explains how the Greeks conceived of the public and the private 
spheres as autonomous realms:  
In the fully developed Greek city-state, the sphere of the polis, which was 
common (koine) to the free citizens, was strictly separated from the sphere of 
the oikos; in the sphere of the oikos, each individual is in his own realm (idia). 
The public life, bios politikos, went on in the market place (agora), but of 
course this did not mean that it occurred necessarily only in this specific 
locale. The public sphere was constituted in discussion (lexis), which could 
also assume the forms of consultation and of sitting in the court of law, as well 
as in the common action (praxis), be it the waging of war or competition in 
athletic games. (3)  
While Habermas notes that this political order “rested on a patrimonial slave 
economy” from which it was never truly autonomous, Greek thought characterized 
the public sphere as separate from the private sphere (3). The public sphere was the 
realm in which the unrestrained masters of a household came together to discuss 
matters of public or communal concern: “Only in the light of the public sphere did 




sense, politics was conceived since the earliest Greek formulations as those matters 
which came into the light of the public sphere—within the polis where economic 
exchanges occurred in and around the agora—in order to be subjected to debate for 
the good of the community.  
 Neither dependent upon presence in the city, nor seeking full visibility in the 
public sphere, the politics of going unnoticed would be meaningless within this 
classic framework. However, as is well known, Habermas continues to trace the 
transformation of the public sphere through the twentieth century. In sum, he 
examines how the Greek division between the public and the private spheres loses its 
clarity; the two spheres come to infiltrate one another as the market economy grows 
and globalizes, as the State continues to intervene into private business transactions to 
ensure their success, and as the masses enter into political conflict and negotiate the 
competing messages circulating in the media and the culture industries (141–146). 
What interests me is not Habermas’s intent to revive a rational-critical debate in the 
public sphere, but how the classic Greek divisions between private and public do not 
adequately describe social, economic, and political relationships in the twentieth 
century.  
 If the countryside is no longer a refuge from the political city, and if the 
public-private divide no longer adequately describes social functions, then the 
question I want to ask is the following: To what extent can one engage in a political 
gesture while going unnoticed in a crowded, urban center or in pseudo-isolation in the 
countryside? In what ways does going unnoticed become a more effective strategy for 




political arena? In what follows, I answer these questions by building a definition of 
politics as a means of engaging in dissensus within an overcrowded and saturated 
political environment like that of the Sixties in Latin America. This politics will be 
founded on three irresolvable paradoxes drawn from contemporary political theory: 1) 
democratic pluralism only functions as a never-ending tension between bids for 
liberty and bids for equality; 2) those who go unnoticed engage in politics without 
acquiring full visibility or a clear voice; and 3) the modern state of exception has 
become the rule that guides Western biopolitical relationships wherein the law is 
suspended in order to guarantee the future of the law.  
 In The Democratic Paradox, Chantal Mouffe contends that liberalism and 
democracy are the two competing logics that constitute the unresolved paradox at the 
heart of contemporary, radical democratic politics. She characterizes this politics as 
“the dichotomy between the liberal emphasis on individual rights and liberties and the 
democratic emphasis on collective formation and will formation” (85). In contrast to 
those who insist on consensus building as the only possibility for democracy, Mouffe 
claims that every agreement already foregrounds an exclusion.34 Any choice that 
includes some (“us”) and excludes others (“them) is already a political choice that 
constitutes a power relation.35 Mouffe’s theory for a pluralist democratic politics does 
                                                
34 See Chapters One and Two of The Democratic Paradox where Mouffe goes into 
greater detail of her critique of the “deliberative democrats” like Jürgen Habermas 
and John Rawls who locate consensus-building as the foundation of their political 
thought.  
35 This argument is further detailed in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democatic Politics (London 




not seek to resolve this paradoxical tension. Instead, she proposes a politics that relies 
on difference and pluralism as the condition of possibility for democracy: 
Envisaged from an anti-essentialist theoretical perspective, on the contrary, 
pluralism is not merely a fact, something that we must bear grudgingly or try 
to reduce, but an axiological principle. It is taken to be constitutive at the 
conceptual level of the very nature of modern democracy and considered as 
something that we should celebrate and enhance. This is why the type of 
pluralism that I am advocating gives a positive status to differences and 
questions the objective of unanimity and homogeneity, which is always 
revealed as fictitious and based on acts of exclusion. 
However, such a view does not allow a total pluralism, and it is important to 
recognize the limits to pluralism which are required by a democratic politics 
that aims at challenging a wide range of relations of subordination. It is 
therefore necessary to distinguish the position I am defending here from the 
type of extreme pluralism that emphasizes heterogeneity and 
incommensurability and according to which pluralism—understood as 
valorization of all differences—should have no limits. I consider that, despite 
its claim to be more democratic, such a perspective prevents us from 
recognizing how certain differences are constructed as relations of 
subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic 
politics. There is only a multiplicity of identities without any common 
denominator, and it is impossible to distinguish between differences that exist 




Pluralism of values, difference, and disagreement, then, become the foundation of a 
radical democratic politics in the sense that democracy is the space in which these 
differences can engage in debate about the contingent organization of power relations 
and the changing values of liberty and equality without defining a priori who should 
and should not count as a political subject or community.  
 Pluralist democratic politics should be seen as a paradox that does not need to 
be resolved through consensus building or the construction of a homogeneous 
totality; such a choice to transcend this point of conflict and bring about the end of 
any debate is the political choice to close democracy itself. However, Mouffe clearly 
draws a line between pluralism, as defined here, and the sort of postmodern 
celebrations of all differences that end in a defense of relativism. She insists on 
upholding this difference to avoid arriving at a political process in which “relations of 
power and antagonisms are erased and we are left with the typical liberal illusion of a 
pluralism without antagonism” (20). Mouffe cautions against a form of 
multiculturalism in which the differences among identity groups are essentialized 
without giving recourse to the ways in which such differences have been historically 
and contingently structured via power relations of exclusion and oppression. When 
such antagonism is erased from these power relations, a new consensus is constituted 
in which pluralism becomes the name that purports to celebrate cultural differences 
while simultaneously denying such differences a political voice in the debates on the 
meaning of liberty and of equality. Rather, in order to guarantee a pluralist 




paradox must be upheld in order to guarantee the future of the democratic process.36 
To exclude such antagonism is to relegate these differences outside of the space of 
democracy—even as they are being celebrated or tolerated—where they will seek 
other means of registering their dissent. Only by guaranteeing the possibility for 
dissent does democracy have the potential to remain open to all. 
 Previously, I defined going unnoticed as a precarious, errant movement; one 
may begin to go unnoticed on purpose or it may be the result of happenstance that one 
ends up going unnoticed. In either case, going unnoticed involves moving throughout 
a complex milieu of swirling lights and shadows, of noises, sounds, and voices 
wherein it becomes impossible to distinguish the strictly visible from the strictly 
invisible and the intelligible voice from the unintelligible noise or sound. 
Furthermore, those who go unnoticed can be perceived at any moment when someone 
else changes their own threshold of perception by turning around as one must in order 
to read a palindrome. At this point, the politics of going unnoticed must be located 
within a space no longer conceived as an autonomous public sphere, and it must be a 
radical democratic politics that recognizes difference, dissent, and antagonism as its 
conditions of possibility. By opening and unfolding the political space within which 
such differences and antagonisms can effectively be weighed against one another, 
they will continue to be able to challenge instances of hegemony and other power 
relations among individuals and communities. 
                                                
36 In the following chapter on ethics and the formation of a political community, I will 
explore how Mouffe theorizes the transformation of antagonism into agonism by 




 In this context, the second irresolvable paradox arises when considering 
specifically a politics that arises from the practice of going unnoticed. Since the 
classic Greek formulation, the creation of a political subject has been defined as the 
process of acquiring visibility and a voice within the public sphere. Jacques 
Rancière’s writings, in a way, have become emblematic of such a definition of 
politics most recently. In many ways, his arguments regarding democracy and politics 
are compatible with Mouffe’s. Both understand dissensus and disagreement as the 
only foundation for a democratic politics. Therefore, the institutions through which 
consensus is reached (e.g., parliament or congress) and those through which such 
agreements are guaranteed and enforced (e.g., police and armed forces) are not the 
institutions that engage directly in politics. Mouffe uses the term “the political” to 
name instances of dissensus and antagonism and the term “politics” to refer to the 
consensus-building practices of various institutions. Rancière distinguishes them as 
“politics” and “police,” respectively (Mouffe, 101; Rancière, The Politics of 
Aesthetics 25). The difference between them on this point is basically a difference of 
terminology. When I use the phase “the politics of going unnoticed,” I am referring to 
acts of dissensus and disagreement, not to the practices of consensus-building 
institutions.  
 Their arguments diverge, however, at the point at which Rancière 
characterizes the process by which an individual or a community becomes political by 
engaging in dissent. In The Politics of Aesthetics, Rancière explicitly links his 
definition of politics as dissensus with what he sees as the necessary visibility of any 




defines the common of a community, to introduce into it new subjects and objects, to 
render visible what had not been, and to make heard as speakers those who had been 
perceived as mere noisy animals” (25). This passage, via dissensus, from invisibility 
to visibility or from noise to speech is consistently upheld as the definition of politics 
throughout his work, and it stands today as the most recent iteration of the classical 
Greek formulation by which politics derives from visibility.37  
 By now it is clear that this specific passage cannot be the case for the politics 
of going unnoticed. The two examples of going unnoticed I have provided in this 
chapter so far cannot be read as political practices that are simply in the process of 
moving from an invisible to a visible position or vice versa. Casey’s subtly deviant 
claims about the impossibility of not being committed were practically ignored given 
his publicly declared position as a committed intellectual. Filloy’s narrative about the 
search for an isolated refuge in the provinces is radically undermined by the arrival of 
the journalist who simply followed the public road leading directly to 
Konsideransky’s front door. The politics of going unnoticed, paradoxically, is not a 
politics that privileges such a passage into the public light nor a retreat into complete 
darkness. I would argue that no such clearly delimited spaces truly exist today. Yet, it 
still remains a politics that begins, like Huberto in Héctor Manjarrez’s Lapsus 
(Algunos actos fallidos), with rejection, that is, with dissensus and disagreement. This 
rejection opens an errant path that these protagonists follow with no a priori end in 
mind as they go unnoticed like a screw among a heap of scrap metal, as described by 
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the protagonist in Somers’s De miedo en miedo (Los manuscritos del río). Like this 
metal screw that is almost indistiguishable among all the other bits of jagged, rusted 
scraps of metal in the heap of which it is a part, those who engage in the politics of 
going unnoticed can be paid attention, but they can also be discarded, excluded, or 
abandoned at any moment with the other scraps. By permitting there to be a politics 
of that which goes unnoticed in addition to those who make that transcendental 
passage into visibility, those who are overlooked and can be discarded at any moment 
for their apparent triviality or irrelevance maintain the potential to engage in dissent, 
to disagree with their own exclusion and abandonment even as they remain only 
partially visible or refuse to fully participate in a political system that has or still does 
exclude them.  
 In many ways, Agamben has been the one to argue for the need to reconfigure 
the binary thought that has served for so long as the central organizing logic of 
politics, or more specifically, of biopolitics in the Foucaultian sense. Continuing in 
this tradition, Agamben takes up what he sees as the loose ends left by Foucault’s 
unfinished volumes of History of Sexuality. In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life, Agamben bluntly reorients the point of departure for thinking politics: 
“There is no clearer way to say that the first foundation of political life is a life that 
may be killed, which is politicized through its very capacity to be killed” (89). He 
continues:  
Every attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin with the 
clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the classical distinction 




man as a simple living being at home in the house and man’s political 
existence in the city. […] There is no return from the camps to classical 
politics. In the camps, city and house became indistinguishable, and the 
possibility of differentiating between our biological body and our political 
body—between what is incommunicable and mute and what is communicable 
and sayable—was taken from us forever. And we are not only, in Foucault’s 
words, animals whose life as living beings is at issue in their politics, but 
also—inversely—citizens whose very politics is at issue in their natural body. 
(187–188)  
Agamben thus shifts focus from binary distinctions—to which must be added those of 
inclusion and exclusion, inside and outside, and visibility and invisibility—to the 
human body that may be killed insofar as it is a body that is always already involved 
in a political order.  
 This order is what he calls “the state of exception,” and his primary example 
is that of the camp, but he argues that it has become the norm for political 
organization even when such camps are not present. This body that can be killed is 
what he calls “bare life.”38 It is not simply Aristotle’s zoē, the animal-like human 
being who has yet to enter into public life or the political sphere, the one who remains 
invisible. It is also not a body that can be granted different statuses depending on its 
                                                
38 “Bare life” is the translation of Agamben’s phrase, “nuda vita,” as proposed by 
Daniel Heller-Roazen in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. In Means 
without Ends: Notes on Politics, translated by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino, 
they prefer the phrase “naked life.” I will follow Heller-Roazen’s translation, but it is 
worth noting the two possibilities, since the former connotes a certain simplicity and 
being divested of legal status, whereas the latter highlights the lack of covering or 




position in different private and political spaces. Such a human being no longer exists 
who could be located outside of a political order; the purportedly different political 
spaces—the city, the house, the countryside, and the camp—have become 
indistinguishable. Agamben insists that this has been the case for centuries, but that it 
comes into clarity during the twentieth century.  
 In Agamben’s analysis, this form of bare life, which is irrevocably tied to a 
political order, takes the form of the homo sacer—the life which can be killed but not 
sacrificed, the body or, better yet, the person who may be abandoned by the law in the 
state of exception. Once abandoned, he or she may be killed without there being any 
guarantee that this killing will can be punished by a juridical order, since the law does 
not apply to the state of exception; his or her killing constitutes, “neither capital 
punishment nor a sacrifice, but simply the actualization of a mere ‘capacity to be 
killed’” (114). The prime example of a homo sacer offered by Agamben in this 
introductory book to his homo sacer saga is the Jewish person killed in the Nazi 
concentration camps. The Jewish people were not killed as human beings who must 
be protected by the law, “but exactly as Hitler had announced, as ‘lice,’ which is to 
say, as bare life” (114). Once they are situated in the state of exception and 
abandoned by the law, the Jewish people and any other unsacrificeable bare lives are 
legally permitted to be killed “to an unprecedented degree” by our age (114). This is 
to say that World War II was not the only or even the most recent example of the 
normalization of the state of exception, but rather that the state of exception is the 
foundation of modern biopolitics, and what was once theorized as the exception has 




 In other words, sovereign power is irrevocably tied to the form of bare life 
that it attempts to exclude in its originary political act at the threshold of its power in 
the state of exception. Thus, the spatial binaries of political discourse are collapsed 
into a zone of indistinction, which prohibits the facile structuring of that which is 
inside or outside of a particular judicial order or sovereign state. Whereas in classical 
thought the homo sacer could be simply sent into exile, physically outside of the 
state, such a no-man’s land no longer exists today. The threshold has been carved out 
of the state’s own territory in the form of camps, which by now serves as the 
paradigm of biopolitics, as one particular example that points toward a more 
generalized practice that is carried out with variations in different concrete contexts.  
 In the second installment of the homo sacer saga, State of Exception, 
Agamben expands his research to a genealogical exploration of Western 
constitutional traditions in which he finds variants of the state of exception as the 
foundation of modern constitutional states. He chooses “state of exception” as the 
syntagma to discuss what in German theory is termed “Ausnahmezunstand” or 
“Notstand,” “state of necessity,” in the Italian and French traditions is called 
“emergency decrees” and “state of siege,” as in “etat de siège fictif,” and in Anglo-
Saxon theory, “martial law” and “emergency powers” (4). Building from Agamben’s 
analysis, Marina Franco and Mariana Iglesias have shown that the phrases “estado de 
sitio” ‘state of siege’ and “medidas prontas de seguridad” ‘prompt security measures’ 
have been used in Argentina and Uruguay, respectively, to name this type of juridical 




 The state of exception becomes the third foundational paradox of the politics 
of going unnoticed. In the state of exception, Agamben continues, the constitutional 
distinctions between legislative, executive, and judicial powers are dissolved and 
concentrated in the hands of the sovereign. In theory, these emergency powers are 
only invoked in times of great emergency. During this time, the sovereign must act 
quickly by suspending the law, paradoxically, in order to guarantee the future of the 
law. However, the state of exception “shows its tendency to become a lasting practice 
of government,” and has proven itself to become the rule of Western government, 
particularly in the Atomic Age (State 7–9). While exploring specific examples of 
different Western constitutions, Agamben finds that they share the same paradoxical 
characteristics by which they “remain prisoner in the vicious circle in which the 
emergency measures they seek to justify in the name of defending the democratic 
constitution are the same ones that lead to its ruin” (8). The state of exception never 
plays out as the benevolent salvation of the democratic order it claims to be. 
 Before returning to the specific cases that interest me in Latin America in the 
Sixties, it is worth noting that the state of exception is not simply limited to a space 
easily demarcated as a threshold or clearly identifiable as a camp. Rather, the state of 
exception has become the zone of anomie that, for Agamben, concerns all modern 
biopolitics:  
The state of exception is not a dictatorship (whether constitutional or 
unconstitutional, commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, a 
zone of anomie in which all legal determinations—and above all the very 




exception is not a “state of law,” but a space without law (even though it is 
not a state of nature, but presents itself as the anomie that results from the 
suspension of law). (50–51)  
Any and all acts committed under the state of exception, Agamben explains, are acts 
committed with no relation to the law except for having been abandoned by the law 
while still making recourse to its force. He uses the syntagma “force-of-law” to refer 
to this violent, killing force which claims to protect and uphold the law while 
operating as that same law’s exception in order to produce the law as the norm:  
This means that in order to apply a norm it is ultimately necessary to suspend 
its application, to produce an exception. In every case, the state of exception 
marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur with each other and a pure 
violence without logos claims to realize an enunciation without any real 
reference. (40) 
As the threshold in which inside and outside become indistinct, the state of exception 
is the juridical space wherein the homo sacer may be killed as the exception without 
being sacrificed in an act of pure violence that is outside of all law, order, or logos. 
Subsequently, the norm, that is, the law, is brought into being by its opposition to this 
exception, which has by now become the rule. 
 Agamben’s focus is a form of being-in-the-threshold that defines the homo 
sacer. What is interesting in his formulation of politics, for my purposes, is not so 
much related to a literal threshold in the terms of liminal, in-between, or marginal 
spaces and the subjects who inhabit them willingly or by force. Agamben’s threshold 




generates between city and countryside, house and camp, public and private, visibility 
and invisibility, and democracy and dictatorship. Like Derrida’s khôra which opens a 
place in an already occupied space between logos and mythos, this threshold is neither 
an empty nor a geometic space.  
 I earlier showed that going unnoticed in the Sixties is not an act that takes 
place exclusively at the margins of political spaces nor in between different political 
spaces; people go unnoticed just as easily near the perceived centers as they do in any 
other space. In fact, going unnoticed is not dependent upon a relation to either a 
margin or a center, concepts which are practically impossible to define in the wake of 
the debates surrounding the ideas of modernity and postmodernity in Latin America.39 
Rather, in my view, going unnoticed becomes a political practice available to those 
nude subjects, or bare lives, who manage to find a way to slip out of the sovereign’s 
gaze, who go unnoticed within the state of exception wherein they could be killed 
since they have been abandoned by the law. Those who go unnoticed engage in 
politics by opening a place for disagreement within a highly saturated and inescapable 
political space. Those who go unnoticed are not, or at least are not yet, the subjects 
who are killed or interned in camps, but as I will show, they find themselves in 
incredibly vulnerable positions that often do lead to their death or imprisonment 
without having been proven guilty of any discernible crime. In many cases, after 
                                                
39 See Hermann Herlinghaus and Monica Walter Postmodernidad en la periferia. 
Enfoques latinoamericanos de la nueva teoría cultural (Berlin: Langer Verlag, 1994); 
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perceiving the precariousness of their legal status within the state of exception they 
choose to go unnoticed.  
 In what follows, I briefly return to Casey in Cuba and Filloy in Argentina to 
contextualize my previous readings of their works within this political framework. 
Agamben’s analysis of the organization of political spaces is perfectly well suited to 
read the construction of sovereignty of many mid-twentieth century Latin American 
states—as long as it is historicized and allowed to be altered within these particular 
contexts—outside of which there is not a form of no-man’s land, but always another 
sovereign power. The sovereign can no longer send an abandoned homo sacer into 
exile but creates an internally inscribed state of exception. In Cuba, the labor camps 
euphemistically known as the Military Units to Aid Production (UMAPs) served this 
purpose for excluding socially suspect and potentially counterrevolutionary subjects, 
while still maintaining a form of political control over them through internment. 
These exclusions were not just rhetorical, but more importantly, they were corporeal, 
delimiting the spaces and acceptable actions and thoughts of all those living in Cuba.  
 Despite his rhetoric of constructing the new man for a new society, Guevara’s 
discrimination of queer subjects is well known, particularly from Juan Goytisolo’s 
anecdote, studied by José Quiroga, in which Guevara hurls one of Piñera’s books 
across the room of the Cuban Embassy in Algiers shouting, “How dare you have in 
our embassy a book by this foul faggot” (“Fleshing” 168). Of course, the 
institutionalized homophobia of the radical left—a homophobia that was certainly not 




cases of the literary intellectuals.40 Such homophobia was clearly evident in the 
biopolitical organization of the UMAPs in Cuba where many men perceived as being 
gay were imprisoned alongside others who were similarly labeled as 
counterrevolutionaries. Once interned, they were forced to carry out hard labor that 
was meant to educate them in the ideals of the Revolution and transform them into 
Guevara’s new men.  
 According to Cabrera Infante, it was out of fear of being sent to such a camp 
that Casey went into exile. Casey was one of the few who had even heard about the 
existence of such camps right away, supposedly from personal connections of his 
own. After the closure of Lunes de Revolución, Casey accepted a job at Casa de las 
Américas. Cabrera Infante relates how Casey, who did not try to hide his sexuality, 
had confessed his fears of these camps to Emanuel Carballo, a Mexican writer who 
was invited to Cuba by Casa de las Américas. The next day, Carballo reported back to 
Haydée Santamaría, then director of Casa, and at that point, fearing internment, Casey 
began planning his self-exile (“¿Quién?” 49). Despite his public statements regarding 
his hesitancy to be a committed intellectual and his association with the Lunes group, 
the fact that he was never jailed or interned, but given a job at Casa seems to suggest 
that his actions generally went unnoticed at the institutional level. However, this very 
public confession about his fears of being interned alongside other gay men in the 
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(Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1996), particularly the chapter titled “Institutionalized 
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UMAPs seems to be the moment at which he was no longer certain of his ability to 
remain unnoticed. He took advantage of the translation of his short stories into Polish 
to apply for permission to travel to Poland and eventually settled in Italy, never to 
return to Cuba. From this point on, his writings, which include “Notas de un 
simulador” that I analyzed in the previous chapter, take a notable turn toward 
characters who similarly try to go unnoticed without giving up recourse to political 
action. Some characters become highly paranoid while trying to do so, and many 
others are ultimately jailed and killed, but not before having engaged in some sort of 
political disagreement. I explore these stories more in depth in the subsequent 
chapters.  
 In the case of Argentina, throughout the entire period that spans the triumph of 
Perón in 1946 to the start of the dictatorship in 1976, the political landscape of the 
country shifted dramatically and in numerous directions. In Intelectuales y poder en 
la década del sesenta, Silvia Sigal maps the reactions of the Peronists to the Cuban 
Revolution during the era. The initial reactions to the Cuban Revolution in Argentina 
equated the fall of Fulgencio Batista to the overthrow of Juan Domingo Perón, and as 
such, many Peronists and leftists were immediately reticent to support Fidel Castro. 
Nevertheless, Sigal traces the varying readings of the Cuban Revolution between 
1959 and 1961 that come to identify Castro with Perón, and as a result, “Cuba devino 
puente entre izquierda, nacionalismo y peronismo” ‘Cuba became the bridge between 
the Left, Nationalism, and Peronism’ (201). What is curious about this new, 
retrospective reading of Perón after the Cuban Revolution is that it transforms 




had, “forjando la metáfora: el socialismo nacional y el peronismo revolucionario” 
‘forging the metaphor: national socialism and revolutionary Peronism’ (202). Of 
course, this rereading of Peronism by the Peronist youth during the 1960s provoked a 
discrepancy between Perón himself, who moved to the right, the older generation of 
Peronistas, and the youth’s new, revolutionary Marxist direction made most visible 
by the Montoneros.  
 However, there were other major movements in this era that were not 
Peronist. Mónica B. Gordillo demonstrates that in the year 1969, in particular with the 
Cordobazo and the Rosariazo, the non-Peronist worker protests transformed into 
“rebelión popular” ‘popular rebellion’ that resulted in the downfall of General 
Onganía’s government in 1970 (348). Only later did the Montoneros, who did not 
exist at the time of the Cordobazo, begin to engage in acts of urban guerrilla warfare. 
It must be recalled that the workers, who were not associated with the Montoneros, 
generally rejected those tactics: “las estrategias armadas aparecían como ajenas a su 
experiencia y necesidades de trabajadores” ‘armed strategies seemed anathema to 
their experience and their needs as workers’ (366). Any consideration of the social 
protests and armed guerrilla groups in this era must take care to distinguish between 
the different demands and tactics of these heterogenous groups, not all of which were 
invested in Peronism. 
 Detailing the political landscape from 1973–1976 in particular, Maristella 
Svampa shows that in 1973, the Peronist Héctor Cámpora is elected President and 
appears to make room for “la Juventud maravillosa” ‘the wonderful Youth’ within 




drastically with the massacre at Ezeiza and Perón’s speech in which the same youth 
were cast aside as “imberbes” ‘immature, beardless’ and “estúpidos” ‘stupid, foolish’ 
(19).41 Despite all of the conflicting and rapidly changing ideologies, Svampa recalls 
that Perón’s return appeared to most groups “como condición necesaria para 
cualquier transformación social y política, y aún aquellos sectores que no tenían 
ningún interés en ‘peronizarse’, consideraban que sólo su retorno haría posible la 
pacificación nacional” ‘as the necessary condition for any social and political 
transformation, and even those sectors who did not have any interest in “becoming 
Peronists” considered that his return was the only chance for national peace’ (5). In 
my view, in the same way that there was no outside of the Cuban Revolution after 
1961 in Cuba, it can be said that there was also no outside of Peronism after 1969 in 
Argentina. What I mean is not that there were no other alternatives or dissenting 
groups in Cuba or Argentina. There were plenty. My point is that the Cuban 
Revolution and Peronism came to occupy such highly visible political spaces in their 
respective countries that it becomes difficult to perceive spaces that seem completely 
isolated from them, spaces that in some way do not have to at least provoke some sort 
of disagreement with them before turning to other options. It is in this sense that I 
agree with the statement that everything had become political in this Sixties.  
                                                
41 The entire drama surrounding the reappearance of the Peronistas to the political 
arena, Perón’s return to Argentina, those who dismiss Perón’s ideological turn to the 
Right with the “teoría del cerco” ‘siege theory’ that assumes that Perón was being 
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order to spark a revolution, and the violence commited under Perón’s orders to 
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objectively. See the collection edited by Daniel James, Violencia, proscripción y 
autoritarismo (1955–1976) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2003) in which the essays 




 In “El estado de excepción en Uruguay y Argentina. Reflexiones teóricas, 
históricas e histriográficas,” Franco and Iglesias demonstrate how this era is often 
studied as a series of alternations between democracy and dictatorship. There were 
two interim, pseudo-democratic regimes during which Peronism was proscribed from 
the electoral process—Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962) and Arturo Illia (1963–1966)—
followed by the victory of the Peronist Héctor Cámpora in 1973, Perón’s return that 
year, and his third electoral victory after which he became President until his death in 
1974. Interrupting these governements, there was a series of coups d’etats in 1955, 
1962, 1966, and 1976 (104–107).  
 Drawing from Agamben’s analysis of the state of exception, Franco and 
Iglesias detail the difficulty in sustaining a clear division between democracy and 
dictatorship during this period in Argentina. First, they show how Argentina’s first 
Constitution from 1853 already included within it version of the state of exception—
“el estado de sitio” ‘the state of siege’—that could be implemented in the case of 
external attack or internal commotion. They explain that, under Perón in the 1940s, 
there were already important antecedents to the various laws and “security” measures 
that would allow the suspension of the state of law; these became ever more prevalent 
over the next three decades (104). Then, as Cold War pressures came to affect the 
decisions made by the Armed Forces and the constitutional governments, exceptional 
measures were seen as the necessary solution to combat both the return of the 
proscribed Peronists and any other revolutionary ideological positions, in particular 





implicó la identificación entre defensa nacional y seguridad interior y se 
instaló una concepción bélica del mantenimiento del orden interno que 
suponía la existencia de fronteras ideológicas y un conflicto de nuevo tipo (‘la 
guerra revolucionaria’) planteado por el enemigo comunista. (105)  
‘led to the identification between national defense and internal security, and a 
bellicose conception of maintaining internal order became ingrained after 
assuming the existence of ideological fronts and a new type of conflict 
(“revolutionary war”) brought out by the communist enemy.’  
In 1974, Perón established the Ley de Seguridad (Security Law), which was used to 
combat Marxism, both internal and external to Peronism. These exceptional means 
were framed by the increasing militarization of the country, in part as a response to 
the existence of the armed guerrilla movements, which indirectly aided the Armed 
Forces in appearing as the legal and legitimate response to a threat against national 
security and in justifying the brutal repression with which they crushed both Peronism 
and the leftist opposition in 1976 (106). Thus, the importance of reframing the binary 
opposition between democracy and dictatorship becomes apparent in considering the 
various “security measures,” Presidential decrees, and military operations that 
characterize what can be called the Argentine state of exception in the Sixties.  
 Given this historical context, I find it quite tempting to draw the parallel 
between Maximiliano Konsideranksy, the fictional character, and Juan Filloy, the 
writer. Filloy lived and worked as a judge in Río Cuarto, a city in the province of 
Córdoba, during a period of prolonged silence between the publication of his first 




Filloy continued writing in isolation, but chose to wait until the 1960s to make his 
manuscripts public.42 His short story, “Yo y los intrusos,” could almost come to be 
seen as an idealized, fictional autobiography of the life Filloy might have preferred to 
live—in an almost unlocatable cave-tower in the Argentine countryside far removed 
from the “Politics” that Konsideransky places in between the intrusions of “Fear, 
Morality, Propaganda” and “Film, Radio, Television” (135–136). Had this been a 
literal allegory, this Politics with a capital “P” could have been a direct reference to 
Peronism. But there is one major difference between Filloy and Konsideransky. 
Konsideransky ultimately fails to isolate himself in what he had considered to be the 
ideal, architectural solution for achieving individual autonomy. He unleashes a 
caustic series of insults when he realizes that his monodialogue to the reporter had 
been recorded and transmitted to a radio station for national dissemination without his 
consent. He threatens to attack the reporter and destroy his equipment, but realizes the 
futility of such an attack. Instead, Konsideransky calls him “hijodeputa” 
‘sonofabitch,’ “imbeciloide” ‘mongoloid,’ “gransodomita” ‘bigsodomite,’ 
“vómitonegro” ‘blackvomit,’  and “semendespárrago” ‘esparragusemen,’ among 
many other inventively offensive phrases. Konsideransky’s fears about the intrusions 
of the mass media, as it turns out, were well-founded.   
 In contrast, Filloy comes out of his isolation and self-imposed editorial silence 
of his own will. In 1967, he approves a new edition of Op Oloop, and since 1971, 
with the publication of Ignitus and Yo, yo y yo (Monodiálogos paranoicos) he begins 
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publishing regularly until his death in 2000. When read ironically, “Yo y los intrusos” 
becomes an allegory for the need to return to a political space in the Sixties by 
creating an opening, not unlike what Derrida analyzes in “Khôra,” within the binary 
logic that structured intellectual positions in the Sixties—either one was committed or 
one was in an ivory tower. Filloy’s return to publishing in the heart of the Argentine 
cultural markets in the era is also a political opening; in his fictional account of 
Konsideranksy’s attempts to go unnoticed, he writes an errant allegory, one that must 
be read like a palindrome al vesre, to propose a different form of Politics in the 
Sixties. In my view, this gesture opens a place within the highly satured political 
space completely occupied by all of the various Peronista groups, their so-called 
internal enemies, the endless list of various Leftist groups, including Marxists, 
Leninists, Trotskyists, and Maoists, and their political adversaries in the Armed 
Forces and elsewhere. And this is without needing to establish a new –ism or identity 
group that will then seek visibility among all of these already visible groups. 
Significantly, Filloy’s political fiction was publishable in the midst of the state of 
exception that had become the norm in the era, though he would be interrogated 
briefly by the police in 1976, but ultimately let go, for the novel Vil y Vil that was 
immediately censured under the new regime. As I have said before, going unnoticed 
is also a precarious and temporary situation, and in Chapter Three I focus my 
attention on Vil & Vil and the ethical ramification for the politics of going unnoticed 




An American Cowboy in Mexico 
 Héctor Manjarrez published his first book in 1971, Acto propiciatorio. The 
first short story in this collection, entitled “Johnny,” appears to be a Western from 
1940s Hollywood. The protagonist is the nineteen year old cowboy, Johnny Miles. 
Not without coincidence, John Miles (1923–2006) is the name of a minor American 
actor who played the cowboy, Johnny Miles, in the Western film San Antonio (1945), 
featuring Errol Flynn and Alexis Smith. Among a number of Hollywood films in the 
1940s, Miles also had a minor role, again as a cowboy, in the short film, Star in the 
Night (1945). Without a doubt, Manjarrez’s text references these classic Westerns, 
but like Filloy’s reference to Plato’s classical allegory, Manjarrez’s text will take an 
unexpected turn.  
 Johnny, the protagonist, is on his first pursuit of bandits who have just looted 
his family’s ranch. Shots are fired, and men fall off their horses. The narrative is 
positioned for the inevitable triumph of justice by the clearly recognizable good guys:  
Lenta pero ineluctablemente, disminuye la distancia que separa a los truhanes 
en fuga de los rancheros sedientos de justicia y venganza, de esos hombres 
que vieron sus propiedades quemadas y arrasadas, sus mujeres vejadas, sus 
hijos vapuleados, su dignidad denigrada por la banda más temida de todo el 
Far West. (10) 
Slowly but ineluctably, the distance diminishes between the fleeing rogues 
and the ranchers, now thirsty for justice and vengeance, who saw their 




were beaten, and whose dignity had been denigrated by the most feared gang 
in the entire Far West.  
There is no ambiguity allowed by the clichéd, opening framing of this narrative in 
which the good guys are quickly catching up to the bad guys. Manjarrez appropriates 
the generic conventions of the Western and 1940s Hollywood, but quickly he pries 
them open in order to transform the simplified narratives of good versus evil, or us 
versus them.  
 In what follows, I contend that such simplified narratives are the same ones 
used to justify recourse to the state of exception, and I demonstrate that Manjarrez’s 
“Johnny” can be read in part as an allegory for the ways in which such legal 
exceptions appear in the specific case of Mexico in the Sixties. More than an allegory 
for political violence, “Johnny” sidesteps the most visible and tragic events—
particularly, the massacre of students at Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968—in order to 
go unnoticed within these debates and therefore open a different path for the political 
and cultural milieu of Mexico in this era.  
 Before the distance separating good from evil can be closed, something 
unexpected happens. Johnny’s horse is injured, and he loses his grip on the reigns. He 
falls to the ground, which is curiously described as being “suave y tibio” ‘soft and 
warm’ (13). The opening twist in this plot—reminiscent of a Twilight Zone style of 
science fiction—is that Johnny has crashed through a Mexican family’s television 
screen. This family had been watching an unnamed Western movie starring Johnny 
Miles. Through their television—one of Konsideransky’s infamous intruders—




burst into the living room of a family in mid-twentieth century Mexico City. Luckily, 
Johnny speaks perfect Spanish, because the Zendejas family had been watching the 
dubbed version of the Hollywood film from which he materialized (24).  
 That soft and warm ground on which he landed turns out to be the bed to 
which the Zendejas family has moved Johnny while he recovers from the crash. Not 
unlike the immobile body that Casey’s narrator observes under the blinding light in 
“Notas de un simulador,” Johnny wakes up with a light bulb shining in his eyes, 
exposing his body to the others: “A través de sus párpados cerrados, una luz intensa, 
anormalmente intensa, lo hiere, y él se pregunta si ya transcurrió la noche y si eso es 
el sol” ‘Through his closed eyelids, an intense, an abnormally intense light, hurts him, 
and he wonders if the night already has passed and if that is the sun’ (13). His first 
conscious experience of this new life is one in which he is entirely exposed under a 
private spotlight in the Zendejas family’s house. This light is not a heavenly glow that 
might shine at dawn after the triumph of good over evil at the end of a Hollywood 
film or after the passage into the intelligible realm of Plato’s allegory. It is a harsh, 
piercing light that causes him pain and subjects him to scrutiny by complete strangers. 
Johnny is unquestionably vulnerable under this private light. However, after a few 
days he adjusts to the technological advances that separate his present from his past 
and the harshness of this electric light seems to fade. For a moment, it seems as if this 
American cowboy in Mexico is no longer so vulnerable and exposed. 
 Johnny becomes a national sensation in the news as everyone publicly 




Los diarios habían proclamado y refutado su existencia y se había dividido en 
dos campos agriamente separados; mas el hecho de que un buen número de 
las publicaciones serias, y aun bastantes de las menos serias que habían tenido 
que negar su letigimidad porque sus rivales la habían pregonado antes, 
señalara que era estricta y científicamente imposible que Johnny Miles 
hubiese llegado, de carne y hueso, a la sala de los Zendejas, no ejercía más 
que una influencia deleznable en la mayoría de la gente, para quien la lógica y 
la verosimilitud científica carecían de peso súbitamente. (19)  
‘The newspapers had proclaimed and refuted his existence and they had 
divided into two bitterly separated camps. A good number of the serious 
publications declared that it was strictly and scientifically impossible that 
Johnny Miles had arrived, in flesh and blood, in the Zendejas’s living room. 
Many of the less serious ones had to deny his legitimacy because their rivals 
had announced it previously. But this proved to be of little influence to the 
majority of people for whom logic and scientific verosimillitude suddenly 
lacked importance.’  
Johnny has been converted into the center of a public spectacle that has two clearly 
divided camps, separated only by their journalistic rivalry, not by facts. Both camps 
place Johnny at their point of contact, debate, and struggle for journalistic supremacy, 
a struggle to be the good, true reporters in the face of the false ones. In this way, 
Johnny comes to occupy a position in the media not unlike that of Boris Pasternak, as 
described by Casey, in the flurry of Cold War politics that diluted the international 




 Because of this attention, the Zendejas family thinks Johnny could become a 
true celebrity, situated “entre aquellos raros individuos de quien se habla—y quizá 
entre aquellos que viven después de su muerte” ‘among those few individuals who 
people talk about, and perhaps among those who live after their death’ as in the cases 
of “Bolívar, Aquiles, James Bond, Washington, Hidalgo, Marilyn Monroe, Don 
Quijote, Hamlet, l’Ange Heurtebise, et. al.” (20). The public spotlight has constructed 
and celebrated these national heroes, celebrities, and fictional characters in a non-
hierarchical conglomeration that has flattened out all the distinctions between them.  
 In contrast, Johnny prefers to find a way to go unnoticed by the public 
spotlights. The narrator explains that this was not the life for him: “Pero Johnny no se 
interesaba en estas cosas. Les explicó que prefería quedarse con ellos, con esa familia 
que lo había tratado tan bien, pues básicamente era él un ser pacífico, hogareño, hasta 
un poco tímido” ‘But Johnny was not interested in those things. He explained to them 
that he preferred to stay with them—with the family that had treated him so well—
because he was pretty much a peaceful, somewhat timid homebody’ (21). Johnny 
desires to step away from the harsh lights that shone over him in both the private and 
the public realms.  
 His ability to simply blend in to Mexican society, however, becomes further 
complicated when legal experts begin considering his status as an immigrant in the 
country. How should his case be approached, they wondered: “(¿conflicto de leyes? 
¿estancia en el país sin haber obtenido una tarjeta de turista? ¿inmigrante sin papeles 
de inmigrante que nunca pasó por la frontera? ¿inversionista americano de 




Residency in the country without having obtained a tourist card? An undocumented 
immigrant who never crossed the border? An American Hollywood investor? Or an 
undesirable and morally questionable beatnik?)’ (20). Read from the United States 
today, this seems like an ironic turn of events in which the man from the United 
States is now the subject of legal scrutiny concerning his residency in Mexico, but 
Manjarrez’s text is more complicated than just an inversion of worlds or binaries. 
These legal questions are, in my view, the most pressing questions that need to be 
resolved in Johnny’s case. Not only must his status as an immigrant be resolved, but 
more broadly, his biopolitical relationship to the Mexican State must be determined. 
In the meantime, he remains a legal exception. Though these questions underscore 
how vulnerable Johnny has become, they are also the ones that the text registers 
parenthetically; they occupy a minor status within the public discourse, almost as if 
they were meant to be ignored.  
 Just like all the other issues concerning Johnny’s sudden appearance, his legal 
status quickly was forgotten, “cuando el espionaje relegó al western” ‘when Westerns 
were set aside in favor of the spy genre’ (20). Johnny was an extraordinary curiosity 
who suddenly became highly visible in public, but such visibility is often fleeting. 
The news cycle moved on to other cases, and the public turned their attention to a 
new genre. Nothing was ever resolved in the public, journalistic debate nor among the 
legal experts. Johnny’s situation was simply set aside in favor of the next new thing.  
Instead of pursuing a Frankfurt School critique of the mass media and the culture 
industry, which I demonstrated to be quite imprecise when considering the cultural 




the Western genre in this short story, which is no longer a simple Western, in order to 
ask about Johnny’s biopolitical relationship to the Mexican state. 
 Johnny has become a legal exception and the questions surrounding his 
residency in Mexico have been abandoned. As I showed with the cases of Cuba and 
Argentina above, Agamben’s paradigm of the state of exception can be helpful in 
studying the biopolitics of a particular sovereign state when adequately 
contextualized and historicized. In Mexico, the state of exception can be said to have 
become the norm by which the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) guaranteed its 
sovereignty as the sole viable political party over a seventy-one year span.  
 In The Mexican Exception: Sovereignty, Police, and Democracy, Gareth 
Williams analyzes the authoritarianism of modern Mexico from Independence to the 
supremacy of the PRI in the twentieth century. His aim is to study exceptionality in 
Mexico from the perspective of those who did not compose the state apparatus’s 
unifying vision (11). Curiously, Williams critiques Agamben for having emptied out 
“the historical specificity of modern biopolitics” in favor of a metaphysics of 
exceptionality, and thereby sidesteps Agamben’s homo sacer saga while employing a 
Foucaultian framework for his analysis (10). This is a critique that I am hesitant to 
accept. Though the first volume in the series, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life, certainly tends toward the theoretical, this book is little more than the 
introduction to the subsequent volumes that acquire a rich and dense historical 
specificity. The opening chapter to State of Exception, the second book in the series, 
explores modern European constitutions and, in my view, provides the necessary 




in Agamben is an analysis of the state of exception in Latin American contexts, but as 
in the case of the work done by Franco and Iglesias that I quoted above, and 
indirectly with Williams here, Agamben’s work opens different possibilities for 
thinking about sovereignty, biopolitics, and legal frameworks in specific cases in 
Latin America. What should be clear throughout the rest of this chapter are the ways 
in which this paradigm, which cannot be equated with Platonic universal Ideas that 
are only realized imperfectly as deviations from a model, acquires different and 
concrete historical textures when situated within particular national or regional 
traditions.  
 Regardless of his theoretical positioning, Williams studies exceptionality and 
biopolitics in modern Mexico and provides a nuanced exploration of the specificity of 
the Mexican case. The guiding characteristic of the Mexican state, Williams argues, 
has been the search for unity and consensus by authoritarian means: 
Mexican modernity was inaugurated on the whole by the post-colonial quest 
for a police state capable of creating the good order and sovereign mastery 
that would allow for the implantation and extension of bourgeois rule. The 
quest for the unity of economic and political domination is the lasting 
inheritance of both the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and the Mexican 
Revolution of 1910–1920. (11)  
It is well known that the PRI (initially founded as the National Revolutionary Party in 
1929, then became the Party of the Mexican Revolution in 1938, before finally 
adopting in 1946 the name it still has today) consolidated power in its hands 




2000. As Williams asserts, “By the late 1950s it was clear that the PRI was not really 
a political party at all. It portrayed itself as a universal state and, as such, as the police 
horizon for the essential suppression of the political” (124). In this way, the PRI was 
not engaged in the dissensual gestures of politics, as I defined it above, but rather it 
became the consensus-building institution that guaranteed its own sovereignty 
through exclusive and violent measures.  
 As an example, Williams provides a quote from Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, 
President from 1964 to 1970 during the height of student and worker protests that 
culminated in the massacre at Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968. Díaz Ordaz decrees: “I 
must repeat: No one has rights against Mexico” (125). His decree is directed against 
anyone regarded as a threat to his political party’s sovereignty. Despite Mexico’s 
antagonistic relationship with Cuba in the period, Díaz Ordaz’s decree, as I see it, is 
equivalent to Fidel Castro’s infamous claim in 1961: “Inside the Revolution—
everything; against the Revolution there are no rights” (n. pag.). The politial 
landscapes in Mexico and Cuba were radically different in this era, yet in both cases 
recourse to the state of exception becomes the norm for maintaining power. “No one 
has rights against Mexico” and “against the Revolution there are no rights” are not 
just empty threats. Whereas in Cuba the UMAPs became the space in which those 
who had no rights were abandoned by the law, in Mexico Articles 145 and 145bis of 
the Mexican penal code became the legal framework by which the PRI justified its 




twelve years for carrying out political propaganda, inciting rebellion, or threatening 
national sovereignty.43  
 These articles of social dissolution were incredibly broad and vague, as are 
Castro’s decree and Perón’s campaign against the “internal enemy.” Therefore, as 
Williams shows, they are open to interpretation and manipulation by state authorities 
under “a veneer of legal legitimacy” (Mexican 118). It is at this point in Williams’s 
argument that his concrete focus on Mexico coincides with Agamben’s reflections on 
the state of exception, even as he claims to sidestep Agamben: 
In pure exceptionality force without law gives rise to the law of force [what 
Agamben calls “force-of-law” even though Williams does not quote him 
here]. Law beyond the law becomes the only law, and the exception becomes 
the norm [This is Agamben’s central claim about the state of exception]. 
Through Articles 145 and 145bis, the sovereign remained the law behind the 
law, that is, the only law, while at the same time hiding his de facto 
exceptionality behind the socialized mask of jurisprudence. As such the force 
of sovereign exceptionality was embodied in and through the articles of social 
dissolution. (118–119) 
                                                
43 The following excerpt of Article 145 is quoted by Gareth Williams in The Mexican 
Exception: “A prison sentence of two to twelve years will be given to any foreigner or 
Mexican national who in spoken or written form, or by any other means, carries out 
political propaganda among foreigners or Mexican nationals with a view to spreading 
the ideas, programs or plans of action of any foreign government that might perturb 
public order or affect the sovereignty of the Mexican state. Public order is perturbed 
when those acts determined in the previous paragraph tend to produce rebellion, 
sedition, tumult or riot. National sovereignty is affected when those aforementioned 
acts endanger the territorial integrity of the Republic, impede the functioning of its 
legitimate institutions or propagate among Mexican nationals disrepect for their civic 




Without a doubt, Articles 145 and 145bis are the specific legal apparatus that can be 
associated with the state of exception, legitimizing and carrying out legal bans in the 
Mexican context. Anyone subjected to this law—including all of those imprisoned 
during the 1958 rail workers’ strike and those massacred during the peaceful 
gathering at Tlatelolco in 1968—can be seen as Mexican examples of the homo sacer, 
of the bare lives who can be killed or imprisoned after being abandoned by the law.  
 The bibliography documenting the events leading up to the massacre at 
Tlatelolco is extensive, and in fact, this tragic day understandably became the subject 
of a great deal of intellectual production in the immediate years following it. The 
bibliography on Tlatelolco has become the most visible portion of late 1960s and 
early 1970s Mexican culture.44 This event, as Bruno Bosteels summarizes in Marx 
and Freud in Latin America, “would not only be the name of the place where state 
power exhibited its intrinsically excessive nature, as always brutally superior to the 
situation at hand, but it would also be the anchoring point for the tenacious search for 
a different ‘we,’ or a different subjective figure of equality, capable of putting a limit 
on the errancy of the state” (193). This is to say that the marches and protests of the 
Sixties in Mexico were primarily the search for another form of belonging to the 
political organization of the country, particularly by the youth at the time who knew 
that the PRI was structured like a pyramid, which one must climb and only hope to 
reach the peak much later in life, if at all. Yet, the PRI saw any attempt to alter its 
                                                
44 See Bosteels, Marx and Freud in Latin America (165–166 n.14), for a 
comprehensive bibliography on Tlatelolco. Here I list only a few of these texts that 
had appeared by the time Manjarrez started publishing in 1971: Octavio Paz, Posdata 
(Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1970); Carlos Monsiváis, Días de guardar (Mexico 
City: Era, 1970); Elena Poniatowska, La noche de Tlatelolco (Mexico City: Era, 




hierarchy as an attack on its hegemony and made violent recourse to the state of 
exception legally permitted by Articles 145 and 145bis to ensure its continued 
hegemony. Bosteels proposes reading the politics of the student movement outside of 
the traditional narratives of success and defeat, and instead, he proposes recognizing 
the students’ ability to open a space in which they produced a delinking from society 
(169). Politics, Bosteels argues, “takes off from the opening of a gap or breach in that 
imaginary whole called society” (170). In a sense, this is the same type of politics that 
I have been describing indirectly all along, a politics that opens a gap or breach in the 
community’s consensus.  
 Certainly, the students’ and workers’ politics surrounding Tlatelolco did not 
go unnoticed. In contrast, Héctor Manjarrez’s story about an American cowboy in 
Mexico, and his early works of fiction in general, did go unnoticed. However, I 
contend that by going unnoticed they open a different gap within the cultural milieu 
of the Sixties in Mexico that the one opened by those who openly protested. In my 
discussion of Lapsus (Algunos actos fallidos), I showed how his character Huberto 
rejects everything in the Sixties, including nationalist and anti-nationalist literatures, 
categories within which the highly visible bibliography on Tlatelolco would certainly 
fit. For the students, the literature they wrote documenting the horrific events were 
certainly nationalist, whereas for the PRI, any support of the student movements was 
certainly anti-nationalist, and vice versa.  
 Alongside this blockage in the definition of the Mexican Nation, Héctor 
Manjarrez conspicuously avoids writing about Tlatelolco. Manjarrez lived and 




(Domínguez Michael 3). He obviously did not participate in the Mexican student 
movements. In an interview, Manjarrez explains his relationship to the short stories of 
this collection: “al ver el producto ya pulido y terminado entré en una crisis 
espantosa, ya no podía hacer nada, estaba paralizado, podía creer igualmente en la 
revolución o en la contrarrevolución. Todo era tan difuso y ambivalente” ‘upon 
seeing the polished, finished product, I had a tremendous crisis. I couldn’t do 
anything, I was paralized. I could believe just as easily in the revolution or in the 
counter-revolution. Everything was so cloudy and ambivalent’ (“Resquebajamiento” 
261). Then, after learning of the massacre at Tlatelolco while abroad, he had been 
writing the novel Lapsus: “Empecé a escribirla en 1968, pero de mayo a octubre de 
1968 habían sucedido tantas cosas, que simplemente me era imposible seguir 
haciéndolo” ‘I began to write the novel in 1968, but so many things had happened 
between May and October of 1968 that I found it simply impossible to continue 
writing’ (262–263). In this context, it is not surprising that his first publications are 
not dedicated to either glorifying or demonizing these events; he claims to have found 
it impossible to know exactly how and where to align himself, his politics, and his 
fiction.  
 In this same interview, Manjarrez says that “Johnny” “no me satisfizo” ‘did 
not satisfy me’ (261). Nevertheless, as I read it today, this seemingly unsatisfactory or 
irrelevant short story opens a place within the overcrowded space of explicitly 
political narratives regarding Mexican culture and politics in the Sixties. The short 
story “Johnny” has gone unnoticed in the shadow of the highly visible, critical 




bibliography. Nevertheless, “Johnny” can be read for rejecting the bounds of the 
nationalist versus anti-nationalist debate. By appropriating and radically transforming 
the clichés of the Hollywood Western, it dismantles the moralizing discourses that 
easily oppose heroes to bandits or, in the terms of Mexican politics in the Sixties, of 
the Mexican Nation in peril to the rebellious students who must then be killed or 
imprisoned. Without taking a moral stance on one side of the debate or the other, 
“Johnny” acquires the potential to be read as a text about a character who attempts to 
go unnoticed quite unsuccessfully once he becomes an unprecedented example of a 
homo sacer in Mexico.  
 Public interest in Johnny’s status fades, because no one is interested any 
longer in the Western; however, “Johnny” is no longer a classical Western, but a text 
that has taken up the Western at its point of failure and renovated it for a new public 
through an avant-garde gesture by which outdated forms are reclaimed and recycled 
within the cultural markets of the Sixties. In this way, “Johnny” can be understood 
within the framework develop by Ana María Amar Sánchez wherein writers use 
popular forms as a mode of seduction, a way to lure in readers and provoke interest in 
their literature, even if they fail to produce the object of desire or if they never 
intended to produce it in the first place (Juegos). Manjarrez’s Western gets a make-
over precisely at the moment when Johnny crashes through the Zendejas family’s 
television. The Western is not transformed into the increasingly popular James Bond-
style spy genre that replaces the Western within the text and that gained real traction 
in Sixties, but with a somewhat unclassifiable form of science fiction that draws from 




 Once Johnny leaves both the private light and the public spotlight, he appears 
to be free to move out of the city onto the Zendejas family’s ranch in the Valle de 
Anáhuac. In leaving the city, the polis, he unwittingly becomes a form of classical 
exile, a figure who, Agamben recalls, was situated at the center of a debate “between 
those who conceive exile to be a punishment and those who understand it to be a right 
and a refuge” (Homo Sacer 110). This ambiguity results from the dual meanings of 
the word “banned,” which “in Romance languages originally meant both ‘at the 
mercy of’ and ‘out of free will, freely,’ both ‘excluded, banned’ and ‘open to all, 
free’” (110). Johnny has been abandoned by the debates about his legal status in 
Mexico, and he has also gone into a figurative exile from the city where he carelessly 
experiences a new sense of freedom in the countryside. In the Valle de Anáhuac, 
Johnny corporally reacts to his new surroundings: “su cuerpo era una mezcla de 
excitación y placidez, de calma completa y nerviosismo, y su cuerpo bebía por cada 
poro los humores del campo; cohabitaban en él una febril actividad de los sentidos y 
un reposo sensual de su cuerpo entero, en perfecto y precario equilibrio” ‘his body 
was a mixture of excitement and tranquility, of complete calm and nervousness, and 
through his pores his body imbibed the humors of the countryside; he was cohabited 
by the feverish activity of his senses and the sensual repose of his entire body, in 
perfect and precarious equilibrium’ (“Johnny” 24). All of the descriptions of Johnny 
in the Valle de Anáhuac, an unstable reminder of his former life in the frontier lands 
of the Far West, involve a state of being and its potential antithesis; he is no longer 
the embodiment of the good who will triumph over evil, but becomes a living 




once he leaves the public spotlight. Yet, the narrative describes how such a pleasant 
and peaceful mixture of emotions relies on a delicate balance that can be easily upset. 
In fact, Johnny has not simply been excluded from the city, outside of the reach of its 
force of law; this zone of indistinction that he inhabits becomes, in my reading, none 
other than the modern the state of exception that no longer distinguishes between 
private and public, city and countryside. 
 Johnny was looking for independence, but he overlooks his own vulnerability 
as a form of bare life and mistakes his abandonment by the law for a naïve sense of 
freedom from public scrutiny. Once outside the city, he falls in love with the 
Zendejas’s daughter, Mariana, and she becomes pregnant before they make their 
relationship public and marry. At this point, the same good guys versus bad guys 
binary logic from the beginning of the text reappears at the end to incite the tragic 
consequences that all such facile constructs carry within them. Gonzalo Zendejas, 
Mariana’s father, had come to see Johnny as his adopted son, but when he finds out 
that Mariana is pregnant, he describes Johnny as “ese vípero que se encuentra en 
nuestro nido” ‘that viper living in our nest’ (34).45 Driven by rage and a sense of 
impotence, Gonzalo does not know how else to resolve the situation other than by 
returning to the conventions of the Western genre and recasting Johnny as the villain. 
Along the course of this narrative, Johnny is transformed from the hero saving his 
family and their ranch, to a public spectacle, to the living oxymoron during his stint in 
                                                
45 Recall that in 1971 in Argentina there was a second Cordobazo more commonly 
known as the Viborazo, meaning “an attack by a viper.” The Governor of Córdoba 
announced his intent to end the uprising saying that he will “cortarle la cabeza a la 
víbora venenosa que anida en Córdoba” ‘cut off the head of the venemous viper that 




the Mexican countryside where he became a sort of adopted son to the Zendejas 
family, and finally to the man who has dishonored the Zendejas’s family name and 
denigrated Gonzalo’s only virginal daughter. He has traversed the barrier separating 
the hero from the villain.  
 Gonzalo is compelled to kill Johnny due to an obligation beyond his physical 
control, since killing Johnny is the only way he thinks his honor will be restored. 
Gonzalo shoots him twice, and Johnny lands again on the soft and warm ground of 
the Zendejas’s family house as his blood pools on the floor. One might expect a twist 
ending reminiscent of Ambrose Bierce’s “An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge” 
(1890) in which the protagonist’s actions were in fact just his dying thoughts before 
finally passing away after landing on the ground during the pursuit of the bandits in 
the nineteenth century narrative. Or perhaps the ambiguous end to Jorge Luis 
Borges’s “El Sur” (1944) in which it is impossible to decide if the protagonist, Juan 
Dahlmann, died in the city hospital or if he died in a knife fight in the Argentine 
Pampas. In contrast, Johnny the hero only temporarily escapes death or serious harm 
as the hero in the first narrative to end up being murdered by Gonzalo as the 
despicable outlaw who is indistinguishable from the fleeing rogues Johnny had been 
chasing at the beginning of the text. Ultimately, the narrative appeals more closely to 
Julio Cortázar’s “Axolotl” (1956), in which the protagonist finds himself literally 
switching from one side of a division, a binary, or an identity group, to the opposite 
one. The short story ends abruptly with no further exploration of this murder that 
seems unjustifiable by modern moral standards in the Sixties, but the early modern 




present. Clear temporal distinctions between the ancient and the modern become just 
as muddied in this narrative as the genres to which it appeals, and the contingent 
divisions between hero and villain that so easily become inverted in this text disprove 
any attempt to construct such a binary division as universal. 
 Furthermore, Johnny is not killed by the hands of the State, but by another 
citizen, who would most likely be subjected to a criminal trial had this story not 
ended at the moment of Johnny’s death. It is at this point that I insist on the need to 
return to those parenthetical questions that were literally bracketed in the story and 
never resolved. Without having reached a conclusion about his legal status, Johnny 
has no guaranteed rights or protections. He literally occupies the position of an 
outlaw—of someone outside of the law—from the moment he bursts into the 
Zendejas’s living room until when he is killed by Gonzalo. I do not mean that he is an 
outlaw like the fleeing rogues. He is an outlaw in the sense that the homo sacer is an 
outlaw, a bare life who has been banned and abandoned by the law. Johnny became 
accustomed to the harsh electric lights that first exposed him, and once the public 
scrutiny faded, he seems not to have considered the potential consequences of his 
exposure to a legal system that refused to resolve his status. As a form of bare life 
who has been abandoned by the law, as a homo sacer, Gonzalo could kill him and 
potentially not be accused of having committed a criminal act, because as Agamben 
states, “in the case of homo sacer a person is simply set outside human jurisdiction 
without being brought into the realm of divine law” (Homo 82). This “zone of 
indistinction between sacrifice and homicide” is the state of exception inhabited by 




the political sphere of sovereignty: “The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is 
permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, 
and sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has 
been captured in this sphere” (83). Johnny, in my reading, represents the life that has 
been captured by the state of exception. Gonzalo, therefore, is theoretically exempted 
from a criminal case, since the body he killed was already a legal exception, banned 
and abandoned by the law.  
 In killing Johnny, Gonzalo closed the opening by which Johnny thought he 
had found a temporary sense of freedom in the Valle de Anáhuac. But this is not the 
opening that makes up the political gesture of this text. This opening in the Valle de 
Anáhuac was purely illusory. On the one hand, “Johnny” is partially an allegory for 
the legal and political structures that allowed for the massacre at Tlatelolco to take 
place. But, on the other, “Johnny” also exceeds this particular allegorical 
interpretation. Manjarrez steps outside of binary oppositions from the very start by 
writing a SciFi-Western instead of an explicitly political text. “Johnny” can go 
unnoticed by the reductive antagonisms that classify one group as nationalist in the 
face of another. The politics of this text takes place in the entangled exploration of 
popular genres—the Western, the spy genre, fantastic literature, and science fiction. 
By appropriating the conventions of the American Western, “Johnny” opens a place 
already occupied by such facile binary oppositions. The narrative moves beyond the 
binaries of good versus evil, of us versus them, of the Mexican State versus those 
protesting its authoritarianism. “Johnny” dismantles the possibility for such universal 




can slip from one side of the binary to the other and, therefore, be murdured. Finally, 
“Johnny” opens the possibility for engaging in a more nuanced understanding of the 
competing and conflicting interests that always exist in the public sphere, especially 
when it becomes almost impossible to choose between predetermined, often reductive 
positions with which one feels uncomfortable identifying. This opening toward new 
possibilities, without necessarily creating a new, highly visible and powerful political 
party, -ism, or identity group is precisely the gesture by which those who go 




A Nude Woman in Uruguay 
 Uruguay was known as the Switzerland of South America in the first half of 
the twentieth century, ever since the Partido Colorado’s candidate, José Battle y 
Ordóñez, had become President. The country’s strong, two-party democratic 
institutions were considered to be a stark contrast to its surrounding neighbors, 
Argentina and Brazil, who had engaged each other in war in the nineteenth century 
for control of the Banda Oriental, as Uruguay was known in Spanish, or the 
Cisplantina, as it was known in Portuguese. By the end of World War II, Uruguay 
was praised internationally for its economic growth and stability, which were 
dependent upon the regulations made by the Welfare State (Iglesias 132).  
 Despite the apparent peace and stability of twentieth-century Uruguay from an 
international perspective, this model of democracy in South America also made 
frequent recourse to the state of exception—known in the 1830 Constitution as 
“medidas prontas de seguridad” ‘prompt security measures’ in case of external attack 
or internal commotion—since the beginning of the century (Iglesias 132).46 Between 
1946, the year in which Battlismo consolidated its power under Luis Battle Berres, 
and 1973, the year in which the Armed Forces began the dictatorship known 
euphemistically as “el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional” ‘The National Security 
Council,’ the prompt security measures were increasingly invoked as a political 
strategy oriented toward maintaining the sociopolitical order dominated by the 
                                                
46 Mariana Iglesias records eighteen cases in which the “medidas prontas de 
seguridad” were invoked in Uruguay in each of the following years: 1902, 1903, 
1904, 1906, 1909, 1910, 1914, 1917, 1919, 1920, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 




Partido Colorado and the Partido Nacional. This two-party centered state felt the need 
to reaffirm its centrality and superiority over “cualquier colectivo social —tanto 
patronal como asalariado— que pretendiera erigirse en representante de intereses 
sociales específicos por fuera de instancias controladas por ellos” ‘any social 
collective—be it by the employers or by the workers—that would try to establish 
itself as the representative of specific social interests outside of the proceedings they 
authorized’ (Franco 148).  
 Although presided by two parties, and not just one as in the case of Mexico’s 
PRI, the Uruguayan state similarly invoked the “prompt security measures” in order 
to guarantee the transition between the two parties to the exclusion of any others. 
With the growing tensions of the Cold War, the “threat” invoked in order to justify 
recourse to this Uruguayan variant of the state of exception became Communism and 
later the armed urban guerrillas, the Tupamaros. Abril Trigo recalls that in Uruguay 
the Cuban Revolution “destapó los demonios y los echó a andar por las calles de 
nuestra gris Montevideo” ‘took the lid off the demons and set them walking through 
the streets of our grey Montevideo’ (Caudillo 186). As he shows, the idea of 
revolution brought to the surface many tensions that were hidden behind the 
apparently peaceful, two-party democracy, and it is in this context that the 
Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros attempted to alter the status quo by 
making frequent reference to Uruguay’s nineteenth century civil wars. The 
Tuparamos, Trigo writes, “le lleva a recordar [a los detentadores del statu quo] que la 
guerra civil fue el recurso habitual del pueblo uruguayo en la primera mitad de su 




pacifistas, fueron los protagonistas de aquellas ‘patriadas’ en las cuales nacieron” 
‘remind [those who unlawfully uphold the status quo] that civil war was the habitual 
resource of the Uruguayan people in the first half of its independent life and that the 
same traditional parties, which today are so garrulously pacifist, were the protagonists 
of those revolts in which they were born’ (205). The Tupamaros, in this sense, evoked 
a strange mixture of national history with a revolutionary present as they rebelled 
against the traditional parties, but they would not succeed.  
 For Trigo, the Tupamaros appeared to be attempting “salvar los restos del 
naufragio” ‘to salvage the remains of a shipwreck,’ that of the sinking Uruguayan 
state, more than provoking a more profound revolution (206). By July of 1970, the 
violence had escalated, and on April 15, 1972, the recently elected Juan María 
Bordaberry declared a state of internal war—a state of exception. As Thomas C. 
Wright explains, approximately six hundred Tupamaros were captured and one 
hundred killed by July 15, 1972, but the counterinsurgency measures were not 
dropped, leading to labor unrest, political protests, and allegations of military 
involvement in death squads and brutal treatment of prisoners. In reaction to this 
popular unrest, and not just to the existence of urban guerrilla cells, “Bordaberry 
acceded to the gradual militarization of his government until the culminating coup of 
June 1973, when he closed congress and municipal governments and began to rule by 
decree with a military-civilian cabinet” (101). Under this more generalized state of 
exception, which by 1973 was no longer shrouded in democratic robes, the 





 In detailing the instaces of recourse to the state of exception in Cuba, 
Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay, I would like to clarify two points. First, it must be 
recalled that the state of exception and the homo sacer, as they appear in Agamben’s 
analyses and as I bring them into the present argument, are to be understood not as a 
homogenous, theoretical concept or Platonic Idea that can be applied equally to 
different circumstances. Rather, they are paradigms. In The Signature of All Things: 
On Method, Agamben clarifies this point:  
Homo sacer and the concentration camp, the Muselmann and the state of 
exception, and, more recently, the Trinitarian oikonomia and acclamations are 
not hypotheses through which I intended to explain modernity by tracing it 
back to something like a cause of historical origin. On the contrary, as their 
very multiplicity might have signaled, each time it was a matter of paradigms 
whose aim was to make intelligible a series of phenomena whose kinship had 
eluded or could elude the historian’s gaze. (31) 
The paradigm is not a purely theoretical concept or a metaphor, but rather a 
singularity that neutralizes “the dichotomy between the general and the particular” 
and its historicity “lies neither in diachrony nor in synchrony but in a crossing of the 
two” (31). The paradigm is an example drawn from a specific, historical case of 
which it never ceases being a part, and from this singularity, it acquires an 
exemplarity that can be useful in pointing to concepts that had previously evaded the 
historian’s gaze (31). For this reason, when they are invoked, these paradigms must 
be contextualized and allowed to take on new or different characteristics as they play 




insofar as they allow me to turn around and read against the scriptural currents that 
have come to narrate the Latin American Sixties. 
 Second, my goal is not to create a teleological historical trajectory as if the 
facile recourse to the state of exception in isolated events during the era necessarily 
led to the hardline Communism of Cuba, the massacre of students by the State in 
Mexico, and the dictatorships in Argentina and Uruguay. These were not historical 
necessities, but they were also not isolated, anomalous events. The historians of the 
state of exception in its singular forms in Western democracies have demonstrated the 
potential for authoritarianism, military intervention, violence committed by the State, 
and the suspension of the state of law as a constitutive attribute of Western 
democracies. Historically, these security measures are rationalized within different 
legal frameworks as the paradoxical guarantee of the law by suspending the law.  
 With a bit of temporal distance from specific uses of the state of exception, 
however, the justifications for recourse to the suspension of the law tend to be 
motivated more by the attempt by an individual, a party, or a collective of governing 
bodies to secure sovereignty, both political and moral, than by the need to protect the 
constitutional foundations of a nation-state. It seems unlikely that gay men in Cuba 
posed a serious threat to the sovereignty of the Cuban Revolution, and the students 
and workers protesting in Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay, who were frequently the 
subjects abandoned by the law, are not so easily reduced to the equivalent of the rural 
and urban guerrilla fighters who aimed at provoking a Cuban-style armed revolution 
that escalated throughout the 1970s. In retrospect, even the presence of such guerrilla 




1970s and 1980s. It is at this point that Agamben’s claim that “the state of exception 
has by now become the rule” comes into focus within the Latin American context that 
does not figure into his analysis (State 9). If the state of exception is a generalized 
practice taking on specific countours in particular contexts, as these historians have 
shown it to be, then this means that the space of modern biopolitics has been 
transformed into a threshold or a zone of indistinction. Anyone inhabiting this 
threshold can become at any moment a homo sacer, a body that can be killed once it 
is abandoned by the law.  
 Before the oppressive regimes of the 1970s and 1980s came into power by 
force, the authors I study here were already erring along their own lines of flight by 
provoking other political gestures during the Sixties. However, I would caution 
against reading any of the political gestures I have been studying as if they were 
somehow capable of foresight regarding the failures of the revolutionary projects. 
Their errant itineraries are not, in my view, an attempt to avoid these particular 
failures. The narrative of the failure of the Sixties is only possible in retrospect, and I 
have yet to find anything in these texts that suggests a clear prediction of the future. 
With that said, the politics of going unnoticed enacted by Casey, Filloy, Manjarrez, 
and Somers takes the form of disagreements with the more visible and audible 
politics of the era. In particular, they all write of characters who, when read in the 
light of Agamben’s paradigms, become a sort of homo sacer looking for a way out of 
the state of exception or for a way to disagree with modern biopolitical organizations 
by going unnoticed within them. Both Casey’s essays and Filloy’s ironic character 




both recognize the impossibility of locating an autonomous space outside of the state 
of exception. Manjarrez’s cowboy, Johnny, fails to recognize his precarious position 
within this threshold space, but by reading the elements of the text “Johnny” that go 
unnoticed once he leaves the spotlight, his status as a homo sacer becomes evident. 
With this context in mind, I will turn to my final example of the politics of going 
unnoticed—Rebeca Linke in Somers’s novella La mujer desnuda. 
 La mujer desnuda was first published in 1950 in the journal Clima, but it was 
not made popularly available until 1966 when it was republished by Arca. The reason 
for this, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, is that Somers was outright rejected 
and ninguneada as a serious writer for having written a supposedly pornographic 
novel. In one of the few interviews she granted, Somers explains that the National 
Library purchased almost all of the copies of the first edition of La mujer desnuda, 
and the director of the Library had sent them around the world: “Es decir que La 
mujer desnuda, realmente, no se difundió en Montevideo, la revista [Clima] fue para 
ciertas élites y la separata fue adquirida por la Biblioteca. De tal manera, la novela 
siguió siendo un mito, porque se hablaba de ella pero muy pocos la conocían” ‘La 
mujer desnuda really never circulated in Montevideo. The journal [Clima] was for the 
elites, and the separate edition was acquired by the National Library. For that reason 
the novel continued to be a myth, because people talked about it, but only a few had 
read it’ (Risso 255). Only a few people read the novella when it first appeared, and it 
went almost completely unnoticed outside of the national context, as is the case with 




 In this novella, it is Rebeca Linke, the nude woman and protagonist of the 
text, who attempts to go unnoticed as she pries open a political place for herself. The 
novella begins with the following sentence: “El día en que Rebeca Linke cumplió los 
treinta años, comenzó con lo que ella había imaginado siempre, a pesar de una secreta 
ilusión en contra: la nada” ‘The day of Rebeca Linke’s thirtieth birthday began with 
what she had always imagined, despite a secret, conflicting illusion: nothing’ (La 
mujer 15). The day seemed to be of little importance, one in which nothing out of the 
ordinary would occur; the narrator describes the day as “apenas como un aburrido 
bostezo de verano igual a tantos” ‘barely like a bored yawn in the summer 
indistinguishable from the rest’ (15). But this tranquility would not last for long.  
 The fourth paragraph on the first page registers a second beginning for the 
novella: “Todo empezó así, entonces: que ella fuese retrocediendo inconscientemente 
en un escenario vulgar y desapareciera de la vista. Había llegado quizás el momento 
preciso en que cada uno deba vivir su acontecimiento propio” ‘Everything began as if 
unconsciously she had begun to step out of the spotlight of her normal surroundings 
and disappeared from sight. The precise moment, perhaps, had arrived at which 
everyone must experience their own event’ (15). There is an uncertainty in these 
actions; the narrator hesitates to tell them as fact, and the narrator’s words also 
become slightly confused with the thoughts of Rebeca Linke. The narrator frequently 
slips in and out of Rebeca Linke’s consciousness, at times narrating her thoughts as if 
they were shared by the narrator, at times commenting on the events of the story as if 




create an opening in her life. She almost automatically steps out of the spotlight and 
disappears from sight; that is, she begins to go unnoticed of her own volition.  
 By the end of the first page of the novella, Rebeca Linke is suddenly at the 
small house she had purchased on a ranch in the countryside. She then, through the 
narrator, recalls her journey there on the last train during the night. It is not until 
almost the end of the novella that she further details her flight from her parents’ home 
on the night of her birthday party. She explains to Juan, a man who falls in love with 
her and tries to protect her later in the story, what she was thinking:  
Creo que empezó así, en la fiesta de mis treinta años, hace pocas noches. Que 
yo diera en mirar a los demás en la forma cómo serían otros treinta después, 
con las voces cascándose, el pellejo colgado que ellos se estiran a veces con 
los dedos para crearse un segundo de ilusión, el sexo con los verbos ya sin 
conjugar, y el miedo de morir desprevenidos al acostarse cada noche. (95)  
‘I think it started a few nights ago during my thirtieth birthday party. I was 
looking at everyone else thinking about what the next thirty years would be 
like, with their cracking voices, their hanging skin that they pull back 
sometimes to give the illusion of youth, their genitals no longer conjugating 
verbs, and their fear of dying unexpectedly as they go to bed each night.’  
Rebeca Linke was going through an early mid-life crisis, so she decides to abruptly 
change her life now that she is no longer considered a minor and can legally abandon 
her parents’ home as an unmarried woman. María Rosa Olivera-Williams has shown 
how the Uruguayan Civil Code in operation in 1950 constructed an eternal 




casa de sus padres si no se había casado —sujeto que no había alcanzado la mayoría 
de edad— hasta los treinta años” ‘“incapable” of abandoning their parents’ home, 
unless they get married, until they turn thirty and legally come of age’ (“Lo 
femenino” 32). Rebeca Linke wastes no time. She had already bought the little house 
on the farm so that she could leave that very night, and she runs upstairs during her 
birthday party, takes off all her clothes, stares at her nude body, and then puts on an 
overcoat before running to catch the last train.  
 Once she arrives at the little house, she removes her overcoat and falls into a 
sort of trance under the moonlight that filters through the blinds in stripes of light and 
stripes of shadow, creating prison-like bars that simultaneously cover and expose her 
nude body. The resemblance between Rebeca Linke’s symbolic prison bars in her 
cave-like house in the countryside and the prisoner chained inside the cave in Plato’s 
“Allegory of the Cave” cannot be overlooked, but as in “Yo y los intrusos” by Filloy, 
this narrative is not a simple reconstruction of the Platonic text. The prisoner in 
Plato’s allegory is unchained by some unnamed source. Rebeca Linke’s stuggle for 
freedom will be much less abstract. She remembers that she has a small dagger, “una 
obra de arte” ‘a work of art,’ tucked inside a book that would be apt “para decapitar a 
una mujer prisionera” ‘for decapitating a female prisoner’ (La mujer 18). This small 
work of art will become the means by which she first carves out a tiny opening, 
beginning her political gesture.  
 Rebeca Linke has fled from her family home, but she still feels trapped and 





La mano que quiere alcanzarla [la daga] no puede. Derriba el vaso con agua 
de la mesa y queda allí como una flor congelada. Es entonces cuando la daga 
va a demostrar que ella sí sabe hacerlo, y se desplaza atraída por las puntas de 
unos dedos. Claro que hacia una mano que está adherida a un brazo, que 
pertenece a su vez a un cuerpo con cabeza, con cuello. Una cabeza, algo tan 
importante sobre eso tan vulnerable que es un cuello… El filo penetró sin 
esfuerzo, a pesar del brazo muerto, de la mano sin dedos. Tropezó con 
innumerables cosas que se llamarían quizás arterias, venas, cartílagos, huesos 
articulados, sangre viscosa y caliente, con todo menos el dolor que entonces 
ya no existía. 
La cabeza rodó pesadamente como un fruto. Rebeca Linke vio caer aquello 
sin alegría ni pena. (18) 
‘Her hand wants to reach the dagger but it cannot. She spills the glass of water 
on the table and remains there like a frozen flower. It is then that the dagger 
will demonstrate that she [or it] does know how to do it, and it slides, attracted 
by the tips of her fingers, clearly toward a hand attached to an arm that 
belongs to a body with a head and a neck. A head, something so important 
resting on something so vulnerable as a neck... The blade penetrated without 
effort, despite her dead arm, her hand without fingers. It struggled against 
innumerable things that perhaps could be called arteries, veins, cartilage, 
joints, viscous and warm blood, against everything except the pain that no 




Her head rolled heavily like a fruit. Rebeca Linke saw it fall without 
happiness or sorrow.’  
Rebeca Linke desires to cut off her own head while nude, and in doing so, she 
attempts to sever all ties to her past and divest herself of even the clothes she brought 
with her from her former life.  
 Incapable of carrying out this act on her own, the dagger acquires a form of 
life, or at least of movement. The narrator here achieves a grammatical ambiguity 
with regard to the antecedent of a pronoun, a stylistic trait to which Somers adeptly 
makes recourse throughout her work, challenging the reader to return to her phrases 
multiple time to decipher who or what is being referenced. The dagger is said to 
demonstrate that “ella” does know how to cut off Rebeca Linke’s head. This “ella” 
can both mean “she” in reference to Rebeca Linke and “it” in reference to the dagger, 
a grammatically feminine noun. The dagger simultaneously shows Rebeca Linke how 
to cut off her own head and that it is capable of cutting off her head for her. I contend 
that the only justifiable reading of Somers’s ambiguities is to leave both possibilities 
intact. The rest of this gruesome description of the blade slicing through her neck 
maintains a closely impersonal tone, one that alternates between Rebeca Linke’s 
somewhat disembodied point of view seeing her own actions and an objective, third 
person description of the events, which also might be the point of view of the now 
animate dagger itself. The prose here attains the perspective of an errant palindrome. 
The reader’s attention is alternately demanded by the narrator, Rebeca Linke’s point 
of view, and the perspective of the now animate dagger. These three perspectives are 




on who or what is the grammatical antecedent and on how the reader interprets the 
narrative voice.  
 At the same time, Rebeca Linke is ensuring a radically different perspective 
and a different place for herself in the world. Once this act was committed, either the 
narrator states or Rebeca Linke thinks:  
Se hacía, pues, impostergable volver a lo anterior, tornar a echarse el 
pensamiento encima, construir de nuevo el universo real con las estrellas 
siempre arriba y el suelo por lo bajo, según esquemas primitivos. En eficaz 
maniobra, la mujer decapitada tomó su antigua cabeza, se la colocó de un 
golpe duro como un casco de combate. (21) 
‘Returning to the previous situation, jumping back into her thoughts, building 
once again the real universe in which the stars are always overhead and the 
ground under foot, according to primitive preconceptions, none of this could 
be restored. With an efficient maneuver, the decapitated woman picked up her 
former head and abruptly put it on like a combat helmet.’ 
The decapitation was not a final, suicidal act. She pulls her head back onto her 
shoulders, and the wound seals itself almost immediately. It takes her a few moments 
to fully recover her senses, but this moment marks a definitive break with the past. 
Rebeca Linke refuses to return to the “primitive preconceptions” that ordered her 
former life. She recognizes her new position in the world once her eyes painfully 
regain their capacity to see, and she quickly realizes how much she prefers her 




 On the surface, it seems Rebeca Linke has overreacted. She turned thirty years 
old, had an early mid-life crisis, removed all her clothes (except for an overcoat that 
allows her to take the night train without drawing much attention to herself), moves to 
a house in the countryside, and cuts off her own head. Lucky for her, she inhabits a 
fantastic world and survives this ordeal, still able to put her head back on her 
shoulders. Somers, like Manjarrez, appeals to the fantastic genre, but she mixes her 
tales with a bit of horror and mystery. Setting all judgments aside about her life 
choices, Rebeca Linke’s thirtieth birthday is all that was needed to send her down this 
line of flight into the countryside. As Deleuze and Guattari state, “We can be thrown 
into a becoming by anything at all, by the most unexpected, most insignificant of 
things. You don’t deviate from the majority unless there is a little detail that starts to 
swell and carries you off” (Thousand 292). Clearly turning thirty was sufficient to 
send her on this errant path along which she now desires to go unnoticed as she 
continues moving away from her past. Such a seemingly minor event, a birthday 
party or more likely the birthday itself, is all it took to provoke this small, but radical 
political gesture. 
 In contrast to Plato’s prisoner, but not unlike Maximiliano Konsideransky, 
Rebeca Linke leaves her house and sets out into the darkness of the night. In the 
previous chapter I quoted from Agamben in his essay, “What is the Contemporary?,” 
to show that to be contemporary person must perceive the darkness of their own time, 
and not solely be blinded by the lights that shine the brightest. In this sense, those 
who go unnoticed can become the contemporary of an era despite its lack of 




that hides in the darkness without needing to bring it into the light. Regarding Rebeca 
Linke, her birthday is the moment at which she perceives this darkness hiding behind 
the apparently mundane, normal life she and her family had been living; she is no 
longer blinded by the lights of her era and becomes contemporary at the moment she 
perceives her former position as that of an unwitting prisoner who must break her 
chains and divest her body of the shrouds placed on it.  
 In other moments of Agamben’s writings, the need to perceive the darkness 
also acquires political potential. In the essay, “On Potentiality,” Agamben studies 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and De anima to consider the relationship between dynamis 
and energeia, potentiality and actuality. In Agamben’s reading of Aristotle, energeia 
or actuality corresponds to the light, whereas dynamis or potentiality corresponds to 
darkness. When one sees, one actualizes one’s potential for sight, that is, for the 
perception of light: “when we do not see (that is, when our vision is potential), we 
nevertheless distinguish darkness from light; we see darkness” (180–181). In this 
perception of darkness when light is absent, there is still the potential for sight even 
though one is not actually seeing at the present moment. Rebeca Linke comes to see 
the darkness of her situation, the nothingness that takes over the day of her birthday 
and convinces her to make a radical break. Furthermore, Agamben claims that 
potentiality “is not simply the potential to do this or that thing but potential to not-do, 
potential not to pass into actuality. […] The greatness—and also the abyss—of 
human potentiality is that it is first of all potential not to act, potential for darkness” 
(180–181). This is a tricky area in Agamben’s essay. Potentiality is both the potential 




refuse to do something, at the same time. I say it is tricky, because there are two ways 
to read each side of this potential to do and to not do. Agamben states that potentiality 
“is such a terrible experience, which borders on both good and evil” (181). One 
remains capable of doing both good and bad acts, and one can also refuse to do good 
or refuse to do evil. The terms “good” and “evil” seem quite out of place as moral 
absolutes within Agamben’s larger work, but he never labels any particular action as 
being good or evil. In contrast, his intention here is to show that the space of 
potentiality is the threshold in which the decision to be both good and evil remains 
open; it is a space in which decisions can still be made. If this space were to foreclose 
the possibility of choosing evil over good or vice versa, then there would be no 
possible choice, no actual state of potentiality. Potentiality, then, is this opening of a 
threshold in which decisions can be made, an opening without content that serves 
only a means for acquiring the potential to make decisions without predetermining the 
outcome of those choices. In my view, Rebeca Linke creates such an opening when 
she cuts off her own head. I will return to this point in a moment.  
 First, Agamben clarifies why guaranteeing potentiality must also guarantee 
impotentiality. In “On What We Can Not Do,” he explains that “Deleuze once 
defined the operation of power as a separation of humans from what they can do, that 
is, from their potentiality” (43). In this definition, power is that which renders human 
activity, in the form of its potentiality, impotent. To this, Agamben adds another 
operation of power that also affects “impotentiality” or “what they cannot do, or 
better, can not do” (43). For Agamben the loss of impotentiality is more “insidious” 




impotentiality lose, on the other hand, first of all the capacity to resist. And just as it 
is only the burning awareness of what we cannot be that guarantees the truth of what 
we are, so it is only the lucid vision of what we cannot, or can not, do that gives 
consistency to our actions” (45). Each human being is incapable of certain actions; 
one may or may not have the capacity to be a great painter or a great machinist or a 
great aviator. These incapacities are simply facts and, although unfortunate, once 
faced, it is possible to come to terms with the limits of one’s talents and skills. 
Impotentiality, for Agamben, is not related to the limits of one’s abilities or skills in 
this sense. Impotentiality is the final component of real potentiality; it is the capacity 
to not do something, to refuse or to resist an action that one is physically capable of 
doing. To not do something because one is physically unable to do it is not the same 
thing as refusing to do an act that one could physically complete. I will chose an 
extreme, arbitrary example to make this point more clear: there is a difference 
between, on the one hand, not killing another person because I did not have bullets 
for my gun and, even if I did, I know I have horrible aim and would probably not be 
able to kill them and, on the other, refusing to kill another person when those bullets 
were loaded in the gun in my hand that I am skilled at shooting.  
 For Agamben, denying someone the potential to resist an action is more 
insidious than simply taking away their ability to complete an action. The potential 
for resistance and refusal is a necessary component of any truly open space, and it is 
this type of dissent and disagreement that gives this opening its political potentiality. 
The politics of going unnoticed, finally, is the dissent made possible in the space 




an era wherein various elements are left unattended. It is not necessarily the act of 
tending to those elements, but rather opening up the space in which they can register 
their dissent and recover their potentiality, their capacity to do, to not do, and to resist 
or refuse. 
 Rebeca Linke creates and inhabits a space of potentiality when she moves to 
the little house in the countryside where she decapitates herself. She is both 
physically capable of this gruesome gesture and of refusing to do it, but she puts up 
no resistance even when the dagger seems to acquire its own agency. I use the word 
gesture in the sense that Agamben gives it in “Notes on Gesture,” as a means without 
ends: “if producing is a means in view of an end and praxis is an end without means, 
the gesture then breaks with the false alternative between ends and means that 
paralyzes morality and presents instead means that, as such, evade the orbit of 
mediality without becoming, for this reason, ends” (57). Rebeca Linke makes a 
choice to carry out this gesture that has no discernible end goal made clear in the text. 
The reasons she flees her home and carries out this gesture are known, but she never 
states her goals for what she plans to do after enacting this gesture. It is not meant to 
lead her anywhere in particular.  
 First, this is not a story about suicide, nor do I wish to psychoanalyze her 
actions as a call for help or as a cry for attention; readings like this often stem from a 
veiled form of misogyny. On the contrary, Rebeca Linke actively desires to go 
unnoticed. Second, I want to resist the potential referential reading pact that can 
easily accompany non-realist genres; in other words, I am attempting to refuse to 




Instead, I am interested in this act as a gesture, as a means without ends. “The gesture 
is, in this sense,” Agamben writes, “communication of a communicability. It has 
precisely nothing to say because what it shows is the being-in-language of human 
beings as pure mediality” (59). Rebeca Linke’s gesture does not say any referent in 
my reading of it. Rather, it shows its potentiality. It opens a space in which one can 
decide to do or to not do something.  
 In “Notes on Politics” in the same volume, Agamben defines politics as 
follows: “Politics is the exhibition of a mediality: it is the act of making a means 
visible as such. Politics is the sphere neither of an end in itself nor of means 
subordinated to an end; rather, it is the sphere of a pure mediality without end 
intended as the field of human action and of human thought” (116–117). Politics, 
then, is that which opens up a means without end. It is the opening of a space of 
potentiality, comparable to the opening in an already occupied space that Derrida 
calls khôra and to the guarantee of disagreement in Mouffe’s formulation. In opening 
such a space, politics in this sense does not exclude; rather, it creates the possibility 
for ever more dissent and disagreement without conditions or ends within an already 
occupied space characterized by the normalization of the state of exception. 
 Rebeca Linke’s political gesture, which she enacts while going unnoticed in 
her little shack in the countryside, is one that becomes visible only in the published 
text. It goes unnoticed within the narrative, and in fact, the other characters, 
particularly Juan, do not believe that she actually committed this gruesome, 
realistically impossible act. In exhibiting this means without ends, while going 




gesture alone in the dark. With only the few bars of moonlight filtering through the 
window blinds that dimly illuminate only portions of her body, she stands with her 
head replaced on her body in stark contrast to the bodies exposed under the electric 
bulbs in Casey’s “Notas de un simulador” and Manjarrez’s “Johnny.” Even the 
narrator rhetorically asks what the purpose of this gesture could be: “¿Pero y qué más 
daba? Un estado sutil de felicidad malogrando las comparaciones, eso era todo” ‘And 
what of it? Nothing more than a delicate state of happiness wasting comparisons’ (La 
mujer 21). She really has no plan in sight. This brief moment of happiness, these 
means without end, is all there is.  
 At this point, the narrative lingers on her last seconds inside the house: “Hasta 
que la mano, retardándose algo más de lo común sobre las cosas, consiguió abrir la 
puerta luego de un crispamiento largo sobre el pomo” ‘Until her hand, lingering 
somewhat longer than usual on things, was able to open the door after slowly turning 
the knob’ (21). Her political gesture—severing all ties with her past, literally and 
metaphorically—provided a brief respite that seemed to resemble something like 
freedom. There is a blank space in the text, what I read as the visual opening within 
the narrative itself, separating the moment she turns the knob from the moment she 
steps outside of the house. But there is no freedom; Casey’s essays, Filloy’s character, 
Konsideransky, and Manjarrez’s Johnny all made this evident. There is no outside of 
the biopolitics of the state of exception, just as there is no outside of the cultural 
markets in the Sixties.  
 When Rebeca Linke opens the door and steps nude onto the prairie, she 




barefoot on the ground. Suddenly, she notices something else: “La vigilaban miles de 
ojos ocultos, la trituraban miles de dientes. […] Pero le pareció, de pronto, que el 
bosque la había identificado, que la estaba espiando” ‘Thousands of hidden eyes were 
watching her, thousands of teeth were biting at her. […] But it seemed, suddenly, the 
woods had identified her, they were spying on her’ (23). In fact, the rest of the novel 
follows her meandering itinerary through the woods and around the outskirts of the 
sleepy town in the area. She stumbles into a log cabin in the forest, where she 
provokes a sleeping man. Rebeca Linke laughs at him because of “los cerrojos en que 
viviría aun sin creerse prisionero” ‘the shackles in which he was living without even 
realizing he was a prisoner’ (33). This man is like one of the prisoners still chained 
inside the walls of Plato’s cave, but she has a moment of superiority in which she 
feels freed from those very shackles and unsuccessfully attempts to wake him from 
this dream state.  
 However, her so-called freedom does not last for long. Once the townspeople 
hear of this monstrosity—a nude woman walking through the woods and threatening 
their sense of decency and morality—they set out to track her down and murder her 
with no sense that such violence is prohibited by law. Once her political gesture fails 
to go unnoticed, she becomes yet another homo sacer, another bare or nude life 
banned and abandoned by the law. Not long before she is killed, the narrator explains 
the townspeople’s violent reaction:  
En cuanto a la mujer, aquel desnudo les había recordado con demasiada 
insistencia lo que ellos se cubrían. La criatura desvestida tras el desasosiego 




descubierto, el soñarse pesadillescamente con sus rencores al viento, con sus 
pequeñas miserias sin cortinado espeso. (108)  
‘As for the woman, such nudity had reminded them with too much insistence 
of what they were hiding. The undressed creature generated a sense of unease 
in their beds. She had just pulled down the heavy curtains that veiled the terror 
in their souls, ending their nightmarish dreams and airing their resentment and 
their misery.’  
Rebeca Linke’s political gesture, once noticed by this community that quickly 
transforms into a torch-wielding mob, exposes everything this community had been 
ignoring—its miserly living conditions and the resentment and pain that accompanies 
such a life. Their violence is a reaction to having the lid taken off their demons, not 
unlike what Abril Trigo describes as the reaction caused by the Cuban Revolution in 
the Uruguayan imaginary.  
 In order to return things to the way they were, this community decides to 
eliminate the “creature,” that nude woman in Uruguay who irreparably exposed what 
they had all been hiding and can serve as their scapegoat. With such a violent act, the 
mob closes the opening created by Rebeca Linke. They kill her, and the final image 
of the novel is that of her bruised, nude body floating facedown through a river. In the 
end, she truly was a nuda vita, a bare, nude life, who jumped nude into mankind’s 
struggle to tell them what she had learned. This is the same “heroically humble” 
gesture that Calvert Casey’s inspiration, José Antonio Portuondo, proposed as the 
best representative of intellectual activity in the era. But sharing these lessons is not 




 In this context, the communal decision to kill Rebeca Linke can be read as the 
biopolitical decision enacted by a sovereign power to invoke the state of exception for 
the purpose of eliminating any political actor that seeks to disagree with their 
organization. Yet, it must be recalled that the decision to violently eradicate Rebeca 
Linke’s nude body did not have to be the decision made in this case. Making recourse 
to the state of exception is never a historical necessity, but rather an individual 
decision, a historical contingency that could have been different. The state of 
exception forecloses the communal space to any actor who seeks to open it through 
dissent. Rebeca Linke’s political gesture was only possible as long as she went 
unnoticed. The violence by which the common of this sleepy community was upheld 
in no way correlates to the minor acts by Rebeca Linke who simply tried to open a 
space in which disagreement could be made possible.  
 Before her death, the narrator explains the following about Rebeca Linke: 
“Odiaba desde siempre las moralejas, rechazaba las conclusiones finales y los mitos 
que las generan en un mundo que de pronto se abre en volcán, en aluvión de lodo, en 
silencio de sombra que anda en busca del cuerpo desintegrado” ‘She always hated 
morals and rejected final conclusions and the myths that give rise to them in a world 
that suddenly opens like a volcano, like a torrent of mud, like the silence of a shadow 
that goes about looking for its disintegrated body’ (119). Rebeca Linke’s politics of 
going unnoticed proposes a different reaction and a different type of decision making. 
In reaction to the world that is suddenly thrust open, like the townspeople’s world 
when confronted by the nude woman, Rebeca Linke rejects the narratives that attempt 




former place or to quickly talk over the silence of that disembodied shadow. That 
which goes unnoticed can all too easily remain unnoticed and be overpowered by that 
which is brighter, louder, stronger, and multitudinous. It is out of an awareness of 
their precarious state of going unnoticed that Casey subtly hints about his hesitations 
about the need to be a committed writer. Konsideransky’s exposure and the deaths of 
Johnny and Rebeca Linke all validate Casey’s hesitation. However, the politics of 
going unnoticed, the opening of a means without ends and of a potentiality to do and 
to refuse to do, points toward the horizon that Huberto, despite all his pessimism and 
rejections, walks toward with a smile. Instead of a morality of final conclusions, the 
politics of going unnoticed opens toward an ethics of pluralisms, dialogues, and the 
potential to make decisions without predetermined ends and without ever fully 
closing off a political space. In this sense, the politics of going unnoticed will 
generate the conditions of possibility for the ethics of being perceived that I explore 




NO CORROBORO, BORRO CON… 
 
 Filloy’s palindrome “No corroboro, borro con…” can be translated literally as 
‘I do not corroborate, I erase with…’ (Karcino 85). In a first left to right reading, this 
appears to be an unfinished sentence. With what does this speaker erase something 
when he refuses to corroborate? The answer is irrevocably lost. The trailing ellipsis 
takes the place of words that would upset the symmetry of the palindrome if they 
were present. This phrase remains a palindrome that can be read as well from right to 
left, since the ellipsis itself does not count as part of the word according to Filloy’s 
rules: “no se computan grafías de signos, acentos y puntuación” ‘graphical symbols, 
accent marks, and punctuation are not calculated’ (9). Only the actual letters of the 
words are considered part of the palindrome. Yet, the ellipsis is not exactly like other 
forms of punctuation in that its purpose is to stand in the place of something that has 
been removed from a text, signalling to the reader that the absent words have been 
declared irrelevant by the writer within that particular context. In this palindrome, the 
ellipsis is the tool for erasing seemingly unimportant information that would prohibit 
it from being a palindrome. At the same time, a second left to right reading of the 
palindrome becomes possible. The ellipsis itself—as opposed to the words erased by 
an ellipsis—can be the object of the preposition “con” ‘with.’ With what does this 
speaker erase something when he refuses to corroborate? He erases with ellipses. 
 I would like to situate Filloy’s palindrome here at the threshold between 
politics and ethics, between my chapters on the politics and the ethics of going 




corroborate,’ takes the form of a dissensual affirmation. The speaker refuses to 
provide data that would bolster someone’s argument, and this refusal can be both a 
political gesture—defined as disagreement—and an affirmation of the speaker’s 
potentiality—defined as the ability to do, to not do, or to refuse to do. The second half 
of the palindrome, “borro con…” ‘I erase with…,’ serves, for my purposes, as a 
description of the means without ends by which the speaker engages in politics. This 
means is simultaneously the seemingly unimportant information that is erased by an 
ellipsis and the ellipsis itself. The seemingly unimportant—the fragments of 
conversations heard in passing, recalling Casey’s example in “Notas de un 
simulador”—is what goes unnoticed and what requires attention. This means without 
ends, going unnoticed, is an action purposefully carried out by the speaker who 
refuses to agree by erasing with ellipses, by choosing to label certain words as 
unimportant and letting them slip out of the perspective of the reader. The ellipsis 
serves as the tool for opening a place that had been occupied by other words wherein 
an ethics will acquire its potentiality.  
 There is a text by Casey, “A un viandante de 1965,” in which I also begin to 
perceive this ethics.47 Similar to Filloy’s palindrome that can be read in two different 
ways just within the left to right reading, Casey’s text can be read as a list of 
questions and statements, and it can also be read as a poem: 
¿A qué teléfonos llamaste y nadie respondió? 
                                                
47 Casey published “A un viandante de 1965” in the Gaceta de Cuba in 1965 before 
going into self-exile. The Gaceta was founded by the Unión de Escritores y Artistas 
Cubanos (UNEAC) in 1962, the same year that Revolución and Lunes de Revolución 
were closed after the debate surrounding P.M. that the UNEAC instigated. It should 
be noted that the Gaceta de Cuba, founded by the UNEAC, published a dossier on 




¿A qué puerta tocaste que conducía a la nada?  
¿Qué ojos buscaste con la mirada vidriosa que tan bien conozco? 
¿Qué cuerpos no reconociste con la pupila del obseso? 
Sales de las tinieblas para perderte en las tinieblas. 
……… 
Desde lo oscuro verás cerrarse la puerta. 
Tu último paso será tu último gesto. 
Si encuentras a quien buscas y te detienes, rodarás muerto a sus pies. 
Septiembre 18, 2778 
(Merlino, Notas 159) 
‘Which telephones did you call and no one answered? 
At which door did you knock that led you nowhere? 
Which eyes did you look for with your glassy stare that I know so well? 
Which bodies did you not recognize with your obsessive pupil? 
You leave the darkness only to get lost in darkness. 
……… 
From the darkness, you will see the door close. 
Your last step will be your last gesture. 
If you find who you are looking for and stop, you will wander at a standstill 
 around his feet. 
September 18, 2778’ 
The text is organized into verses, yet it produces no consistent rhyme scheme. There 




verses beginning with “desde” and “tu último” share an internal rhyme between 
“verás” and “será” that creates a metrical rhythm within the otherwise free verse 
structure. However, none of the verses produce a clear enjambment; each ends with a 
rotund period or question mark.  
 According to Agamben, “the possibility of enjambment constitutes the only 
criterion for distinguishing poetry from prose” (The End of the Poem 109). He 
explains that this is because poetry is the space in which it is possible to produce an 
opposition between a “metrical limit” and a “syntactical limit” or between a “prosodic 
pause” and a “semantic pause” (109). The end of the verse is, simply, the point at 
which the meter and rhyme can produce a pause, but this is not necessarily the same 
location as the semantic pause that comes at the end of a sentence or at the end of the 
final stanza. Distinguishing poetry from prose is not a matter of whether or not 
enjambment actually takes places, but rather whether “this opposition is, at least 
virtually, possible” (109). For Agamben, poetry is the potentiality of enjambment, the 
potentiality of opening a threshold space in which the syntactic and semantic limit is 
not reached. In strictly formal terms, “A un viandante” would appear to preclude the 
potentiality of enjambment in this first reading, despite its division into verse on the 
written page, precisely because of the clear union between its metrical and syntactical 
limits at the end of each verse.  
 Why, then, would the writer bother to produce line breaks between each 
sentence? This decision could be dismissed by judging the text from within the 
moralizing terms of a traditional aesthetic theory as an arbitrary rhetorical device 




aesthetic judgments of this sort. The formal structure of this text points toward 
something that nevertheless goes unnoticed in the threshold space where enjambment 
has the potential to occur, similar to the way that Filloy’s ellipses signal the erasure of 
seemingly unimportant words and make the opening through erasure possible. The 
first two verses begin with objects (the telephones and the door) that permit one to 
establish a connection with another person or another space. Yet, these verses end in a 
negation of that possible connection; no one answers the phones, and the door opens 
onto nothingness. The question marks that close these two verses mark the closure of 
any metrical enjambment, but the images produced at the point of metrical and 
syntactical closure create two openings—the telephone line that can communicate 
with another but does not and the void behind the door where another person could be 
but is not. The ends of these verses open up a space in which dialogue with an other 
becomes possible even if it does not actually take place. 
 In The Idea of Prose, Agamben provides more detail about the importance he 
gives to enjambment; he situates the “constitutive core” of poetry “at the end, at the 
versura point” (40). This versura is “the Latin term for the point at which the plough 
turned around at the end of a furrow” (End 111). Moreover, he argues: “[The versura] 
is an ambiguous gesture, that turns in two opposed directions at once: backwards 
(versus), and forwards (pro-versa)” (Idea 41). This versura or turning point takes 
place at the end of a verse of poetry, allowing the reader to move in two directions at 
once, in the same way that the reader of a palindrome can move backwards and 




 Both in the ellipsis at the end of Filloy’s palindrome and in the versura at the 
ends of Casey’s verses, the erased words, the missed encounters, and the empty 
spaces can go unnoticed, and they can be perceived by those who pause and turn 
around at these ends. However, even the perceptive reader will find it impossible to 
fill in these gaps with information provided by the texts, since the words and subjects 
to which they point have been erased from the texts by these same gaps. In the same 
way that the enigmas in Somers’s Un retrato para Dickens refused any final solution, 
a hermeneutics could only take place by guessing what had been erased and 
arbitrarily filling in these ellipses and gaps, as Agamben shows, under the sign of 
Oedipus.  
 Instead, the reader is left to wander like the lover in “A un viandante” from 
darkness into darkness, never into the light of knowledge. The potential for dialogue 
that opens at the ends of these texts will be a dialgoue as difficult and imperfect as the 
one that takes place between the poet and the lover who speak across an untraversable 
temporal gap between the twenty-eighth century (announced in the date at the end of 
the poem) and the twentieth century (announced in the title). In the third to last verse, 
the lover’s errant itinerary in the dark comes to a standstill; the door closes without 
him ever fully passing through the temporal threshold that separates them. In the final 
verse, the poet foresees the end of his lover’s itinerary as the end of his gestures, and 
he warns him that any actual encounter with the desired object will only result in a 
wandering (“rodarás”) standstill (“rodar [en] muerto”) that is also a death (“muerto”). 
This end never takes place in the poem. If a complete and perfect communication 




 The end of the poem only points to this future end, a future that can be both 
the lover’s future from the twentieth century and also the poet’s future from the 
twenty-eighth century. A perfect and complete encounter and a definitive end will 
never take place across the untraversable spaces opened in the various ends within 
this text, but without these openings there is no potential for dialogue at all. Instead of 
silence and instead of a dead standstill, the poet and his lover maintain the potential 
for dialogue across these empty spaces by moving back and forth across this text 
wherein the ends serve as versura. These ends that open onto nothingness where the 
poet and the lover can turn around again and again are not ends at all, but rather the 
conditions of possibility for future movement and dialogue. Neither the ellipsis in 
Filloy’s palindrome nor the empty spaces in Casey’s text are perfect or the only 
possible solutions to engaging in politics and speaking across such a vast distance, but 
they both transform the ends of their texts into turning points at which politics and 
dialogue renew their potentiality instead of closing in on themselves. This potential 





Chapter 3: The Ethics of Being Perceived 
 
 If the Sixties is an era in which everything became political, it was also an era 
like so many others in which violence served as the means for achieving specific 
political ends. In “Living in Revolutionary Times,” Greg Grandin concludes that “the 
learning curve of state repression has steadily increased throughout the twentieth 
century and, except in the cases of Cuba in the late 1950s and Nicaragua in the 1970s, 
was always a step ahead of movements seeking social and political transformation. 
But it took a radical and great leap forward in the 1960s” (4). His analysis goes on to 
study, broadly, the changing theories that have attempted to uncover the root causes 
of both social violence and state repression, of both revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary violence. This is not, however, a clear opposition situated along 
a definitive, causal chain. Violence is frequently theorized by revolutionaries like 
Guevara as the necessary opening for radical social change; in the face of the military 
power of the institutions they seek to challenge and overcome, violent opposition 
quickly appears as the only realistic chance of success.  
 Yet, as Jean Franco demonstrates in Cruel Modernity, the clearly gendered, 
violent discourses and practices of revolutionary groups is not only external:  
The red thread of violence runs through Marxist thinking from the Paris 
Commune onward. It binds many different left-wing movements from 
Leninism to the anticolonial struggle as theorized by Fanon, and by Mao’s 




external. There was the danger from within, from weakness and error that 
must be eradicated. (120)  
This is an important point. Violence is theorized by such revolutionaries as the means 
to an end, and this future end, in their thinking, justifies violence in the present. 
However, those who join the revolution can become the target of that same 
revolution’s violent means at any moment when such revolutionaries are judged as 
weak or potentially injurious to the cause. Franco refers explicitly to the case of 
Roque Dalton, the revolutionary poet par excellence who was executed by his own 
comrades in El Salvador (128–133). Calvert Casey and the Lunes de Revolución 
group, as intellectuals who had pledged their allegiance to the Cuban Revolution 
without having fought as guerrillas, for example, were especially susceptible to this 
internal threat of violence.  
  The far-reaching effects of the Cuban Revolution cannot be underestimated, 
but the foco theory of guerrilla warfare was not the only model for revolutionary 
change that it inspired. As Grandin summarizes:  
The [Cuban] revolution was consequential not just in that it was the first in 
Latin America to fully understand itself as “world historical” and thus try to 
“externalize” itself, fracturing Latin America’s already debilitated Old Left 
and spawning and supporting imitators throughout the Andes and Central 
America in the 1960s and the Southern Cone in the 1970s. It was also 
consequential because, especially after the disaster of foco theory in 
Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala, it quickly gave rise to movements 




Various groups sought potentially less violent and even non-violent means of social 
change. Grandin cites Liberation Theology, Chile’s Popular Unity coalition that 
democratically elected Salvador Allende as President, and the coalitions being formed 
in Central America during the 1980s that appeared as the promise of a truly new form 
of social change. Lamentably, in retrospect, all of these now make up part of the list 
of the failed revolutionary projects of the Sixties. Regardless of the extent to which 
violence was employed for their ends, it was through the unbelievably cruel measures 
of state sponsored violence, backed most notably by the CIA with its rigid Cold War 
logic, that these projects were defeated and their supporters annihilated (Grandin 3–
5). As such, there is no direct correlation between the degree of violence employed by 
revolutionaries and the degree of violence by which counterrevolutionaries respond or 
make pre-emptive strikes.  
 All of this is to say that politics was a violent undertaking in the Sixties, 
regardless of one’s engagement with violent means. When violence, whether it be 
revolutionary or counterrevolutionary, becomes the blockage that impedes politics—
defined as the potential for dissent—then the need to explore the ethics of the politics 
of going unnoticed begins to unfold. Whereas violence was theorized and practiced as 
the predominant means toward a particular end—both creating a revolution for 
radical social change and stopping such change from taking place—the practice of 
going unnoticed is a means of engaging in dissent with no a priori ends in sight. The 
highly politicized spaces within which those who go unnoticed embark on an errant 
itinerary are now characterized as being full of violent threats. Those who go 




counterrevolutionary violence as the only conditions of possibility for transcending 
capitalism or for eliminating the red threat. In what follows, I will detail the ways in 
which going unnoticed opens the possibility for dialogue along its errant route, and 
how this exposure that is the end or the failure of the practice of going unnoticed is 
irreducible to the narratives of the failure of Leftist politics in the Sixties. Instead, the 
failure brought about by the exposure of those who had gone unnoticed and are now 
being perceived impedes the creation of any new hegemonic project and guarantees 
the possibility for future dissent as others then go about going unnoticed or 





The Repetition of Violence 
 Calvert Casey’s short story, “La ejecución” ‘The Execution,’ begins with an 
epigraph from Franz Kafka’s The Trial: “¿Y el proceso comienza de nuevo? —
preguntó K. casi incrédulo—. Evidentemente —respondió el pintor” “‘And the case 
begins all over again?’ asked K. almost incredulously. ‘Certainly,’ said the painter.” 
(Casey, El regreso y otros 193; Kafka 159). At this moment in Kafka’s novel, K. is 
speaking with the painter who explains the intricate details and possibilities of the 
legal system that has ensnared K. In particular, what can begin all over again is the 
process of ostensible acquittal; if K. is acquitted in this scenario, he would be free 
temporarily, only to be arrested and put on trial again. As K. suspects, the artist 
clarifies that this is an unending process: “The second acquittal is followed by the 
third arrest, the third acquittal by the fourth arrest, and so on. That is implied in the 
very conception of ostensible acquittal” (160). This option appears to be the most 
likely scenario in which K. could be acquitted of the crimes of which he knows 
nothing, but it is also the option that never leads to a final and permanent verdict. In 
the end, K. is killed upon being found guilty of an unnamed crime. And Casey’s short 
story begins by going back to this infinite cycle of arrests and verdicts that can only 
come to an end with an execution. 
 “La ejecución” was first published as the final short story in El regreso y otros 
relatos in 1967 with the Spanish publishing house, Seix Barral. This new collection is 
an expanded edition of El regreso, which he had published in 1962 with the Cuban 
publishing house, Ediciones R. Casey returns to the short stories of El regreso and 




review of Kafka’s The Castle in Memorias de una isla, titled “Kafka,” in which he 
declares that there is “una literatura antes de Kafka y otra después de él” ‘a literature 
before Kafka and another one after him’ (77). In addition to the epigraph, the plot of 
Casey’s narrative generally repeats that of The Trial. In Casey’s text, Mayer is 
arrested in his home one evening, taken to a police station to declare his innocence or 
guilt, thrown in jail, put on trial, and executed in the final paragraph. However, “La 
ejecución” is not a simple copy of The Trial, nor is it a farcical repetiton of what was 
at first a tragedy. Casey’s text is not a radical departure from or an ironic undermining 
of Kafka’s novel in the way that Filloy and Derrida rewrite Plato. I propose to read 
Casey’s Mayer as someone who learned from Kafka’s K. that it is futile to participate 
in a legal apparatus built to take away the accused’s potentiality. Instead, Mayer 
enacts his potentiality by refusing to participate in the process altogether. 
 As if the title and the Kafkian epigraph were not enough to determine the 
unfortunate fate of Mayer, the first sentence announces his impending arrest: “Una 
hora antes de que se produjera la detención, el teléfono sonó” ‘One hour before his 
arrest, the telephone rang’ (193). When Mayer answers the phone, no one responds; 
he only hears silence coming through the telephone line, until he hears that “colgaban 
suavemente” ‘they carefully hung up the phone’ (194). The scene repeats itself a few 
minutes later, and Mayer assumes this is some sort of prank phone call. Upon hearing 
them hang up again, he goes back to his solitary evening that the narrator describes as 
his “veladas a oscuras” ‘evening events in the dark’ (195). Like many of Casey’s 
protagonists, Mayer also prefers to be left alone in the dim light where no one can 




opacos los cristales por donde podía filtrarse la luz de la calle” ‘In order to enjoy this 
time of day, he had covered the windows with opaque paper that could filter the street 
light’ (195). In the softly lit room, Mayer goes back to his nightly routine. 
 The phone rings for a third time. He answers, but this time he does not say 
anything. He listens for any sound, “tratando de penetrar el silencio” ‘trying to 
penetrate the silence’: “Pero el más absoluto silencio reinaba en el lugar desde donde 
llamaban” ‘But the most absolute silence prevailed from where they were calling 
him’ (196). Across the telephone lines, only silences are being transmitted between an 
unknown other and a seemingly unimportant protagonist who has suddenly become 
the focus of Casey’s fiction. The silence being communicated across the telephone 
lines, especially when read alongside Casey’s other narratives, begins to acquire an 
extraordinary importance, signalling a sudden shift in his life. While listening to the 
silence, Mayer looks around his room: “Sin que pudiera precisar qué exactamente, 
creyó notar que algo había cambiado de modo imperceptible en los objetos que le 
rodeaban” ‘Unable to specify what exactly had happened, he believed to notice that 
something about the objects that surrounded him had changed in an imperceptible 
way’ (196). The silent phone calls subtly, almost imperceptibly penetrate Mayer’s 
home like the filtered street light. He begins to sneak around the room on his tip toes 
so as to not make any more sounds, but the silence acquires a new, threatening 
dimension:  
Sus ojos exploraron la oscuridad. De nuevo le asaltó la idea, fugaz e 
inexplicable —aquello no dejaba de ser una broma— de que todo era 




de sus muebles mal pintados y feos, había sufrido un cambio profundo y que 
lejos de sosegarle como antes, lo amenazaba de una manera vaga pero 
formidable. (198) 
‘His eyes explored the darkness. Again the fleeting, unexplainable idea struck 
him (still this seemed to be a prank) that everything was different, that each 
object, each book in his tiny library, each poorly painted, ugly piece of 
furniture, had undergone a pround change. Far from soothing him like before, 
it was threatening him in a vague, but formidable way.’ 
This possible prank has begun to alter his perspective. The silent caller now appears 
as a threat to him, and he is correct to begin to worry. Very soon after noticing this 
imperceptible change while peering into the darkness—like Agamben’s 
contemporaries—three police officers knock at his door, arrest him, and take him to 
the police station. The silent telephone calls were, in the end, a sign of what was 
already underway—Mayer’s arrest and prosecution after being framed for a crime. 
 Up to this point, Kafka’s novel seems to have been resituated within Casey’s 
fictional universe that is populated by unnoticed protagonists and seemingly 
unimportant details that subtly, yet radically transform a space or a character’s 
perception. Casey purposefully calls attention with the epigraph to the ways in which 
his narrative recalls and rewrites from the Sixties a novel by Kafka that is 
contemporaneous with the historical avant-gardes. In this sense, Casey’s short story 
can be read in the context of the neo-avant-gardes that Hal Foster analyzes in The 
Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century. To return to his 




(8). This is to say that the ruptures and transformations enacted by the historical 
avant-gardes were not immediately apparent; rather, it was not until the neo-avant-
gardes of the mid-twentieth century that their significance was better comprehended. 
By returning to these historical avant-gardes, writers and artists in the Sixties, for 
example, can reconfigure their chronological predecessors at their point of failure—
their institutionalization—but without the promise of emancipation or happiness 
inscribed in modernist aesthetic theories.  
 Casey’s narrative does not rewrite the ending in which Mayer is set free; both 
K. and Mayer die in the end. In my view, Casey returns to The Trial at the point at 
which K. fails to realize his lack of potentiality within the legal apparatus that has 
already decided to convict and kill him. The narrator in Kafka’s novel explains K.’s 
attempt to remain alert while preparing his defense: “He accepted it as a fundamental 
principle for an accused man to be always forearmed, never to let himself be caught 
napping, never to let his eyes stray unthinkingly to the right when his judge was 
looming up on the left—and against that very principle he kept offending again and 
again” (164). K. thinks he knows what he must do to succeed, but as the privileged 
reader who knows that he will fail to be acquitted, K.’s attempts only to sustain the 
illusion that there is a possible way out of this situation. K.’s major failure may be 
said to be his inability to comprehend that his potentiality—the ability to do and to 
refuse to do—has been irrevocably blocked. Despite all his attempts, K. is radically 
prohibited from doing or refusing to do anything to save himself. 
 In contrast, Mayer does not attempt to fight his accusers. When he is asked to 




read it first: “Mayer firmó rápidamente donde se le indicaba” ‘Mayer signed quickly 
where they indicated’ (201). He makes no attempt to fight these claims, and he even 
worries about the well-being of one of the guards. Whereas K. insists on the need to 
remain vigilant, Mayer finds the silence and darkness of his jail cell to be comforting. 
Trying to recreate his nightly routine from his jail cell, he covers the small window 
with a blanket “hasta obtener una oscuridad casi completa” ‘to make it almost 
completely dark’ (201). In his cell, “se acostó y se quedó profundamente dormido” 
‘he laid down and fell into a deep sleep’ (201). Instead of repeating K.’s frantic 
itinerary through back alleys and courtrooms in the attics, Mayer tries to get some rest 
and relaxation in his jail cell. He later learns that his signature has been forged on a 
thick stack of documents, and that these were the proof being used to accuse him of a 
crime. He never publicly claims that these are forgeries, nor does he defend himself in 
court. His only worry seems to be to leave the glaring lights of the offices in the jail 
to return to his dark cell: “El resplandor del salón le había producido un vivo ardor en 
los ojos” ‘The room’s brightness caused a sharp burning sensation in his eyes’ (207). 
Once more, the electric bulbs harm the protagonist. It is as if he knows all too well 
how futile K.’s efforts were, how vulnerable K. had become under the harsh lights of 
the enigmatic legal apparatus that had ensnared him; Mayer seems to know he is 
living a repetition of those events in another time and place and that there is no way 
out of this cycle. Since fighting the system is futile, his only potential political 
gesture, a highly imperfect solution, is to reclaim his potentiality by refusing to 
participate earnestly in the legal process that has already banned him to a jail cell and 




 The debates that attempted to define the political role of literature and culture 
in the Sixties is by now a commonplace, if not clichéd, theme. In Entre la pluma y el 
fusil, Gilman summarizes the contours of these polemics. On the one hand, there was 
the paradox that intellectuals were expected to be the “portavoces de una vaga pero 
extendida urgencia de transformación social” ‘mouthpieces of a vague, but broad 
need for social transformation’ while simultaneously developing a literature and a 
marketplace that would be able “constituir una verdadera literatura latinoamericana” 
‘to constitute a true Latin American literature’ (30). Somehow, literature should be 
capable of both giving rise to anticapitalist revolutions—or bolstering the revolutions 
once they take place—and create new markets for selling and circulating literature. 
On the other hand, Gilman explains that these intellectual debates sought “movilizar 
una fuerte voluntad normativa” ‘to mobilize a strong, normative will’ (31). The 
various round-table discussions like the ones I analyzed that took place in Lunes de 
Revolución with Pablo Neruda, Nazim Hikmet, and Nathalie Sarraute can be seen as 
examples of the types of debates by which radically different intellectuals sought to 
come to an agreement on exactly what their role should be. However, according to 
Gilman, this would prove to be an impossible task in general: “La institución de un 
programa común fue imposible y la eufórica cohesión inicial de un bloque de 
escritores finalizó con la constatación de que eran más sus desacuerdos que sus 
consensos” ‘The institutionalization of a shared program was impossible, and the 
intial euphoric cohesion of a group of writers ended up proving only that their 
disagreements outweighed their agreements’ (31). The “acuerdos provisorios” 




polémica” ‘violent polemics’ (32). Julio Cortázar, for example, dismisses from Paris 
the revolutionary potential of the Peruvian writer and anthropologist José María 
Arguedas. In Cuba, many of the writers from the Lunes group, including Casey, leave 
the island, and when considered in retrospect after the Padilla Affair, this seems to 
have been an intelligent decision.48 
 Literature in the Sixties was to be a literature that explicitly declares its 
ideological position as it contributes to the visibilization of Latin America’s aesthetic 
modernization. However, going unnoticed is a politics and an ethics that errs away 
from these normative debates on the role of literature, while taking place within these 
debates, just like Casey at first errs slightly from the party line, while proclaiming his 
place within the Cuban Revolution. By the time “La ejecución” was published, he had 
fled from Cuba and its moralizing, normative demands on both his writing and his 
sexuality. Even as Casey goes into exile, his texts remain within the threshold 
characterized by the swirling lights and shadows within which his protagonists still 
move. From this space, his writing acquires a political and ethical role by breaking 
with the failed, violent, and normative debates on the role of writing in the era. 
 The point at which Mayer refuses to contest the charges falsely brought 
against him is also the point at which Casey’s text returns to Kafka’s narrative—part 
of the historical avant-garde—and transforms it after understanding the way in which 
K. had lost his potential after being abandoned by the law. Mayer comprehends what 
happened to K.; Casey repeats the avant-garde and draws conclusions from it, 
                                                
48 See Marcela Croce, ed., Polémicas intelectuales en América Latina. Del 
“meridiano intelectual” al caso Padilla (1927–1971) (Buenos Aires: Ediciones 
Simurg, 2006) for a selection of primary texts and analyses of the Cortázar-Arguedas 




offering a different reaction to the situation, even if he could not offer a different 
ending. Instead of attempting to dismantle the legal apparatus or to find a loop hole 
by which to secure his freedom—as in the apocalyptic gestures of the historical 
avant-garde that sought to destroy institutions—Mayer simply refuses to participate in 
the system. This is his political gesture, his means without ends. Mayer awaits his 
execution by creating a temporary refuge so that he can sleep and pace in the 
darkened jail cell where the harsh lights of the jail’s offices and the courtrooms 
cannot reach him.  
 Though this particular short story ends with Mayer’s death and his failure to 
truly break out of this legal apparatus’s cycle of arrests and verdicts, his political 
refusal to participate points toward the ethical potential of the politics of going 
unnoticed. It will be necessary to read other texts by Casey, Filloy, Manjarrez, and 
Somers to further develop the ethics that becomes possible when one stops going 
unnoticed and finally opens a gap within this type of unending cycle of violence that 
is justified through an exceptional legal apparatus that has become the rule. What I 
argue is that this ethics takes place when those who go unnoticed open themselves to 
being perceived by an other while simultaneously refusing to participate in any 





Posología: El lector no debe ‘administrarse’ más que un monodiálogo por día. 
‘Dosage: The reader should not “take” more than one monodialogue per day.’ 
—Juan Filloy, Yo, yo y yo (Monodiálogos paranoicos) (10). 
 Juan Filloy’s Yo, yo y yo (Monodiálogos paranoicos) opens with an “Exordio” 
‘Exordium’ by which he frames a description of the short stories that comprise this 
collection. The narrator warns against overdosing on monodialogues, Filloy’s 
neologism for the rhetorical structure that links the seven short stories of this 
collection. While each monodialogue slightly varies in its number of speakers and 
interlocutors, the general structure is comprised of one person, always a man, who 
dominates the entire discussion while ignoring most of what is said by the others, 
when not directly insulting them or ordering them to do as he wishes. There is no real 
dialogue here, only a dominant speaker and his interlocutors who must submit to his 
authority. These monodialogues do not and cannot play an active role in the politics 
of going unnoticed. However, by reading the irony that undermines the authoritarian 
logic of the monodialogue, an alternative to this moralizing and violent struggle for 
power can be imagined. This alternative is what I call the ethics of being perceived. 
 The monodialogue takes place somewhere between the solitary monologue 
and the communal dialogue when a character like Maximiliano Konsideransky is 
interrupted during his solitary walks up and down his spiraling cave-tower. Other 
characters are present, like the reporter and his mule, but they exercise little to no 
influence over the stream of thought spoken out loud by the male speaker. The 




never given the opportunity to say more than a few sentences. When they make 
requests to speak, if they are not blatantly ignored, they are shut up:  
—Pido la palabra.  
—La tengo todavía. No me interrumpa. (“Yo y la madre patria” 32) 
‘—Allow me to speak. 
—I have the floor. Do not interrupt me.’ 
And if they assert themselves, they are often insulted:  
—Si usted se empeña, iré. Que decidan mis compañeros. A mí la fiesta me 
gusta. La frivolidad es la espuma de lo profundo. Lo afirma un pensador local.  
—Cretino. ¿Qué sabe ese cretino? A lo mejor es un tipo de esos que 
confunden trivialidad con superficialidad. 
—Yo también la confundo. Ergo…. 
—Ergo, usted también es un cretino. Lo superficial es siempre algo muy serio. 
(“Yo y los subterráneos” 109) 
‘—If you don’t back off, I’m leaving. Allow my friends to decide. I like the 
party. Frivolity is the foam floating above a great depth. A local intellectual 
says as much. 
—Idiot. What does that idiot know? At best he’s one of those who confuse 
triviality with superficiality. 
— As do I. Ergo…. 




In other instances, the interlocutors’ reactions are transcribed in the text as nothing 
more than ellipses, at times shown to be an emphatic silence with exclamations 
points:  
—… (“Yo y los anónimos” 77) 
—¡…! (“Yo y el arquitecto” 16) 
As a rule, the interlocutors are only allowed to participate within the monodialogue 
when they ask questions that allow the dominant speaker to continue or to clarify his 
thoughts; only the interlocutor who appeases the dominant speaker is respected within 
the monodialogue’s asymmetrical power relations.  
 In this sense, the monodialogue can be compared—in contrast to those who 
engage in open dialogues—to Foucault’s definition of the polemicist,: 
Questions and answers depend on a game—a game that is at once pleasant 
and difficult—in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the 
rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of the dialogue. 
The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he 
possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he 
possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just 
undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in the search for the truth 
but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very 
existence constitutes a threat. (“Polemics” 111–112) 
The polemicist develops a moral framework by which the other must be brought over 
to the side of the polemicist or otherwise eradicated, since any opposition constitutes 




los intrusos” concludes with Konsideransky shouting insults at the reporter and 
threatening to do him serious harm. The power dynamic in the monodialogue, like 
that of the polemic, easily leads to violent action against an other who has been 
degraded through the moralizing discourse of the dominant speaker. 
 The exordium at the beginning of this collection, with its concluding dosage 
recommendations—only “take” one monodialogue per day—highlights the 
monodialogue’s adverse side effects. Administering too many of these 
monodialogues, the narrative voice of the exordium suggests, will only cause you 
harm, especially when “taken” or read in quick succession. In this sense, these texts 
have become something like Derrida’s pharmakon, the writing which is 
simultaneously a “poison” and a “remedy” (“Plato’s” 98). In engaging in too many 
monodialogues, one can literally overdose on this written drug, this violent power 
play between unequal antagonists. Even to observe such violence as an impartial 
reader might cause a great deal of harm. However, the remedy may also lie within 
this poison. 
 In Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas theorizes the discursive 
interactions between a self and an other, which I paraphrase here in broad strokes. 
There are two general approaches to establishing this interaction, both of which 
require language. The totalizing approach is the one that “reduces the other to the 
same” (42). To totalize an other is to approach an other and attempt to eliminate the 
other’s alterity, to swallow up the other by annihilating anything that stands out as 
different from the self. The totalizing self “approaches the other not to face him, but 




The dominant speakers in Filloy’s monodialogues approach their interlocutors in this 
way. Konsideransky, for example, aggressively defends his particular values and 
point of view as the only ones worthy of attention, and he simultaneously attacks the 
values and opinions held by the others. If they do not concede to his authority, they 
are demoralized as improper and inauthentic agents of a lesser or evil will.  
 In contrast, “infinity” is the concept Levinas employs to reveal the 
untraversable distance that always separates a self from an other and demonstrates 
that every other is irreducible to any self. This distance does not mean that there is no 
means by which a self and an other could relate to one another. Levinas insists that 
language can serve as this medium for the infinite, but only in certain circumstances: 
“Mediation (characteristic of Western philosophy) is meaningful only if it is not 
limited to reducing distances. For how could intermediaries reduce the intervals 
between terms infinitely distant?” (44). An infinite distance can never be traversed, 
and for Levinas the ethical relationship is the face to face interaction that recognizes 
the impossibility of fully reaching the other, of speaking for the other, and of reducing 
the other to the self’s experience and knowledge. Language can be the remedy, in the 
form of dialogue, if it limits its function to that of an imperfect medium that allows 
for a self and an other to approach one another face to face.  
 In this context, writing for Derrida and language for Levinas can alternately 
be used as a poison that reduces the other’s alterity through violence and as a remedy 
that allows for dialogue between a self and an other. These two modes of conceiving 
of writing and of language can be aligned with the two modes I proposed for reading 




the monodialogue, in this sense, can stand as a supplement for the debates 
surrounding the proper place of literature in the revolution and of writing in the 
Sixties. The dominant speaker becomes the sovereign who only speaks via decree, 
like Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and Fidel Castro when they claim that no one has rights 
against Mexico and Cuba, respectively. The sovereign, in this sense, is the legal and 
moral judge. He can morally degrade the other by appealing to absolute universal 
categories in order to ban the other as an agent of evil who subsequently can be 
abandoned by the law like Agamben’s homo sacer. Writing and language in this 
monodialogic sense serve only to poison and exclude the other. In the ironic reading, 
in contrast, the monodialogue can also come to supplant this violent, moralizing 
power play and point toward a remedy. When the ironic reading of “Yo y los 
intrusos” demonstrates that all of Konsideransky’s propositions are impossible within 
the cultural landscape of the Sixties, then the text opens itself to the possibility of 
there being an alternative political and ethical relationship between the speaker and 
the interlocutor. This alternative will be characterized by its respect for the infinite 
distance separating any and all of the participants in a dialogue, but for now I have 
only provided a negative example of this ethics.  
 I must clarify one point. To state that Konsideransky’s monodialogue in the 
case of “Yo y los intrusos” is not what I mean by ethics does not mean that the 
reporter’s strategies are necessarily better or ethical. The reporter also uses language 
as a means for totalizing Konsideransky’s biography when he records, transmits, and 
disseminates his invasive interview around the country without Konsideransky’s 




and subaltern subjects, nor will it be my intention to label certain subjects as good and 
others as bad. This would be yet another moral judgment that has no place in the 
ethics I study here. The monodialogue, therefore, is one of many ways in which 
language is used for totalizing purposes, and those who find themselves on the 
subordinate side of the monodialogue are not by default the ethical counterweight to 
the dominant speaker’s violent means for achieving a particular end.  
 Distinguishing between morals and ethics is tricky, since almost everyone 
who uses these terms defines them differently. They are frequently used as synonyms, 
and their connotations vary drastically from one context to another. When teaching 
the distinction between morals and ethics, my undergraduate students tend to 
associate morality and moral values with religious, national, or other forms of 
identity-based appeals for appropriate behavior; they understand “ethics” as the 
buzzword of the business world as it establishes a variety of codes of conduct for its 
employees. I think this is a good yardstick for measuring common sense 
understanding of such terms today. For my purposes, however, this common sense 
distinction names more or less equivalent practices by which one group tells its 
members and others how they ought to behave. In philosophy, rulebooks for behavior 
are studied and developed under the umbrella term, “normative ethics,” which 
encompasses three main subfields: 1) virtue ethics,49 which emphasizes virtue or 
                                                
49 Virtue ethics is founded primarily upon the works of Aristotle, especially his 
Nicomachean Ethics in which he explores virtue of character as that which guides 
moral action. In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes postulates mankind’s “state of nature” as 
the proclivity toward violence and war, the opposite of the virtuous character. In his 
wake, David Hume insists, in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, on 
the innate goodness of humankind, thus reviving the possibility of virtue ethics in the 




moral character as the foundation for good actions; 2) consequentialism,50 which 
focuses on the outcomes of actions; and 3) deontology,51 which determines duties and 
obligations (Hursthouse n.pag.; Sinnott-Armstrong n.pag.; Alexander and Moore n. 
pag.). Despite their specific perspectives, each of these three branches is concerned 
with establishing the boundaries by which virtuous or moral actions are defined. This 
outline, although hasty, can serve as a guiding map for a variety of ethical theories 
that do not interest me at present; as a shorthand, I prefer to label all such theories and 
rulebooks under the term “morals.” 
 In The Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical 
investigations target precisely this type of morality through genealogical and 
etymological explorations that critique moral values by calling into question their 
“intrinsic worth” (155). Instead of accepting the concept that good actions are 
universally so, Nietzsche claims that “the origin of the opposites good and bad is to 
be found in the pathos of nobility and distance, representing the dominant temper of a 
higher, ruling class in relation to a lower, dependent one” (160). His argument is that 
                                                
50 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as the founders of utilitarianism, stand as the 
classical figures of consequentialism. Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of 
Moral Legislation underscores mankind’s search for pleasure over pain, while Mill’s 
Utilitarianism seeks to establish a sort of hierarchy among those pleasures. For both 
philsophers, moral actions are those which bring about the greatest pleasures for the 
greatest good; the consequences of actions, not the virtue of character or the 
intentions of the moral agent, are what determine the ethical value of an action. 
51 Kant’s “categorical imperative” is the classic example of deontology; moral action 
is a duty, an imperative, that must be carried out, and it is categorical insofar as “my 
maxim should become a universal law” (Groundwork 14). In contradistinction to the 
previous two branches, Kant’s is not founded on the innate, virtuous character of the 
agent, nor does it depend solely on the outcome of an agent’s decisions, since neither 
the immediate nor the long-term effects of any actions can ever be known at the 
moment one makes a decision. For Kant, only the moment one makes a decision can 




the concept of “the good” was not something attributed to oneself by an outsider’s 
perspective, but rather an internally applied term by which a ruling class legitimized 
its claim to power. In order to sustain this argument, he explores the etymology of the 
word “good”: “The basic concept is always noble in the hierarchical, class sense, and 
from this has developed, by historical necessity, the concept good embracing nobility 
of mind, spiritual distinction” (162). Similarly, the Greek aristocracy “speak of 
themselves as ‘the truthful’” (163). He continues by showing how that which was 
“common,” “plebian,” or “base” similarly developed into synonyms of “the bad,” 
while the aristocratic values historically constructed as “the good” became more or 
less the same values assumed as moral and virtuous by the priestly caste (162–167). 
While he ultimately reduces the question of moral values to class distinctions, 
Nietzsche’s analysis lays the groundwork for interpreting “the good” and “the bad” 
not as universal categories, as thinkers from Plato to Kant have argued, but rather as 
historically contingent values that structure a society through the belief that one’s 
own community is good, while those who oppose this group are bad or evil. 
According to Nietzsche, the good is nothing more than that which an individual or 
society declares as its will, and the bad or evil is that which opposes this individual or 
collective will to power. 
 Nietzsche’s philosophy can be said to have cleared the ground for the type of 
genealogical work later carried out by Foucault and Agamben. In “What is 
Enlightenment?,” Foucault proposes an ethos of what he understands to be a common 
philosophical project in the twentieth century—understanding what the 




that one must consider one’s historically determined relationship to the 
Enlightenment, but without being “‘for’ or ‘against’ the Enlightenment”: “one must 
refuse everything that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian 
alternative” (313). Once the supposedly universal categories of, for example, good 
and evil are determined to be historically contingent, it becomes possible to refuse to 
participate in making such moral choices. Instead of adopting an attitude of 
rejection—of casting aside what is labelled “bad” or “evil”—he proposes adopting a 
“limit-attitude” that can move beyond the “outside-inside alternative” or beyond any 
other simplistic and authoritarian binary, whether they be political or ethical in nature 
(315). This brings Foucault to his well-known genealogical and archaeological 
methods for studying what is historical and contingent without pretending to rise to 
the level of a universal perspective. This refusal to name, divide, and cast aside as if 
from a universally true moral standpoint serves as a necessary attitude for the ethics 
of being perceived. 
 Nietzsche’s philosophy also underlies, albeit indirectly, Ernesto Laclau’s 
essay on the empty signifier in its relationship to the theory of hegemony he 
developed with Chantal Mouffe.52 The empty signifier is “a signifier without a 
signified”; this is to say that it is neither equivocal (i.e., arbitrary and thus simply 
interchangeable in different contexts) nor ambiguous (i.e., underdetermined or 
overdetermined and thus floating about because it has yet to be properly fixed) 
(Laclau “Why” 36). The empty signifier does not signify any actual concept or thing. 
Nevertheless, it demarcates the true limits of a hegemonic order, and these limits 
                                                
52 See Mouffe and Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 




“presuppose exclusion” and are “always antagonistic” (37). This is a very dense 
essay, but I believe its main tenets can be synthesized quite well. The empty signifier 
is the term inscribed around a group of differential identities by a particular individual 
in his will to organize them as a community over which he will have power. Once this 
exclusive boundary has been marked by the empty signifier—examples of which 
include “revolution,” “freedom,” “religious values,” or “patriotism”—this particular 
individual secures his hegemony by insisting on the universality of his ideological 
and moral values. His values are easily set in opposition to all those who remain 
excluded from this individual’s sovereign space.53  
 Those who are included in this space come to share a common identity, valued 
as good, and in agreement with Nietzsche, Laclau explains that what “is beyond the 
exclusion delimiting the communitarian space—the repressive power—will count less 
as the instrument of particular differential repressions and will express pure anti-
community, pure evil and negation” (42). By emptying such signifiers of all content, 
the hegemonic individual assumes a universal position of power over the “we” (“we, 
the revolutionaries,” “we, the free,” “we, the morally good”) inscribed within the 
limits of these empty signifiers as opposed to the “them” who are excluded and 
negatively valued as “our” evil enemy. Previously, I showed how Casey struggled to 
situate his defense of Pasternak within a similar communitarian group delimited by 
                                                
53 In Filloy’s Vil & Vil, the narrator calls attention to other instances of signifiers that, 
in the Sixties, no longer have the same, everyday meaning as they did in the past: 
“Deber-Honor-Patria: palabras símbolos. Se impone una semántica nueva para 
modificar y actualizar conceptos perimidos. El sentido común no los acepta como 
otrora integrando una heráldica de abnegación y heroísmo” ‘Duty-Honor-Homeland: 
symbolic words. A new semantics is being imposed to modify and update antiquated 
concepts. Common sense no longer accepts them as in bygone days as the heraldry of 




the phrase “we, the committed,” which now stands out as an empty signifier. It was 
absolutely necessary for intellectuals living in Cuba in the Sixties to proclaim their 
position within this group and have that position recognized by others; only such 
recognition would allow these potentially bourgeois intellectuals to be both 
ideologically and morally inscribed within the sovereign space of the Cuban 
Revolution.  
 From this, there are three conclusions to be highlighted. First, Laclau further 
opens Nietzsche’s insistence on class distinctions as the primary foundation of moral 
values; Laclau’s theory of hegemony and empty signifiers allows for the moral claims 
of what is good (“us,” the proper) and what is bad (“them,” the improper)—otherwise 
known as normative ethics—to be interpreted within a broader context that also 
includes exclusions based on gender, sexuality, race, and any other mode of 
ideological identity, as they intersect with and reinforce class distinctions. Second, 
these theories demonstrate that moral values are not autonomous, intrinsic to 
individuals, or universal; they constitute a necessary component of securing the 
hegemonic status of any individual who exercises his will to power. Third, from here 
it becomes clear that there is a definitive connection between the way in which both 
hegemonic orders and moral communities constitute one another through language 
and violence. Whether it is through Laclau’s empty signifiers or the monodialogues in 
Filloy’s writing, language can function as the poisonous, totalizing tool that orders 
exclusions and legitimizes claims to universality. 
 With that said, it will now be possible to better clarify the terms “politics” and 




for “will to power” as in Nietzsche or for “hegemony” as in Laclau. Instead, I defined 
politics in the previous chapter as a gesture (borrowing from Agamben’s definition as 
a means without ends) that produces an opening for dissent and disagreement within a 
democratic framework (borrowing in part from Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics, 
but mostly from Mouffe’s The Democratic Paradox). Similarly, for my purposes 
“ethics” will not be the equivalent of any “morality” or “moral code,” nor anything 
that resembles a “normative ethics” built on empty signfiers.  
 Instead, ethics will have no such moralizing or universalizing point of 
departure. In The Coming Community, Agamben makes this claim for ethics by 
building on Foucault’s refusal of universal thinking:  
The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics 
is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological 
destiny that humans must enact or realize. This is the only reason why 
something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or 
had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience 
would be possible—there would be only tasks to be done. (43) 
The ethics that develops alongside the politics of going unnoticed is not an attempt to 
constitute an exclusive distinction between good and bad actions, between the proper 
and the improper, between the norm and the exception, or between us and them. Nor 
does it intend to prescribe a path of action that must be followed in all circumstances. 
Rather, I will show it to be an attempt to guarantee the conditions of possibility for an 
inclusive political space wherein dissent and disagreement among individuals and 




 Before continuing to my analysis, I would also like to address the recent 
attempts to dismiss or discredit what has been labeled “the ethical turn” in literary and 
cultural studies. The most visible voice in this debate has been that of Jacques 
Rancière in the final chapter of Aesthetics and its Discontents, titled “The Ethical 
Turn of Aesthetics and Politics.” In my view, Rancière engages in a fairly reductive 
reading—without direct quotes—of Agamben’s theory of the homo sacer and the 
state of exception; he makes the generalized claim that Agamben’s critics frequently 
make by insisting that for Agamben “All differences simply disappear in the law of a 
global situation” (120). Rancière’s complaint is that Agamben is one of many voices 
that insist on turning to past catastrophes, in particular to the Holocaust, and therefore 
he says Agamben creates a new consensus that “erases the difference between 
henchmen and victims, including even that between the extreme crimes of the Nazi 
State and the ordinary everyday life of our democracies” (120).  
 I find this synthesis to be purposefully misleading and one that makes no 
attempt to grapple with the real complexity and nuanced nature of Agamben’s 
thought. Opening a threshold space between binaries does not so easily erase the 
differences between the henchmen and the victim, for example. Previously, I 
elaborated on the historical specificity that Agamben’s theory acquires and on his 
methodology of employing paradigms; in what follows, I expand on just how this 
supposed erasure of differences between the good guys and the bad guys is not for the 
sake of leading to a generalized consensus, not for the sake of erasing the real 




morality.54 Rather, his thought takes up Nietzsche’s questioning of such consensual 
categories of good and evil and allows me to think through other possibilities for 
ethics today. More than simply defending Agamben’s theories, ones that certainly 
should not be accepted blindly, when I turn to ethics to think through the politics of 
going unnoticed, it is not for the sake of simply returning to a past trauma or 
catastrophe or establishing a consensus about the expediency of literature for 
denouncing or mourning that past. This would be to engage in what Rancière disdains 
as the ethical turn (130).  
 Instead, I prefer to think of Simon Critchley’s somewhat ambiguous maxim 
that “If ethics without politics is empty, then politics without ethics is blind” 
(Infinitely 13). This is to say, as I understand it for my purposes here, I find it 
productive to consider a crossroads of politics and ethics. On the one hand, this 
allows me to consider an ethics that does not simply become a universal theory of 
virtuous behavior. On the other, the politics of going unnoticed—defined here as a 
practice of engaging in the same sort of democratic dissensus that Rancière, but not 
only Rancière, desires—can acquire an ethical consistency that refuses any 
moralizing consensus-building and that negates any isolation of individual ambitions 
that show no regard for others. Thus, a consideration of the ethical consistency of 
such a dissensual politics is without a doubt necessary. To adequately define what I 
mean here by “ethics,” then, will require a bit more work. In what follows, I turn to 
                                                
54 More than in Remnants of Auschwitz, the only book to which Rancière’s essay 
refers, Agamben’s writings on ethics take place and gain a much more nuanced set of 
details in Potentialities, Nudities, Means without Ends, Opus Dei: An Archaeology of 




three novels, Filloy’s Vil & Vil, Somers’s De miedo en miedo, and Manjarrez’s 





 Juan Filloy’s Vil & Vil: La gata parida (1975), published originally by the 
Macció Hnos. Editores in Río Cuarto, Argentina, lies at the temporal extreme of the 
works I study here. According to Mónica Ambort’s interview, Filloy had already 
attempted to publish it in 1968, but did not find a publisher until 1975, a year before 
the military coup that established the “Proceso de Reorganización Nacional” in 1976 
(163). For this reason, I situate it within this study of the Sixties. After the coup in 
1976, Filloy was arrested and interrogated about its contents. He was eventually 
released after convincing the military officers that the ideas expressed in the novel 
were only those of his fictional characters, not his own, which he has since said was a 
lie (Ambort 163–165). Told from the perspective of a conscript, the novel follows a 
General who plots and executes a military coup against the government. Each 
chapter, divided into three sections, begins with a brief dialogue with the General. 
The second section of each chapter takes the form of the conscript’s first-person 
narrative by which he provides contexts for those dialogues and advances the plot. 
The third section’s more experimental structures read like excerpts from the 
conscript’s journal, although this is not confirmed in the text; regardless, it is a less 
plot-driven, free-form space for reflection, whereas the first two sections maintain a 
consistent structure throughout the novel.  
 In the “Nota previa” ‘Preliminary Note,’ Filloy claims that his novel is “de 
anticipación” ‘one that looks to the future’: 
Cronológicamente, sin embargo, está situada en una época tan cercana a 




confunda. […] Por el curso que llevan las cosas en los países 
latinoamericanos, esta novela acontece a menudo y, forzosamente, variando 
detalles y circunstancias, acontecerá. (6)  
Chronologically, however, it is situated in an era so close to our own that they 
appear to get mixed up. May whoever wants to confuse them feel free to do 
so. […] Given the course of events in Latin America, this novel occurs 
frequently and, by changing a few details and circumstances, it necessarily 
will occur in the future.  
The course of events to which he refers are the series of military coups ranging from 
the one that removed Juan Domingo Perón from power in Argentina in 1955 to the 
one against Arnulfo Arias in Panamá in 1968; this list, under the title “Historia 
reciente” ‘Recent History,’ appears on the previous page, in addition to the various 
references to Pinochet’s dictatorship made within the novel. In retrospect, it might be 
tempting to read this novel as one that foretells the coming of the terrorist state in 
Argentina. Filloy was certainly well versed in Latin American history and current 
events and able to see that his own country, which had already suffered various 
military coups during his lifetime, was headed along a similar path once more. For a 
man obsessed with patterns and repetitions—the palindromes, the seven-letter titles—
it is no surprise that he noticed such clear historical patterns.  
 Nevertheless, Vil & Vil is much more than a vague premonition about future 
events. The General, like any leader of a military coup, is not a stranger to using 
violence as a means for victory; he insists on the need to “imponer la decencia” 




‘against opposition, oppression’ (248). Once again, the sovereign decrees that 
violence will be employed as the solution for eliminating political opposition. 
However, the plot does not suggest the degree of violence that the events of 1976 
entailed, nor does it foretell of the thousands of disappearances. Rather, in my view, 
this novel is successful insofar as it takes account of the generalized state of exception 
operating throughout Latin America in the era, and in the face of an impending, 
evident threat, it narrates the strategy by which an almost unnoticed military conscript 
imagines a potential line of flight away from the General’s power struggles. 
 The novel focuses on the antagonism between the narrator, who interrupted 
his studies at law school to fulfill his mandatory military service, and the General for 
whom the narrator works as secretary and chauffeur. Their public interaction can be 
characterized as the General’s attempt at ordering him and all others to do as he 
pleases. In Levinasian terms, it can be said that the General’s “universal thought is an 
‘I think’” (Totality 36). The General exemplifies the universal ambitions of an 
individual point of view. He is the clear authority whose will may not be questioned, 
and he is only interested in conversing with others insofar as they help him achieve 
his own goals. The novel begins with the following dialogue between the two men: 
—A ver, ese melenudo piojoso, que se apure. 
—Grrmgrr… 
—¡Cómo! ¿Qué dijiste? A ver, repetí lo que gruñiste, si sos macho. 
—Znnsmmx… 
—¿Pensás sobrarme, entonces? Desgraciado de mierda, te voy a romper el 




‘—You, with the lousy, long hair. Hurry up. 
—Grrmgrr… 
—What! What did you say? Let’s have it. Repeat what you just grumbled if 
you’ve got the balls. 
—Znnsmmx… 
—You think you’re better than me? You fucking moron, I’m gonna kick you 
ass.’ 
These brief dialogues are further instances of the monodialogue. The first section of 
each chapter repeats the monodialogic structure wherein the General is the dominant 
speaker and all others, including the narrator, are forced to accept the General’s 
authority or face his wrath. 
 As the conscript later claims, “El diálogo es imposible en la escala militar. El 
diálogo implica paridad natural entre dos personas. […] En la escala militar siempre 
hay un superior y un subalterno. El superior, por su propio status, no desciende ni 
condesciende a conversar amistosamente con inferiores” ‘Dialogue is impossible 
between military ranks. Dialogue implies a natural equality among two people. […] 
In the ranks, there is always a superior and a subaltern. The superior, given his status, 
does not descend nor condescend to coverse politely with inferiors’ (24). The General 
is particularly aggressive and has little patience for his interlocutors whom he 
frequently interrupts and insults. The monodialogue is his preferred rhetorical 
strategy for asserting his authority and imposing his will on others and eventually on 
the entire nation. However, in contrast to the monodialogues in Yo, yo y yo, the 




while the General’s monodialogues are always the shortest of the three sections in 
each chapter. The conscript, who otherwise would be of so little historical importance 
within this plot to overthrow the government, always has two sections after the 
monodialogues in which he resists the General’s attempts to flatten out his will and 
reduce it to his own. The conscript’s perspective becomes another example of a voice 
that could so easily have been left unattended in the era, yet Filloy wrote a novel that 
exposes this particular voice. 
 The conscript would oppose the General’s monodialogic authority, but given 
his circumstances, he has to reign in his antagonism. Early on, he says, “Deseo que ni 
siquiera se sospeche de mí” ‘My goal is that they don’t even suspect anything of me’ 
(18). This attempt to not become the target of suspicion is part of the survival tactics 
that he has adopted, since he says he does not instinctively know how to behave in the 
military. He describes these tactics as a “capacidad teatral” ‘theatrical ability’ and 
recommends the following to his fellow conscripts: “lo principal que hay que hacer 
en el ejército es simular corrección. Cuanto más fiel la simulación del cumplimiento 
del deber, mejor” ‘the most important thing one can do in the military is feign 
correctness. The more loyal one is to pretending to comply with one’s duties, the 
better’ (27). There is no doubt in his mind that “correctness” is simply the term the 
military’s high command uses to signify unreflective obedience; as such, he does not 
actually aim to be correct or proper, but only pretends to be so. Appearances, not 
truth, are all that matter within the monodialogic relationship he has with the General.  
 Further, his use of the verb “simular” ‘to feign, to pretend’ strikes me as 




shares a root with a word used in the title of Casey’s “Notas de un simulador.” The 
difference is that, in Casey’s text, the narrator does not feign proper behavior; he 
simply attempts to avoid the public light, by going unnoticed, so that he can 
accompany people who would otherwise die alone. The only thing he pretends to be 
is a medical professional, but he does not actually hide his true intentions. In contrast, 
the conscript’s performance of propriety is not an instance of going unnoticed, since 
this practice as I defined it is not the creation of a public mask or persona used to veil 
an underlying truth; the conscript is simply developing a survival tactic to imperfectly 
get by in the face of the General’s ominous monodialogues. 
 The narrator opposes the General from the very beginning; he was drafted into 
the armed forces while preparing for a civilian life. This opposition is firmly 
cemented when the conscript accidentally overhears that the General is planning a 
coup against the democratically elected government: “Sin querer, capté ese fragmento 
de conversación telefónica” ‘Accidentally I caught that fragment of his telephone 
conversation’ (33 my italics). Indeed, this is almost verbatim the suggestion that 
Casey’s narrator makes in “Notas de un simulador”: “fragmentos de la conversación 
escuchada en el breve trayecto de un tranvía, un cruce en las líneas telefónicas, 
pueden darnos espléndidas claves” ‘fragments of a conversation heard during the 
brief journey on a streetcar or a cross in the telephone lines can offer us splendid 
clues’ (51–52). Filloy’s novel duly attends to an otherwise unimportant voice, that of 
the conscript who, in turn, manages to pay attention to a fragment of a telephone 
conversation that he hears in passing and records in the sections of his narrative 




 The conscript hears the following: “Sí, claro. Preparamos la revolución porque 
la fuerza armada sin el poder no sirve para un corno. Le falta acción coercitiva. 
Carece de acción y dominio. No corta ni aprieta. Es como una tenaza a la cual le 
faltara uno de sus brazos…” ‘Yes, of course. We are preparing the revolution, 
because armed force without power is useless. It needs coercive action. Otherwise, it 
lacks action and dominion. It doesn’t cut or squeeze. It’s like a pair of pliers that’s 
missing one of its needles…’ (33). Since the narrator cannot do much about this plan 
that he accidentally overhears, he is limited to registering his dissent through writing. 
He challenges the General’s use of the term “revolución” ‘revolution’ to name his 
military coup by showing that it functions, in Laclau’s terms, as an empty signifier by 
which the General rallies the other interest groups around his particular will to total 
power. The conscript writes: “Alterar la costumbre de la esclavitud, por meras 
mudanzas de amos y patrones, de carteles y monopolios, es cipayismo cien por 
ciento. Fuera de la francesa, la norteamericana, la rusa y la china, no ha habido otras 
revoluciones en el mundo” ‘Altering the habits of slavery by simply changing owners 
and masters, cartels and monopolies, is politics in the service of foreign interests one 
hundred percent. Other than the French, the U.S., the Russian, and the Chinese, there 
have not been other revolutions in the world’ (220). The conscript highlights that the 
General is unable to see how he is simply operating within the same neocolonial 
structures of dependence on foreign interests against which a real revolution would 
fight; he is not, like Guevara or Sartre, ideally promoting a radical change in those 
power structures other that inserting himself at their highest national seat. At the same 




list of true revolutions, since the conscript has no sympathies with the PRI’s 
institutionalization of their solitary will to power nor with Castro’s increasingly 
authoritarian state.  
 The conscript’s relationship with the General, just like the reporter’s 
relationship to Konsideransky, cannot be reduced to one of the revolutionary hero 
versus the authoritarian villain in the way that the barbudos of the Cuban Revolution 
mythologized their opposition to Batista and U.S. foreign interests. Nor is this the 
case of Johnny, from Manjarrez’s eponymous short story, in his fight against the 
bandits. As I interpret it, the repetition of the adjective in the title, Vil & Vil, literally 
announces the repulsive qualities of both the General and the conscript. Neither may 
claim moral superiority over the other. The General is a cruel, power-hungry man 
who does not hesitate to use force and violence to achieve his goals. The conscript, 
after all, was going to school to be a lawyer, and he has an affair with the General’s 
wife; despite my own sympathies with his opposition to the General, he is not exactly 
the shining image of a philanthropic hero. Each is labeled with an equivalent 
descriptor, “vile,” thus balancing out in moral terms the asymmetrical power 
relationship that their military titles create. Ultimately, the title announces that in this 
novel two mutually repulsive and antagonistic interests collide. 
 In Paratexts, Gérard Genette has studied how paratextual elements like the 
title constitute a “threshold” that “operate between text and off-text,” framing a text 
for its readers and potentially influencing their reception of it (2). It is clear that Filloy 
as the author has judged these two characters in moral terms by calling them both 




monodialogue by which he morally condemns all of the characters and situations in 
his own novel. Both the General’s and the conscript’s claims to goodness, propriety, 
and authenticity are denied. It may seem counterintuitive to cultivate an ethics from a 
text in which vile, evil characters abound, and of course, I do not mean that such 
amoral individuals are the only ethical ones. That would be ridiculous. What I 
propose is to reject Filloy’s monodialogic strategy and ignore his moral judgments. 
An ethics of the sort I imagine here can only take place when moral judgments are set 
aside so that no individuals can be banned or abandoned. This ethics can only arise 
when no self legitimates his or her claims of moral superiority over any other. These 
are the conditions of possibility for the ethics of being perceived.  
 To return to a discussion I began in the previous chapter, in “On Potentiality” 
Agamben defines “potentiality” as an opening for both darkness and light, for both 
good and evil: “To be capable of good and evil is not simply to be capable of doing 
this or that good or bad action (every particular good or bad action is, in this sense, 
banal). Radical evil is not this or that bad deed but the potentiality for darkness. And 
yet this potentiality is also the potentiality for light” (181). If both darkness and light 
are not guaranteed as potential actions or decisions, then there is no action or decision 
to be made, but only forced compliance with a mandate. This is the position in which 
the subaltern conscript finds himself when he is forced to comply with the General’s 
monodialogic demands. When caught inside a monodialogue, the interlocutor has lost 
his or her potentiality. The question, then, becomes one of recuperating this 
potentiality for the interlocutor, regardless of how he or she has been morally judged 




 In Agamben’s Coming Community, a text that offers a constructive 
supplement to the deconstructive Homo Sacer saga, this opening of potentiality 
becomes an ethical opening toward a radically inclusive community. The coming 
community is not one of saints or of evildoers; these moralizing value distinctions 
have no place here. In the chapter titled “Taking Place” he elaborates a definition of 
the ethical opening: 
Ethics begins only when the good is revealed to consist in nothing other than a 
grasping of evil and when the authentic and the proper have no other content 
than the inauthentic and the improper. This is the meaning of the ancient 
philosophical adage according to which “veritas patefacit se ipsam et falsum.” 
Truth cannot be shown except by showing the false, which is not, however, 
cut off and cast aside somewhere else. On the contrary, according to the 
etymology of the verb patefacere, which means “to open” and is linked to 
spatium, truth is revealed only by giving space or giving a place to non-
truth—that is, as a taking-place of the false, as an exposure of its own 
innermost impropriety. (13)  
Agamben’s appeal to universals like “good,” “evil,” and “truth” seems to betray his 
preference for thresholds and genealogies, but they are better understood in the wake 
of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals as particular, moralizing categories by which a 
community defines itself and casts aside its others. Ethics, for Agamben, takes place 
when and where a space opens up for both “the light” and “the darkness,” for what is 
called “true” and what is called “false,” for what is valued as “proper” and what is 




both, because those labeled as “the darkness,” “false,” “improper,” or “them” are not 
universally so, but only described as such by those who desire to cast them aside and 
legitimize their exclusion. For this sort of ethics, these are no longer terms that 
oppose one another through binary logic, including one and excluding the other as if 
such a distinction were a universal truth; neither is cut off and cast aside. And how 
could they be cast aside since there is no longer an outside, no longer a no man’s land 
outside of the generalized state of exception? Like actually existing potentiality, the 
ethical opening is the opening that guarantees a radically inclusive space with no a 
priori moral value judgments or ideological ends. In other words, ethics opens and 
takes place in the space—characterized as the state of exception—where both the vile 
General and the vile conscript can face one another outside of the monodialogic 
structure and without a universal, paratextual judge determining who is good and who 
is evil or vile. 
 The ethics of being perceived does not take place by simply inverting the 
power relationship between the General and the conscript and showing the latter’s 
fictional agency. This would only amount to turning the conscript’s written text into 
an inverted monodialogue wherein the subaltern conscript acquires power to speak—
a power that is rather meaningless at the end of the day. The conscript can write his 
rebuttal to the General, but the General still has the upper hand—the men with 
guns—within their world.  
 In addition to the rhetorical strategy of the monodialogue, the General makes 
use of a physical, violent strategy for securing his power, which is announced in the 




cat,” is a clear struggle for hegemony via brute force similar to “king of the hill.” The 
verb “parir” ‘to give birth’ also means ‘to come up with, to create (an idea).’ Its usage 
in the phrase “la puta que te parió” ‘son of a bitch’ and other vulgar phrases is 
certainly a connotation floating around in the name of this game. In a rare moment, 
the General becomes giddy with nostalgia, and he claims that children from the 
provinces like himself “inventan sus juegos” ‘invent their own games,’ unlike their 
less virile counterparts who grow up in the capital, which is ironically the national 
seat of power he now conspires to take. Here he explains how to play “la gata 
parida”:  
En un banco […] nos sentábamos tantos muchachos como cabíamos. Los que 
no cabían estaban alertas, esperando turno para sentarse. Porque el juego 
consiste en hacer caer a los de la punta, a fuerza de empujar con el cuerpo, los 
hombros y las caderas. Lo principal es mantenerse sentado en el banco, 
resistiendo los empellones para no ser desplazado y caer. Es un juego de 
machos que excita el amor propio. Porque cuando cae alguno, los que esperan, 
o el mismo caído, ocupan ese lugar libre en la otra punta del banco y prosigue 
la pechada hasta volter al del extremo. De izquiera o derecha, lo mismo da. Lo 
importante es ubicarse y conservar enérgicamente el puesto. ¡Es de lo más 
divertido! (42) 
‘As many boys as possible would sit on a bench. Those who didn’t fit had to 
remain alert, waiting for their chance to grab a seat. The game consists of 
making those on the ends fall off with force by pushing with your body, your 




strong when you’re pushed so you don’t get moved and fall off. It’s a 
masculine game that engenders self-esteem. Because when someone falls, 
those who are waiting, or even the guy who falls, grab the open space at the 
other end of the bench and the fight continues until you knock someone down 
from the other side. From the left or the right, it’s all the same. What’s 
important is claiming a space and energetically conserving it. It’s so much 
fun!’ 
This clearly gendered game links masculinity with violence and the ability to stand 
one’s ground, all the while encouraging a heightened individualism that respects only 
the self’s will.  
 Now commanding a national military, the General makes use of the same 
strategies he developed while playing this game as a child to knock down all those 
who are in his path to securing power and, once achieved, he will stand his ground by 
any means available to him. His claim carries even more political undertones when he 
declares with enthusiasm that you have to knock down your opponents from the left 
and from the right without hesitation or concern for their well-being. There is no 
political ideology worthy of his commitment other than self-preservation and self-
love. Perhaps the General could call this grown-up version of “la gata parida,” by 
taking a lesson from Konsideransky, “yomismo,” the political party committed only 
to its sole member’s self-interest.  
 Within the last third of the novel, the General triumphs and legitimizes his 
military coup over the radio by invoking the state of exception “en defensa de la salud 




Agamben’s Homo Sacer saga, in consonance with Filloy in the “Nota previa,” 
demonstrates that the state of exception has become the political norm as the aporia 
that is inscribed within the constitutions of Western democracies. Within the novel, 
however, it is clear that the General is not committed to a democratic politics. He is 
only committed to the two main strategies—the monodialogue and “la gata parida”—
by which he successfully realizes his will to total power over the military and national 
political institutions.  
 Facing the reality that he has no means of counteracting the General, like 
Casey’s Mayer who knows it is impossible to win his court case, the conscript desires 
to retreat as far away as possible from him; in the days just before the military coup, 
he even considers desertion, only to find himself confronted with the chaos of fear 
and a loss of moral certainty: 
Nunca había estado metido en un laberinto. Sabía lo que es la línea recta y lo 
que es la rectitud. Ya no. Me cruzan y entrecruzan mil senderos 
endemoniados. No soy dueño de mis designios. He perdido mi capacidad de 
optar. Pero esa luz de la deserción me está alumbrando. (237) 
‘I had never been stuck in a labyrinth. I always knew which is the straight path 
and what rectitude is. Not anymore. A thousand wicked paths cross back and 
forth over me. I no longer have control over my plans. I have lost the ability to 
choose. But the light of desertion is shining on me.’ 
The conscript is not faced with a decision between the high road and the low road, a 
moral decision he claims to have been able to make successfully in the past; for the 




of this cursed labyrinth. In this sense, there is no choice to be made; there is no good 
option to be found among the winding paths laid out in front of him. The only option 
he can hope for is to flee this labyrinth entirely, but as he says, he is not capable of 
choosing, because every choice is equally vile. He has lost, to use Agamben’s terms, 
his potentiality and his impotentiality, that is, his ability to make a choice and his 
ability to refuse to participate in the General’s hegemonic game. He will not desert 
the military; instead, he continues to serve the General and to carry on his romantic 
affair with the General’s wife. It is for reasons like this that the conscript is not 
exactly a hero and can be labeled paratextually as “vile.” 
 Given the state in which the conscript finds himself trapped and his 
impossible desire to thwart the General’s struggle for power, it is not surprising that 
his reaction is to dismiss all political action in a sweeping generalization about Latin 
America: “Todavía no existe vida democrática en las naciones latinoamericanas. La 
democracia recaba continuidad en el proceso de su perfeccionamiento. […] Al 
desplazamiento por la fuerza, sigue una transición azarosa… hasta otra nueva conjura 
o asonada lo desplaza” ‘Democratic life still does not exist in the Latin American 
nations. Democracy demands continuity in order to perfect itself. Displacement by 
force is only followed by a random transition… until another conspiracy or mob 
displaces it’ (228). Behind his reductive pronouncements still lies a certain teleology 
of developmentalism and modernization. I would like to move beyond this point. The 
narrator makes no effort to prove his claim, and it is not one I am interested in 
defending. Instead, I want to consider the claim that politics in Latin America, or 




parida” wherever the state of exception and absolutist, authoritarian forms of 
hegemonic rule run rampant. What becomes clear is that the conscript is making an 
appeal for a more radical form of democracy to come into existence, and this 
imagined democracy would operate otherwise than in the form of the General’s 
monodialogues and disturbing childhood games in his will to totality.  
 In a way, Chantal Mouffe’s democratic theory also feels around in the dark for 
a path toward a radical democratic politics still to come. In The Democratic Paradox, 
she critiques the deliberative democratic theories of Rawls and Habermas for their 
inability to grapple with the pluralism of values within the public sphere of 
democratic debate. While the deliberative democrats both accept a pluralism of values 
in name—which is more than can be said of the General in Filloy’s novel—Mouffe 
shows that “they need to relegate pluralism to a non-public domain in order to 
insulate politics from its consequences” (92). This is to say that for deliberative 
democracy to come into being, antagonism must be left at home. In contrast, Mouffe 
contends for the need to develop a more realistic democratic theory:  
Such a search should be recognized for what it really is, another attempt at 
insulating politics from the effects of the pluralism of value, this time by 
trying to fix once and for all the meaning and hierarchy of the central liberal-
democratic values. Democratic theory should renounce those forms of 
escapism and face the challenge that the recognition of the pluralism of values 
entails. This does not mean accepting a total pluralism, and some limits need 
to be put to the kind of confrontation which is going to be seen as legitimate in 




acknowledged instead of being presented as requirements of morality or 
rationality. (93) 
This is to say that one should not only be granted access to democracy if and only if 
one subscribes to the moral values of that system or if and only if one can eliminate 
all affective influences from the political decisions one makes. Mouffe calls for a 
democracy that can be inclusive, within some limits that she does not at present 
specify, of even those whose values do not completely match those of contemporary 
liberal-democracy. She also insists that there is no way to eliminate power from 
politics and society: “power is constitutive of social relations” (98). The question for 
democratic politics, then, “is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms 
of power more compatible with democratic values” (100).  
 At this point, I would like to call attention to what I see as the ethics of her 
democratic model; instead of creating an exclusive, moral community for democracy 
or a utopian vision of a society without power relations, Mouffe seeks a democracy 
that resists the will to totality: “The democratic character of a society can only be 
given by the fact that no limited social actor can attribute to herself or himself the 
representation of the totality and claim to have the ‘mastery’ of the foundation” (100). 
Instead, democracy must accept the ineradicable and irreducible antagonism brought 
out by the pluralism of values. To do so is to reconfigure the friends versus enemies 
structure of hegemonic power struggles: “the aim of democratic politics is to 
construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be 




right to defend those ideas we do not put into question” (102).55 She does not attempt 
to eliminate different social identities nor to relegate their differences to an idealized 
private space, but rather she contends for the need to allow such pluralism to engage 
openly in political power struggles.  
 More specifically, her theory insists on transforming these struggles from 
antagonistic struggles to agonistic ones: “Antagonism is the struggle between 
enemies, while agonism is a struggle between adversaries” (102–103). From my 
perspective, Mouffe’s agonistic democracy at this point merges well with Levinas’s 
ethics that seeks a face to face encounter between a self and an other that does not 
attempt to totalize the infinite distance between them and with Agamben’s coming 
community that seeks an opening for potentiality, for both the proper and the 
improper, for us and for them. It is within such a space that the conditions of 
possibility for dissensus and disagreement can take place within the ethical 
framework I propose here.  
 Within the experimental third section of his unnoticed text, the conscript 
opposes the General’s two violent strategies for asserting his will to total power and 
proposes a radical alternative to them. His writing becomes the only possibility of 
producing a line of flight within that demonic labyrinth. As he searches for an 
alternative space in which ethics can take place, he necessarily errs off the General’s 
course of military action for the following reason:  
                                                
55 I quoted from Foucault above who, in the English translation, uses the term 





La vida es demasiado bella para que se la malogre. Los caracteres varoniles 
cruzan indemnes las penurias que impone el servicio militar. Pero los 
caracteres delicados padecen verdaderos quebrantamientos, y tropelías éticas 
de todo género acaban por nulificarlos. […] El afán de aplastar la 
personalidad para gregarizar al individuo no puede admitirse como meta de 
ninguna disciplina, porque involucra la peor traición al progreso de la especie. 
(Vil 182) 
‘Life is too beautiful to waste it. Virile personalities cross unharmed through 
the misery that military service imposes on them. But the more delicate ones 
suffer true breakdowns, and all sorts of moral abuses end up annihilating 
them. […] The desire to squash an individual’s personality in order to make 
them sociable can not be admissible as the goal of any discipline, because it 
involves the worst treason against the progress of the species.’ 
I have translated “tropelías éticas” as ‘moral abuses’ to not confuse the ways in which 
I have chosen to divide the two terms for my own purposes; the type of violent acts 
and abuses carried out by the military, according to the conscript, serve only to flatten 
out any individualizing characteristics in order to force the young conscripts into 
submissive obedience. This can only be described as another form of violence 
justified by an appeal to military morality. What I would call ethics, as it errs away 
from this morality, is what the conscript opens in the sentence that continues from the 
previous quote: “Mi desesperación es casi un pandemónium. Creo ya estar en él:” 
‘My desperation is almost a pandemonium. I believe I am already in it:’ (182). He 




is, the hellscape populated by all sorts of evil demons and lesser gods—that will take 
place within the already occupied space of the wicked paths that cross back and forth 
over the conscript within the vile labyrinth of military morality.  
 The definition of this pandemonium follows the colon I quoted above; it is an 
eleven page dialogue in which the voices of historical and fictional leaders from 
antiquity to the twentieth century shout, insult, joke, quibble, and demand to be heard. 
Among those names who speak in this pandemonium are: from Latin America, San 
Martín, Rosas, Liniers, Martín Fierro, Doctor Francia, Iturbide, Benito Juárez, 
Porfirio Díaz, Pancho Villa, Victoriano Huerta, Bolívar, Solano López, García 
Moreno, Sandino, Martí, Guevara, Castro, Vicuña Mackenna, Neruda, Allende, 
Pinochet, Battle y Ordóñez, Baltasar Brun, Getulio Vargas; from Spain, Torquemada, 
Fernando VII, Unamuno, Primo de Rivera, Millán Astray; and so many others, 
including Atila the Hun, Ghengis Khan, Julius Cesar, María de Medicis, Alexander 
the Great, Robespierre, Napoleon, Pepe Botella (Joseph Bonaparte), Ivan the Terrible, 
Woodrow Wilson, Stalin, Mussolini, Himmler, Clausewitz, Einstein, Mao, Trotsky, 
Ho Chi Minh, Sartre, Goethe, Freud, Bernard Shaw, T.S. Eliot (183–193).  
 Such a pandemonium is a historical impossibility, but it opens up along 
ARTELETRA’s errant path in the experimental section of the conscript’s writings. 
Those who take part in this dialogue do so as evil demons or lesser gods; they are all 
just as vile as the General and the conscript who also speak in this pandemonium. 
This dialogue ends with the following open-ended words of El Viejo Pancho (the 
nickname for the gauchesca poet José Alonso y Trelles) and Martín Fierro:  




 ‘tando la tormenta armada. 
Martín Fierro: Yo he visto rejucilar  
 y dispués no pasar nada… (193) 
‘El Viejo Pancho: “Anything can happen 
 Once has begun the storm.” 
Martín Fierro: “I’ve seen lightning strike 
 And then nothing more.’ 
No one voice dominates this space; no one is physically removed from it either. 
Throughout, the friendships and enmities between these actors are not erased, but 
rather they are given the space in which their agonistic struggles can play out. Like 
the discourses and ideologies that many of them generated, they are not restricted to 
dialoguing with the others from their own historical era or geographic region. Martí 
responds to Guevara; Marx, to Einstein; and Bolívar, to Primo de Rivera, for 
example. What tool is better than language, in Levinas’s words, “to break the 
continuity of being or of history” (Otherwise 195). In the face of this powerful 
rupture through discourse, even the General who is typically so skilled at turning 
conversations into monodialogues and at standing his ground in “la gata parida” loses 
his hegemonic grip within this radically open, rhizomatic dialogue that ends with the 
equal possibility of both a future storm and a future tranquility.  
 Pandemonium serves as a potential model for democratic dialogue as it 
generates the conditions of possibility for dissent and disagreement among 
adversaries. The struggle for power is not removed as in an unrealizable, utopian 




particular individual rising above the rest to secure his hegemonic will to totality over 
the others. The conscript’s pandemonium, then, exposes the ethical form that, in my 
view, can arise from the politics of going unnoticed. This practice errs off prescribed, 
moral paths by creating an unnoticed itinerary, but ultimately those who go unnoticed 






 In my previous analysis of Somers’s La mujer desnuda, I demonstrated that 
Rebeca Linke’s political gesture, a means without ends, begins from her desire to go 
unnoticed and takes place along her errant line of flight into the countryside; her 
flight, her self-decapitation, and her attempt to put herself back together, both literally 
and psychologically, in the face of moralizing and universalizing blockages constitute 
the politics of going unnoticed in the novel. Since going unnoticed is always a 
temporary state, there comes a moment in which she must open herself to being 
perceived once more by others, a moment in which the ethical potential of this 
politics becomes possible. Rebeca Linke’s experience of what seems like freedom 
only lasts until she steps outside of her shack and onto the prairie. There she is 
immediately confronted with thousands of eyes and teeth that appear to keep vigil 
over her every move. As these vulnerable characters alter the thresholds of perception 
in which they previously went unnoticed, they open their own versions of what the 
conscript in Filloy’s novel experiences as “pandemonium.” When Rebeca Linke steps 
across the threshold of her shack, she takes up another errant path along which she 
can be perceived by the surrounding world. In this way, the political opening made 
possible by going unnoticed becomes quite literally an exposure of the nude, 
vulnerable body in an ethical encounter or dialogue with others as an alternative to, 
although not a utopian elimination of, the violence that characterizes the state of 
exception.56 
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 The ethics of being perceived takes on different, although compatible 
characteristics in the works of these four authors. This act of opening oneself to 
exposure through dialogue in Armonía Somers’s De miedo en miedo (Los 
manuscritos del río) does not rely on the creation of a pandemonium as in Juan 
Filloy’s Vil & Vil. The novel, whose title translates as From Fear to Fear (The River 
Manuscripts), was first published by Arca in Montevideo en 1965. Set in an 
unnamed, French-speaking city, the novel shares a certain existentialist affinity with 
Albert Camus’s The Fall. The anonymous, first person narrator of Somers’s novel 
writes his interior ramblings and copies snippets of his journal (the pages of which he 
tosses in the river every night) as he navigates the humdrum events of his daily life 
and the incessant fears that drive his obsessive-compulsive behaviors. Through his 
memories of past and invented interactions with other women, he mentally escapes 
his boredom and distracts himself from his fears. However, his most important line of 
flight takes place during his real and imagined errant dialogues with an anonymous 
woman who one day comes into the bookstore where he works and continues to meet 
with him on various occasions, only to talk.  
 Their first encounter was brief, and almost became their only one, but the 
narrator was impressed to see that the woman kept her handkerchief sealed inside an 
envelope in her purse; he knew they shared at least a fear of germs. Given the scope 
                                                                                                                                      
works as brought together through a primarily psychoanalytic framework. In addition, 
her study focuses mostly on two of Somers’s later works, Viaje al corazón del día and 
No todos los elefantes encuentran mandrágora. It shares little with my own approach, 
despite both of our attempts to construct an ethics from Somers’s works, in particular 
for focusing on the “ex-céntrico,” which means in Spanish both “eccentric, odd” and 
“peripheral, outside of the center.” See Armonía Somers. Por una ética de lo ex-





of the city, he recognizes how difficult it would be to find her: “En una ciudad llena 
de cuevas de la que cada cual sacará su cabeza a la mañana, ella se me acababa de 
perder como la pequeña piedra de un anillo, en esa forma tan insidiosa de dejarnos 
con el aro vacío” ‘In a city filled with caves from which everyone pokes out their 
head each morning, I had just lost her like one loses the stone from a ring, deceitfully 
leaving only the empty hoop’ (De miedo 17). As she walks out of the bookstore, he is 
left only with the absence that takes the form of her former presence. Since he does 
not know very many details about her, he decides it is best to forget her: “Pero uno no 
se echa en busca de pequeños fragmentos incapaces de recomponer el todo” ‘But you 
don’t got about searching for small fragments that are incapable of recreating the 
whole’ (17–18). His obsessive-compulsive instincts leave him resigned to ignore 
those seemingly unimportant details that he does remember—her voice, her smile, her 
handkerchief—since a more complete and totalizing encounter, something more like 
the perfect palindrome, could not be formed from them. 
 Recalling Casey’s narrator’s suggestion in “Notas de un simulador,” this is 
precisely Somers’s narrator’s mistake, one which he gradually rectifies as he opens 
himself to less certain and totalizing encounters both with his own desires and with 
this unknown woman. He begins writing fragmented journal entries to record his 
most profound thoughts, which at times become repugnant reflections on murder and 
suicide; again, the characters in these narratives are not necessarily heroes, divine 
creatures, or guiltless victims. His fear of having these thoughts revealed to anyone 




in the process, he comes to appreciate a sort of piecemeal acquisition of an imperfect 
knowledge that he notices in the river:  
Es decir que yo, que he tenido siempre tanto miedo de morir por inmersión, 
comencé a guardar más de mí en aquel fondo lleno de ahogados azules que 
por encima. […] La vida había sido un acontecer lineal, como una novela 
fuera de moda dividida en capítulos. Pero el río, siempre hambriento de mí, 
quería mis pedazos, fueran o no consecutivos. (19–20) 
This is to say that I, who have always been very afraid of drowning, began to 
safeguard more of myself in those depths full of blue, drowned bodies than 
above them. […] My life had been a linear event, like an old-fashioned novel 
divided into chapters. But the river, always hungry for more, desired pieces of 
me, whether or not they were in order.  
He begins to understand the ravenous desire to approach and listen to the words of 
another person even when those are only bits and fragments of ideas tossed around in 
a random order. This is an emergent appreciation of the narrative modes made 
possible by the avant-gardes in their attempt to smash various institutions and 
conventions that by the Sixties are being published within the cultural markets. 
Simultaneously, it is an opening toward the type of incomplete, errant dialogues that 
he comes to have with the woman in which their lines of communication always 
exceed what is said out loud.  
 The man and the woman meet on a number of occasions. While they reveal 
some of their most intimate thoughts to one another—particularly the narrator to the 




one of their early encounters: “Nos quedamos [nosotros] unos minutos más como 
suspendidos de un hilo, incapaz [yo] de resistir si alguno de los dos no disminuía la 
tensión de algún modo” ‘We stayed a few minutes longer as if suspended by a thread, 
being incapable myself of holding out if one of us didn’t reduce the tension in some 
way’ (23, my italics). A subtle, almost imperceptible shift between subjects, a 
characteristic that frequently appears in Somers’s syntax, manifests itself here; the 
sentence begins in the first person plural by which the narrator is capable of 
describing what he and the woman are experiencing, but it quickly jumps mid-
sentence to his limited, interior experience. Only he is incapable of maintaining this 
dialogue; he does not speak for the woman, thereby allowing the distance between 
them to show itself.  
 Such an opening to being perceived by others constitutes the foundation of 
Levinas’s ethical theory: the encounter takes place between a self and an other—in 
this case between the narrator and the woman—in which they expose their faces to 
one another in an asymmetrical relationship and remain separated by an infinite 
distance. This exposure of “the face” only allows for a glimpse of the other: “The way 
in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here 
name face” (50). This face to face encounter is not a direct line of communication, 
but rather an attempt to converse with another person without the need to reduce the 
other person’s alterity to the same of the self; it is to approach the other like the 
narrator imagines the river approaches his own piecemeal and discarded manuscripts.  
 In fact, once the narrator accepts this infinite, untraversable gap separating 




continue their dialogues: “Mi costumbre de mostrarle las entrañas y su desesperación 
por revolverlas y encontrar símbolos, nos empezó a fanatizar, a impedir el curso hacia 
adelante de la vida” ‘My habit of showing her my guts and her desperation for 
digging around in them and finding symbols began to obsess us, to block our path 
forward in life’ (De miedo 34). He says, “Me había acogotado una ansiedad mortal de 
aclaración, de desciframiento” ‘A mortal anxiety to clarify, to decipher had me in a 
stranglehold’ (36). But like ARTELETRA, the Sator Square, and other enigmatic 
palindromes, there is no true meaning to be totally clarified or deciphered; there will 
always remain an excess to what is capable of being said across this distance through 
language. The voracity of their mutually exposing encounters leads the woman to 
suggest that they break their conversations into even smaller fragments. Even these 
tiny bits of language seem to say so much more than either can comprehend.  
 First, she says, “Creo que no podrías entregármelo todo por completo” ‘I think 
that you won’t ever be able to hand everything over to me completely’ (34). Then, in 
a curious symmetry with Filloy’s recommendation in the “Exordio” to Yo, yo y yo, 
she thanks the narrator for having divided one of his stories about a priest into smaller 
“doses”: “[La historia sobre] Tu sacerdote no me dejó dormir […]. Has hecho bien en 
administrármelo por dosis” ‘The story of your priest kept me awake all night […]. 
I’m glad you administered it to me in doses’ (49). Finally, when he begins to spiral 
from his fears and unanswered existential inquiries, she points out to him the 
difficulty of even knowing what he is talking about, but reassures him that this is part 
of his “infinity”: “No sé de lo que estás hablando, pero se trataba también de tu 




infinity’ (70). Their dialogues attempt over and again to establish lines of 
conversation, but they will never fully reduce the infinite distance that separates them. 
They fail to completely reveal their own interiority to the other and to fully 
comprehend the other’s interiority, gradually settling for exposing only smaller and 
smaller fragments of their experiences, which they still find overwhelming. Yet, it is 
precisely their eagerness to pay attention to these fragments of conversations that 
allows them to continue exposing their faces to one another, thus opening and 
reopening the potential for dialogue.  
 Whereas Levinas frequently writes from the perspective of the same—e.g., the 
other’s “irreducibility to the I” (Totality 43)—Somers’s novel exceeds an 
interpretation that would identify the man speaking in the first person as the same and 
that would identify the woman, his interlocutor, as the Other. The man’s interiority is 
inaccessible to the woman; this is not due to his totalizing will to power as in the 
monodialogue, but to his “infinity,” his and every subject’s irreducibility to a singular 
essence. Although he speaks in the first person, she is the one to point out his 
irreparable alterity to her, his “infinity.” In my view, this prevents an attempt to read 
this structure as if the interlocutor, an anonymous woman, is a way of conjugating the 
Other as Woman, that is, as Man’s radical alterity. Nor is it simply an inversion of 
binary values wherein the Other becomes Man as Woman’s radical alterity. Rather, 
each of them demonstrates a certain distance from knowing him or her self and from 
knowing the other person.  
 When read alongside La mujer desnuda, the anonymous man in De miedo en 




prescribed paths and moral duties toward a radical divesting of himself in the face of 
this woman and all the readers of the parts of his fragmented narrative—the novel 
itself—that are not thrown into the river. The parallel between the two novels does 
not appear to be accidental, since he says: “Sentí […] que nos habíamos puesto al 
desnudo interiormente como bajo un relámpago” ‘I felt […] that we had shown our 
interiority in all its nudity as if under the flash of lightning’ (74). Later, he feels as if 
he has lost all of his blood, not unlike the anemic Rebeca Linke after cutting off her 
own head: “Sentí durante algunos segundos que había quedado anémico, debilitado 
por mi hemorragia definitoria” ‘I felt for a few seconds that I had ended up anemic, 
weakened by the hemorrhage that defines me’ (90). Without the fantastic elements of 
La mujer desnuda, the narrator here experiences the same bloodletting and nude 
exposure to the world as Rebeca Linke. Both the nude woman and the nude man 
reveal themselves; both can be constituted as someone’s other, and both will find it 
impossible to fully know themselves.  
 In this way, these characters are not so easily elevated as universal 
representatives of their respective genders as in a gesture toward some form of 
identity politics. The politics of going unnoticed, and the ramifications it has for an 
ethics here, does not allow for the type of visibilization of the exposed subject or of 
the identity group; the subjects who go unnoticed attempt to open up a dialogue with 
others—or with the others within themselves—by refusing to assimilate the other to 
the self and by constantly exceeding any line of communication that might try to 
identify the self with any other. Yet, this is not to say that this ethics does not have 




Levinas, Agamben’s essay, “The Face,” demonstrates the politics of the face: “The 
face is at once the irreparable being-exposed of humans and the very opening in 
which they hide and stay hidden. The face is the only location of community, the only 
possible city” (91). The face both hides and reveals; it can turn away from the other’s 
gaze, or it can stare the other in the eyes, exposing itself. “Exposition,” Agamben 
affirms, “is the location of politics. […] Human beings thus transform the open into a 
world, that is, into the battlefield of a political struggle without quarter” (93). By 
exposing their faces, those who go unnoticed open the potential for these impossible-
to-fulfill dialogues to take place in an already occupied space and, by extension, for 
sustained dissent and disagreement that can allow for a radical democratic politics to 
come.  
 Thus, these subjects engage in the construction of something like what 
Agamben calls the coming community, a community that is always coming and 
becoming, moving and changing as the individuals who conform it continue to 
dialogue and disagree with one another. This exposition is not a revelation or an 
illumination to the light of the polis’s center stage, but “the possibility of taking 
possession of impropriety as such, of exposing in the face simply your own proper 
impropriety, of walking in the shadow of its light” (98). By opening this form of 
dialogue, by exposing one’s impropriety to the world along the dimly lit paths that 
traverse the swirling lights and shadows of their era, they engage in politics. The 
ethics of being perceived is not an opening that will remain free from all values and 




humans engage one another in a pandemonium of face to face encounters that are 
opened by writing and language in an already occupied space.  
 If the exposition of the nude face is not capable of ever fully illuminating 
itself or communicating directly with an other, what form does this conversation 
take? The narrator describes this flight into language at one point as provoking 
“aquella ruptura en la que el pensamiento se hacía carrera sobre las vallas, 
lanzándome a sintaxis liberadoras” ‘that rupture by which my thought went racing 
over hurdles, launching me toward a liberating syntax’ (De miedo 54–55). The 
hurdles he successfully jumps over are bits of banal conversation with his wife who 
ignores his attempts to converse with her as he does with the other woman. This 
liberating syntax allows him to narrate invented conversations with that other 
anonymous woman even when she is not around. Instead of paying attention to the 
details of the mortgage he is about to take out with his wife on a new home, he 
imagines which of his fears and dark desires he and the woman might discuss. 
Whether part of the real or imagined dialogues with her, they constantly slip and slide 
from one topic to another, fragmenting their discussion, returning to previous 
conversations, and starting narratives that only make sense in retrospect when more 
details are revealed in a future “dose” of the story.  
 In Chapter One, I mentioned that this man wants to write a novel made up of 
random, quotidian objects, expressions, and gestures. When he feels he no longer 
even knows where to begin their dialogue within this text, the woman recommends 
the following: “Tú eliges algo que te haya quedado inexpresado, sin poderlo 




something that you’ve always left unsaid, something you couldn’t communicate to 
anyone. Then we’ll toss the ideas around [literally: displace them] as if we were 
alone’ (67). They do not plan to fully state exactly what he was unable to express, but 
they attempt to throw it around, displace it, and pass it back and forth across the gap 
separating them, shifting and slipping around on the surface of the ideas, allowing 
their conversation to always exceed what is actually said.  
 Going unnoticed, opening an errant line of flight for politics, and being 
exposed within an impossible dialogue with an other in the construction of a 
democratic community can now be linked to what Levinas calls “saying” in 
Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. As opposed to the said that only states an 
essence as if it were a fact or a piece of easily transmittable information, saying is the 
condition of possibility for the unending communication of the other’s alterity: 
“Saying is communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all communication, as 
exposure. […] The unblocking of communication, irreducible to the circulation of 
information which presupposes it, is accomplished in saying” (48). Insofar as it 
unblocks communication and exposes the other’s alterity, saying requires a 
temporalization other than succession and regression, other than “a linear regressive 
movement, a retrospective back along the temporal series toward a very remote past” 
(10).  
 In my view, this ethical saying can be set along the path opened by the errant 
palindrome. Against the current of a temporally structured reading of the avant-garde, 
as Hal Foster makes possible in The Return of the Real, and against Plato’s linear 




“Khôra,” respectively, the flight of the errant palindrome goes unnoticed and passes 
back over that which was going unnoticed. This flight opens the conditions of 
possibility for saying, for exposing the unattended fragments and their attempts to 
communicate dissent and disagreement through a language that always remains 
irreducible to what is said and always exceeds any attempt at totalization or 
essentialization. Their exposed language is never revealed under the harsh lights of 
the public sphere, but instead remains only dimly lit among the shadows and lights of 
the era. This is the saying that the narrator and the woman go about exposing in their 
dialogues before deciding to end their brief, errant encounters and to go their separate 
ways. At the woman’s insistence, they turn their faces away from one another, thus 
closing the lines of communication temporarily opened in their dialogues. The 
question that remains concerns the extent to which this opening and exposure to 





The Potential of Failure 
 In retrospect, the Sixties in Latin America could quite easily be considered as 
an era of profound failures in the face of the one spectacular and seemingly 
insurmountable success—the transition from the modern national State to a 
transnational market logic that took place during the various dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes (Thayer 96 n. 2). These failures are numerous. The Boom failed 
to suture the gap between, on the one hand, the foundational gestures by which it 
celebrated its own cultural modernity on a global scale and, on the other, Latin 
America’s more general technological underdevelopment and neo-colonial status 
(Avelar Untimely 31–37). Buenos Aires, Havana, and Mexico City failed to secure 
their status as a global center for Western art in the eyes of Europe and the United 
States, since Latin American artists were often dismissed either as providing nothing 
new or innovative that had not already been achieved in Paris or New York City or as 
being too provincial or local for international tastes (Giunta 240–241). The Cuban 
Revolution failed to maintain its international support by even Leftist intellectuals in 
the wake of the Padilla Affair (Gilman 265–278). Those who nonetheless remained 
committed to armed revolutions—ranging from Guevara’s campaigns in the Congo 
and in Bolivia where he died, to the urban guerrilla cells, among them the Tupamaros 
in Uruguay and the Montoneros in Argentina—failed to recreate the military success 
of the Cuban Revolution in other countries (Halperín Donghi 338–360). These are, of 
course, just a handful of the most visible and well-known failures of the Sixties in 




ideology.57 In many regards, these are the failures of political and cultural paradigms 
that sought to transform the world through grandiose and often violent revolutions. 
They failed on their own terms; they sought different means in order to achieve their 
differing, but preconceived end goals.  
 In contrast, the politics of going unnoticed is only a means without ends; even 
if it eventually engages in an ethical opening of overly saturated political spaces, this 
was never an end goal it set for itself from the beginning. At the same time, going 
unnoticed is always a precarious state in which those who go unnoticed are always 
perceptible in the sense that they are capable of being perceived by an other. In order 
to engage in the sort of ethical communication of a saying that I detailed above, they 
must be perceived in the face of an other. The failure of the politics of going 
unnoticed is not an unfortunate outcome but rather the necessary conditions for this 
ethics to take place. The phrase “the potential of failure” is defined here as the 
likelihood and inevitability of failure for those who go unnoticed, as the possibility 
that arises from such a failure, and even as the desire or the necessity of such a failure 
in order to keep the future open to other ethical, political, and aesthetic interventions. 
 In all the texts analyzed so far, the climax of each plot leads to the ultimate 
failure of the protagonists. Those who go unnoticed fail by being perceived; 
afterward, they are often jailed or killed, not unlike the homo sacer. Maximiliano 
Konsideranksy’s cave-tower is penetrated by the media. The conscript in Vil & Vil 
fails to stop the General’s coup. Rebeca Linke is murdered by the masses she startled 
                                                
57 See, for example, Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 
1996) in which he critiques Francis Fukuyama’s discourse on the ends of history as 
well as the facile appropriations of such discourses by Western media to celebrate 




with her nude body. The anonymous narrator in Casey’s “La ejecución” is executed 
by the police after being accused of a crime he probably did not commit. Johnny, the 
cowboy, is killed by Gonzalo, the man who had earlier rescued and sheltered him. 
Yet, failure for those who go unnoticed is not just the unfortunate outcome of their 
endeavors; their entire enterprise is one surrounded by failures along every step of the 
way.  
 In Cruising Utopia, José Esteban Muñoz conceives of failure in contemporary 
performance by queers of color who engage in future-oriented projects; here he 
provides an insight into the way I understand the failure of those who go unnoticed. 
He defines failure as “not so much a failure to succeed as it is a failure to participate 
in a system of valuation that is predicated on exploitation and conformity” (Cruising 
174). Following Muñoz’s definition of failure “as active political refusal” (174), the 
failure of those who go unnoticed is only unsuccessful when interpreted from within a 
normative, moralizing framework that clearly delineates the distinction between the 
proper and the improper, the timely and the untimely. This failure is an active refusal 
to participate in exploitative or universalizing projects.  
 Going unnoticed was already in the first place a failure by those who arrived 
too late, by those who traced less timely but still contemporary itineraries through the 
already occupied cultural cartographies of their era. The next failure of those who go 
unnoticed takes place as a refusal—or a rejection, as Huberto prefers in Lapsus—to 
subscribe to such normative demands. Instead of moving in a Platonic fashion from 
the darkness of ignorance to the light of knowledge and the good, these subjects begin 




lines of flight that pass through the swirling shadows and lights of their era. As a part 
of the political gesture of going unnoticed, they go about opening a space for dissent, 
thus becoming exposed to the vigilant eyes and violent obstacles they previously 
desired to evade. By being perceived, they may be said to have failed to remain 
unnoticed; however, staying unnoticed, as opposed to temporarily going unnoticed, 
would vacate their political gestures of its ethics, of its potential to create an opening 
toward pandemonic, errant, or even other forms of dialogue not studied here. 
Therefore, this failure becomes the condition of possibility for enacting the ethics of 
being perceived.  
 Casey committed suicide in 1969; despite this detail that otherwise might 
tempt one to engage in an autobiographical reading of his more depressing fictions, 
he curiously leaves a dim glimmer of hope or potential for future dissensus toward the 
end of some of his texts. The incarcerated narrator in “Notas de un simulador,” for 
example, writes his account of what he was doing creeping around the city at night 
with the hope that some day someone might stumble across his version of the events. 
Whereas the juridical system wrongly accused him of murder and the mass media 
promptly circulated this story, he writes so that future readers might read against the 
current of this information in order to see him as the philanthropic caretaker he claims 
to be. He explains:  
A las toneladas de papel y los ríos de tinta que narrarán mi caso, impreso junto 
a otras deformaciones de la verdad para que lo lean millones de ojos 
extrañamente ávidos de novedades, sólo puedo oponer estos párrafos que 




obstáculos son tremendos pero sé que alguna vez llegarán estas líneas a 
conocerse. Esperemos. (90) 
‘To the tons of paper and the rivers of ink that will narrate my case, printed 
alongside other deformations of the truth so that they may be read by the 
millions of eyes that are surprisingly eager for novelty, I can only object with 
these paragraphs that I write with difficulty under the poor light that reaches 
where I work. The obstacles are enormous, but I know these words will come 
to be known. Let’s hope.’ 
 The spirit of Casey’s critique of the international press in the case of Boris 
Pasternak returns here. By considering this critique from the perspective of Levinas’s 
differentiation between the saying and the said, I view his condemnation of the mass 
media as a rejection of the media’s attempt to communicate easily consumable bits of 
information that give the appearance of complete truth and easy access to the total 
knowledge of an other, or in the case of the narrator of “Notas,” to the total 
knowledge of an other’s alleged crime. In opposition to this communication of a said, 
Casey’s narrator writes his own version by which he attempts to communicate a 
saying that is filled with gaps and misunderstandings that cannot be assimilated by 
the mass media or the legal system. Under the poor light of his jail cell—not the total 
light of knowledge—and by his own, externally unverifiable account, he offers an 
alternate and incomplete version of what he was doing when he attempted to go 
unnoticed around the city. Not only does he open up the closed narrative that 
condemns him publicly, but he also states with utmost certainty that his private words 




unlikeliness that he will be exonerated, he remains hopeful that at the very least his 
version of the story, the trace of an unverifiable past, will be disseminated to future 
readers. He locates, to borrow a phrase from José Esteban Muñoz, “a kernel of 
potentiality” after and despite this failure (Cruising 173). That is, he refuses to give 
up, he fails to fail while waiting in prison, thus opening up the potential to continue 
moving, erring, and engaging in dialogues, at least through his writing. 
 This future-oriented gaze and persistence despite failure brings me to my final 
reading of the long list of everything that Huberto rejects in Manjarrez’s novel, 
Lapsus (Algunos actos fallidos). At the end of this cartography of refusals and 
disagreements with the various positions and declarations that became public in the 
Sixties, the narrator concludes with perplexity that Huberto is not a nihilist: “Y ni 
siquiera tienes la decencia de ser nihilista sino que todavía andas sonriendo en la calle 
como si pudiese haber un milenio tras lomita” ‘And you don’t even have the decency 
to be a nihilist, but you still walk through the streets grinning as if there could ever be 
a millennium just around the corner’ (190–191). Huberto’s rejections are not an 
outright destruction but an active political refusal that nonetheless keeps walking 
toward some unknown horizon, despite the negativity, moralizing violence, and 
obstacles to political dissent, with a big grin on his face. In addition to opening up a 
line of flight by going unnoticed, his errancy also guarantees the perpetuation of these 
openings by refusing to permanently close them. Like Casey’s protagonist who keeps 
writing, Huberto continues walking along his errant paths despite his failure to have 
guaranteed his safety or to have secured a utopian future. “Utopia,” as Muñoz states, 




 An acceptance of failure as a necessary component of any future-oriented 
thought is indispensable for the ethics of being perceived. This ethics seeks to open a 
space for dialogue between subjects who are separated by an infinite, untraversable 
distance. The political gesture of going unnoticed attempts to open a space in which 
they can come into agonistic dialogue with one another through a language that does 
not communicate a said or seek to reduce the other’s alterity but through a language 
that attempts to communicate a saying. Such a saying is always incomplete and 
imperfect; therefore, it is always a failure and a refusal to communicate in a totalizing 
manner.  
 As Simon Critchley has demonstrated in The Ethics of Deconstruction, 
“Ethical dialogue should not result in the annulment of alterity, but in respect for it” 
(13). In his more recent study, Infinitely Demanding, he takes this conclusion even 
further by defining ethics as “commitment or fidelity to an unfulfillable demand,” that 
is, a commitment to the demand to respect the irreducible alterity of another subject 
(11). Critchley’s commitment is not the type of commitment demanded of 
intellectuals in the Sixties who must write for the end goal of producing or securing 
the revolution. This commitment is to uphold what Derrida has termed the promise of 
a democracy to come:  
So when I speak of a ‘democracy to come,’ I don't mean a future democracy, a 
new regime, a new organisation of nation-states (although this may be hoped 
for) but I mean this ‘to come’: the promise of an authentic democracy which is 
never embodied in what we call democracy. This is a way of going on 




our societies. This doesn't mean that ‘democracy to come’ will be simply a 
future democracy correcting or improving the actual conditions of the so-
called democracies, it means first of all that this democracy we dream of is 
linked in its concept to a promise. The idea of a promise is inscribed in the 
idea of a democracy: equality, freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press—all these things are inscribed as promises within democracy. 
Democracy is a promise. (“Politics” n. pag.) 
With this in mind, what those who go unnoticed demonstrate with their final failures 
is their acceptance of this impossibility to ever fully communicate through dialogue 
and their simultaneous commitment to continue erring along new lines of flight that 
can open up new avenues for future, imperfect dialogues even after being blinded by 
the harsh lights of the political arena. The ethics of being perceived imagines ways in 
which this promise of a future democracy can come, ways in which it has the 
potential to come.  
 At this point, I read Lapsus as a novel that radicalizes the ethical potential of 
the politics of going unnoticed by taking this failure to its extreme. The subtitle, 
(Algunos actos fallidos), which I translated as “some slips of the tongue” in the 
psychoanalytic sense could be rendered literally as “some failed acts.” The second 
translation of the title calls attention to how the narrative continually slips from one 
storyline to the next and fails to render a cohesive, linear plot. This failure, once 
more, is not just a lack of success but an active refusal to create a closed narrative that 
would neatly resolve its protagonists’ dilemmas in a perfectly timed denouement. The 




with no clear order in the first chapter and displaced throughout extensive end notes 
not unlike the bits of text thrown into the river by Somers’s male protagonist—is the 
simultaneous plane trip by Huberto Haltter and Humberto Heggo from Mexico to 
Paris with a layover in New York City. The narrator, in the first of his many end 
notes, clarifies the obvious meaning that fails to hide in the protagonists’ names: “En 
efecto, querido lector: Alter y Ego” ‘Precisely, dear reader: Alter and Ego’ (227). The 
similarity of their first names, only distinguishable by the letter “m,” further 
contributes to the obvious psychoanalytical influences that appear in the subtitle; the 
two protagonists seem to operate as a sort of split subjectivity who together might be 
read as a substitute for the narrator, as a projection of the writer’s desires, or as two of 
the alternate identities of the narrator who suggests he may be a schizophrenic. I 
hesitate to be clearer about these details, because the narrative leaves them quite 
unclear, often suggesting ideas that are later contradicted through a narrative voice 
whose identity is difficult to pin down.  
 Nevertheless, Huberto and Humberto appear in most cases as separate 
characters in the novel being seen or observed by the narrator who is also a 
protagonist; with a bit of a attention it is not completely impossible to distinguish 
between the two while reading. The first chapter and its endnotes help maintain this 
distinction. Huberto is a young, ex-student of architecture who only seems to wander 
from one activity to the next with no clear purpose; Humberto is a balding, middle-
aged architect who is bored with his wife, his family, and his job and chooses to leave 
it all behind. Their middle-class, bourgeois lives are filled with apathy and boredom, 




when not outright rejecting them and everything else in the Sixties. Their literal flight 
out of Mexico, therefore, seems not to be driven explicitly by the type of imminent 
violence as in the cases of the other characters studied in this chapter.  
 The final two chapters of the novel turn around and comment on what came 
before them, reading against their errant itinerary. Huberto and Humberto in the 
penultimate chapter get a chance to write about the novel and the author-narrator in 
their own composite voice. They describe him as follows: “Como todos los autores, 
es un ser: totalitario, petulante, prepotente, despótico, que quiere apantallar” ‘Like all 
authors, he is totalitarian, conceited, arrogant, tyrannical, and wants to impress’ (214). 
Despite the narrator’s constant displacing of the plot and the characters, they still 
accuse him of communicating a said, of attempting to construct a totality in his errant 
novel. Their main target, however, is the third to last chapter that suggests “el happy 
end” ‘a happy ending’ for the protagonists (213). To counteract this placating 
conclusion, they create a Questionnaire at the end of the penultimate chapter to 
facilitate the task of the reader to not only interpret but more importantly to 
“Interrogarlo TODO” ‘Interrogate EVERYTHING’ (216). The Questionnaire, in my 
view, is a way to anticipate and belittle many predictable interpretations of the novel, 
for example, as “protesta” ‘protest’; “para probar que ya no se puede escribir novela” 
‘as proof that one can no longer write a novel’; as “chiste” ‘a joke’; or even as a way 
to avoid censorship (217–219). More importantly, the questionnaire unfolds the 
previous chapter’s attempt to quickly wrap up the novel in a way that could leave the 
reader feeling content about the outcome of these events. Just before this 




they suggest that an alternate response to the novel or interpretation-interrogation of it 
would be to write another novel: “Carajo, hasta puede escribir una novela con más 
preguntas, o con las respuestas si así es de chingón” ‘Damn, you can even write a 
novel with more questions or with the answers if you’re such a big shot’ (217). In this 
chapter, Huberto and Humberto, the potential alter egos of the author-narrator-
protagonist, drive the novel off its course along another errant path, failing to reach 
any happy conclusions.  
 But this is not the last errant path. The final chapter errs yet again from these 
rejected conclusions and their proposed questionnaire leaving the novel irreparably 
open-ended. This chapter is narrated from Céline’s point of view; she was the flight 
attendant in the first chapter who then became both Huberto and Humberto’s lover in 
Paris. Now, in the final pages of the novel, she becomes the narrator and claims that 
neither Huberto nor Humberto actually went to Paris but rather that both returned 
from the United States on the next flight to Mexico, failing in their attempt to really 
flee their boring, bourgeois lives. According to her, Huberto was assaulted in the 
airport and offered a free return flight to Mexico by the airline, and “él lo aceptó de 
inmediato” ‘he accepted it immediately’ (221). Humberto also boarded the plane; 
Céline offers the following explanation: “Creo que porque su mujer le había llamado 
urgentemente por teléfono” ‘I think because his wife had called him urgently’ (221). 
This ending is the literal end of their line of flight at which they turn around and 
return to where they began; their points of departure and arrival are clearly marked. 
Céline has the last word in the novel, and if she is to be believed, then none of the 




errant itineraries of the two protagonists and the narrator through Paris, London, 
Vietnam, Huberto’s transformation into a dog, a tropical island where Humberto 
becomes a tribal leader, and their experience with LSD would be nothing more than a 
fictional narrative within the novel’s fictional world.  
 At once, Céline’s narrative provokes a rereading of the entire novel in reverse, 
one that even rereads Huberto and Humberto’s rereading of the novel’s failed, happy 
ending. Upon further interpretation-interrogation, Céline’s narrative, other than 
occupying the final fragmented space of the novel, does not necessarily have any 
more authority than Huberto and Humberto or than the author-narrator-protagonist. 
Her particular opening of the novel closes off their previous errant itineraries as a 
space of pure fiction. When all of these rejections and refusals to accept a particular 
version of the narrative come together as a fragmented, failed whole, the novel 
becomes one that is incapable of closing its boundaries and arriving at a consistent 
conclusion. It literally fails to end in any coherent manner, thereby committing to the 
impossible demand to open and reopen spaces for past, present, and future errant 
itineraries by others who go unnoticed or by others who enact quite different political 
gestures. In the end, failure regenerates the potential for future dialogues and the for 







…reves la ARTELETRA 
 
 I began by asking what possibilities there are for returning to the Sixties in 
Latin America, for seeing them again. ARTELETRA has been the word and figure that 
allowed me to see the Sixties again in a different, dimmer light. Reading ARTELETRA 
al vesre and al verse—in an imperfect reversal and in a way that allows for a 
different, contingent arrangement of texts and discourses to face one another and 
engage in dialogue—has served as the heuristic for reading against the currents of the 
cultural maps of the era. Without ever leaving the space of the Latin American 
Sixties, I adjusted my eyes to what I began to perceive right there on the surface—a 
cast of mostly anonymous protagonists spread throughout the works of Casey, Filloy, 
Manjarrez, and Somers who go unnoticed within the cultural and political landscapes 
of their fictional worlds. Some go unnoticed by chance, like most of the narratives in 
which they appear, but many of them actively choose to stay out of the spotlight. In 
general, they seek an alternative to the high-stakes debates, reductive antagonisms, 
rigid moral demands, and violence justified to obtain political and economic ends that 
characterize not only the Sixties, but many historical eras, including today.  
 What I claim to have located is how this refusal to participate in a political 
landscape by going unnoticed within it can generate the conditions of possibility to 
reconfigure that inescapable space. If my analysis is correct, then it follows that one 
does not have to seek visibility in the public sphere in order to engage in politics. This 
is not to dismiss all of those who do seek visibility within juridical frameworks as if 




undertaking. Nevertheless, I contend that these four very different authors, each in 
their own way, have imagined and created alternative forms of political participation 
in the midst of an era when almost everyone and every minority group was vying for 
visibility. The protagonists they created stay in the shadows when everyone else 
rushes onto the stage. They choose not to fight and shout their way into the spotlight. 
By going against the crowd, they stumble and begin to perceive a different type of 
political arena that opens the potential for dialogue without violence.  
 Without a doubt, there is something of a utopian ethos to this desire to 
imagine models for non-violent political spaces in the Sixties; in this way, these texts 
appear to be very much of their own time, to be contemporary texts. However, they 
never fall into the illusion that a perfect, conflict-free, truly utopian political space 
will come about simply by going unnoticed and later being perceived. Knowing that 
their utopia will never come and that their individual desires are never universal 
ideals sets them apart from those who would use violence to obtain a hegemonic 
position in the political arena. Going unnoticed, as I have said many times, is not a 
means to an end. Going unnoticed opens a space in which it becomes possible to 
imagine alternatives that have the potential to be successful and may just as easily end 
in failure.  
 The politics and ethics of going unnoticed would be truly irrelevant, and not 
just seemingly unimportant, if these gestures were nothing more than a historical 
anomaly from an era that today seems as distant as the Other in Levinas’s ethical 
theory. Going unnoticed is not by necessity limited to the Sixties in Latin America, 




untimeliness of going unnoticed is what makes it all the more contemporary in both 
senses of the word. The contemporary, for Agamben, is the one who can peer into the 
darkness of his or her era; being contemporary is not a matter of bringing visibility to 
the otherwise invisible, but allowing one’s eyes to be “struck by the beam of darkness 
that comes from his [or her] own time” (“What” 14). The contemporary is also that 
which is present today, the one who returns to the unlived experiences of the present 
regardless of whether they are archaic, recently historical, or modern: “It is in this 
sense that one can say that the entry point to the present necessarily takes the form of 
an archaeology that does not, however, regress to a historical past but returns to that 
part within the present that we are absolutely incapable of living” (17). Those 
protagonists who go unnoticed in the Latin American narratives of the Sixties are not 
only present today, but perhaps only today does it become possible to perceive them 
and their political and ethical gestures once the highly visible debates of that era 
recede into the past.  
 After the failures of the Sixties, after the political spotlight shifts from the 
Cold War to neoliberalism, globalization, and the Left Turn, after the ringing in our 
ears from the Boom fades, some of the unnoticed can be perceived. Some of the 
unnoticed of the Latin American Sixties whose potential for perception endured these 
past fifty years finally can pass into actuality today. The politics and ethics of going 
unnoticed, despite its contemporaneity, failed to be perceived in the past, but perhaps 
these gestures still can point toward possible alternatives within the contemporary 
landscape today. They may be successful in moving us toward that unforeseen 




materialize into a static regime, but this was never their goal. Nevertheless, after these 
failures the potential to generate alternate imaginaries of the Sixties and for today 
remains within that incessant movement of those who go unnoticed.  
 What I have learned from those who go unnoticed is that every time one 
arrives at an end or an obstacle, it is possible to turn around, to look at ARTELETRA 
from a new perspective, and to seek an alternate itinerary, while keeping a smile on 
my face just like Manjarrez’s Huberto keeps grinning despite all his rejections. There 
is a certain cynical optimism to this approach. By going down another path, my 
threshold of perception can change, and my ability to plot out a different narrative 
and to imagine a new horizon becomes possible. Perhaps what is needed today is to 
shake off the disillusionment of those who saw their political projects fail in the 
Sixties and to take up once more the type of utopian thought I described above. 
Perhaps it is time to ask what other futures, instead of dwelling in the tragedies of the 
past, are possible today. I will end, then, by asking once more the same question with 
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